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Abstract 
PERCEPTIONS OF TRANSFORMATION, REVOLUTION, IDEOLOGY 
AND GENDER AMONG MEMBERS OF THE TURKISH SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 
IN THE 1970s 
 
 
Emel Güner 
 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution, MA Thesis, 2012 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Gül Altınay 
 
 
Keywords: leftist movement, socialism, revolution, transformation, change, 
ideology, gender. 
 
 
This thesis attempts to examine the response of former leftist activists to the 
disintegration of their political movements and their integration into the rapidly 
liberalizing, capitalist order in Turkey after 1980. While previous research on the 
socialist movement in Turkey has mostly focused on the movement’s historical 
background, internal dynamics or on memories of activists as portrayed in memoirs, an 
analytical approach to changes in leftists’ socioeconomic status or ideology has 
remained either superficial or nonexistent. Based on open-ended interviews with over a 
dozen former activists, this thesis focuses on the “transformations” experienced by 
people who joined the leftist movement during the 1970s. How former activists consider 
their initial participation in different factions of the left; how their current 
socioeconomic status and quality of life affect their relationship to leftist ideology (faith 
in a socialist revolution, defining leftism, the idea of a capitalist society); and how they 
view the role of gender in the movement (feminism, intimate relationships, their 
manifestations and the effect of organizational structures) are some of the key questions 
that the thesis addresses. Throughout the thesis, the theme of “transformation”, whether 
in society or at an individual level, is examined in terms of ideology, socio-economic 
status, and gender. 
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ÖZET 
1970’LER TÜRKĐYE’SĐNDE SOSYALĐST HAREKETE KATILANLAR 
ARASINDA DÖNÜŞÜM, DEVRĐM, ĐDEOLOJĐ VE TOPLUMSAL CĐNSĐYET 
ALGILARI  
 
 
Emel Güner 
 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2012 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayşe Gül Altınay 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: sol hareket, sosyalizm, devrim, dönüşüm, değişim, ideoloji, 
toplumsal cinsiyet. 
 
 
Bu tez, sol hareket içerisinde yer almış bireylerin siyasi hareketlerinden kopuşlarına ve 
1980 sonrası Türkiye’sinin hızla liberalleşen kapitalist düzenine entegrasyon süreçlerine 
ilişkin cevaplarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Türkiye’de sosyalist harekete dair 
geçmiş yıllarda gerçekleştirilen araştırmalar, konunun tarihi arka planına, iç 
dinamiklerine ya da aktivistlerin anı kitaplarında betimlenen kişisel hatıralarına 
odaklanırken, sol görüşlü bireylerin sosyoekonomik konum ve ideolojik değişimlerine 
ilişkin analitik bir yaklaşım ya mevcut literatürde bulunmamaktadır ya da bu konu 
yüzeysel olarak incelenmiştir. 1970’ler Türkiye’sinde sol aktivizme katılmış on iki kişi 
ile gerçekleştirilen açık uçlu görüşmelere dayanan bu tez, bu kişilerin yaşadıkları 
“dönüşümlere” odaklanmaktadır. Görüşmecilerin fraksiyonlarına katılımlarını nasıl ele 
aldıkları, şu anki sosyoekonomik konum ve yaşam standartlarının sol ideoloji (sosyalist 
bir devrime olan inanç, solun tanımlanışı, kapitalist topluma dair görüşler) ile olan 
ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediği ve harekette toplumsal cinsiyetin (feminizm, romantik 
ilişkiler, bu ilişkilerin tezahürleri ve örgütsel yapıların bu konulara etkisi bağlamlarında) 
rolünü nasıl değerlendirdikleri bu tezde üzerinde durulan anahtar sorulardan bazılarıdır. 
Tez boyunca “dönüşüm” teması, toplumsal ya da bireysel seviyelerde; ideoloji, 
sosyoekonomik konum ve toplumsal cinsiyet açılarından incelenmektedir. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction  
We [on the left] have all changed. We used to say “revolution”, but now we 
know that isn’t going to happen. We used to say “classless society”. In one way 
or another we have all experienced integration to some degree. Some of us have 
settled down, some of us are just scraping by. But in the end none of us stayed 
the same. It wouldn’t even have been a good thing to stay the same, maybe. The 
ones who stayed the same are left stuck in leftist history. Do you understand? 
They didn’t go anywhere. They were worn out. They didn’t get over it. They 
couldn’t be a part of the past, or a part of today, they’re stuck in between. 
Purgatory is the worst to experience. Maybe that is why I say we’ve all changed. 
Maybe we didn’t just change, we were forced to change. (Engin) 
Listening to Engin’s words, I felt they pointed to something important about the Turkish 
leftist activists of the 1970s that was missing in my readings on the left today. The 
literature on Turkish leftism today consists mostly of memoirs nostalgic for the “golden 
age” of leftism on the one hand and political histories on the other. In this thesis, I 
attempt to examine the response of former leftist activists to the (dis)integration of their 
political movements and their integration into liberal/capitalist order in Turkey after 
1980. I mostly use open-ended interviews to examine the changes that the available 
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sources do not discuss. By focusing on the “transformations” these former activists 
underwent, this thesis will try to explain these responses to the left from the 
perspectives of ideology, socioeconomic status, and gender.  
The first transformation that my interviewees experienced was that of their 
initial participation in the leftist movement in various factions. All respondents defined 
their joining of a leftist group as a major turning point in their lives. Regardless of their 
faction choice, what was common in all responses was the effect of a person’s social 
network in adopting an activist leftist ideology. I show that joining the leftist movement 
was not a planned out process for my interviewees; rather, it was coincidental to a large 
extent, since it emerged from their interactions with the people who were already active 
in a leftist group. My interviewees depicted these people, whether family, friends, or 
acquaintance,—as the “catalysts” who initiated their introduction to their factions. 
Adopting a particular ideological stance was an important aspect of my respondents’ 
transformations, yet it often came later; and did not seem to be a determining factor that 
contributed to my interviewees’ faction choice in the first place. This transformation is 
the primary focus of Chapter 2. 
In terms of the economic transformations that my interviewees experienced, we 
can classify my interviewees into two groups. While the first group is made up of the 
research participants who climbed the social ladder and integrated into the capitalist 
system, the second group consists of individuals who cannot economically succeed and 
therefore who define themselves as persons marginalized from the system. In both of 
the groups I argue that the amount of money earned and the standards of living that my 
interviewees now have are treated as markers of their relationship to leftism. My 
interviewees in the first group accepted economic transformation; however, they also 
underline their protection of the “leftist soul” by describing a “bad relationship with 
money”. On the other hand, my interviewees who were in the second group emphasize 
their ideological stability, pointing to their economic backwardness. Their low standards 
are portrayed as a sign of their non-integration to the capitalist system but also the 
retention of their leftist values, which kept them away from earning money.  
In terms of ideological transformations, my interviewees touched on two points: 
first, their perception of leftism and their roles in the movement; second, their faith in a 
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socialist revolution and changes in this faith. On the first point, most of my interviewees 
define their political stance as leftist, basing their definition on loyalty for the basic 
values of the left. While rejecting the claim that they experienced a complete 
ideological transformation, they underline that they have adopted revised versions of 
their previous ideologies. In this sense, they each present unique definitions of “being a 
leftist”. This leftism is independent from any organizational bonds and is defined 
through equality, freedom and justice principles. On the second point (the faith in the 
materialization of the revolution), we can mention the existence of two groups. The first 
group is a small group that defends the preservation of their hope for the materialization 
of the revolution. This group is mostly made up of the interviewees who identified their 
socioeconomic status as “low”. According to this group, economic success determines 
the reputation and respect they feel they have in society. As self-described 
“unsuccessful” climbers of the social ladder, they say they are “outliers” in a capitalist 
Turkey. In this framework, it can be claimed that the faith in the materialization of 
revolution acts as a hope that will end the feeling of exclusion. On the other hand, the 
second group (those who felt integrated into the system and economically developed) 
displays much more of a distance to socialist ideologies and says that the revolution is 
an impossible expectation. These interviewees mention a “change” and an “evolution” 
rather than a classical revolution. The changes that were experienced by my respondents 
in terms of economic status and ideology are the topic of Chapter 3. 
Lastly, we will look at the transformations of my interviewees from a gender 
perspective. Despite the auxiliary position of women in the movement during the 1970s, 
today all my interviewees are aware of the invisibility of women in the movement and 
problematize this invisibility. While asserting that the secondary status of women was 
normal in the movement, considering the social conditions of the 1970s and the general 
perception in their factions, today they defend free, equal, and independent participation 
for women in ideological platforms and in social life. On the other hand, a skeptical 
approach towards the idea of “feminism” is still held by many of my interviewees, since 
they consider feminism a divisive, foreign, and opportunistic movement that arose out 
of the suppression of the leftist movement. In the context of gender roles, we will also 
look at intimate relationships in the movement. In contrast to the restrictive role of 
organizations on my interviewees’ private lives, today they reject any kind of 
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intervention in their private lives. According to their responses, we see two reasons that 
caused this transformation: Firstly, none of my interviewees have connection with an 
organization. To put it differently, there is no organizational unit that they are loyal to in 
their current lives which could act as a sanctioning power in comparison to the 1970s. 
Secondly, while the ideal of revolution used to be the most important goal, today most 
of my respondents do not hold such an ideal. Therefore the perceived tradeoff between 
the organizational commitment/materialization of revolution and the desire for an 
intimate relationship does not exist anymore. My interviewees no longer support 
sacrificing emotions in the name of ideals. Thus, they only accept themselves as the sole 
authority in their private lives. This aspect of my respondents’ ideas about their 
participation in the left will be examined in Chapter 4.  
1.2.  Literature Review 
When we look at the current literature regarding the left in Turkey, we see two 
main types of sources: memoirs and academic works. Memoirs on the leftist movement 
are literary works depicting the leftist wave in Turkey over the generations of ‘68 and 
‘78 and are based on the personal narratives of the people involved in the leftist 
movement1. These works generally reflect nostalgia for the leftist movement. The vast 
majority of academic works on the left, meanwhile, focus on the movement’s history 
and ideology. I argue that the current literature discusses the historical background of 
the leftist movement in Turkey without questioning the transformation of the 
individuals involved in them. This thesis is an attempt to fill that gap. First, however, in 
this section, I will look at the discussions related to the Turkish left that focus on the 
evolution of leftism as well as the debates it faced throughout the 1970s and after the 
1980 coup. 
                                                            
1 Prominent works in this category of literature include Sezai Sarıoğlu (2001) Nar Taneleri, Nadire Mater 
(2009) Sokak Güzeldir: 68’de Ne Oldu?, Haşim Akman (2010) Otuz Yıldır 12 Eylül Yaşayanlar 
Anlatıyor.  
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1.2.1.  A Brief History of Leftism in the 1970s 
When we look at the Republican period in Turkey, we see that the first 
interaction between the USSR, and accordingly communism, and Turkey started during 
the War of Independence. In this context, the establishment of The Communist Party of 
Turkey [TKP, Türkiye Komünist Partisi] in 1920, in Baku, Azerbaijan which was a part 
of the Soviet Union then can be considered as a major turning point. The USSR 
considered the Turkish War of Independence as an anti-imperialist struggle and hence 
backed Atatürk and saw him as a leader who should orient the country towards 
socialism (Belge, 2009, p. 9).  
Another important development in the early years of the Republic was the 
establishment of the Kadro movement. In the early 1930s, the journal of Kadro began to 
be published and until the ban imposed on its publication in its third year, it continued 
to be a significant venue for the development of the Turkish left. In the journal Kadro, 
while Turkey was portrayed as an underdeveloped country where there was no capitalist 
development worth mentioning and no capitalist or proletarian class in any real sense, 
the cadres that took part in the journal tried to develop a theory for a Kemalist project 
which had socialist elements in it. However, although they had a socialist vision their 
formulation was centered around the idea of a “democratic and national” revolution 
which was assumed as a necessary stepping stone in a movement towards socialism. 
The idea of a “democratic and national revolution” which was proposed by Kadro left a 
strong mark in intellectual and political history and constituted the basic departure point 
of Turkish socialism in the coming years (Belge, 2009, pp. 9-10).   
After the Kadro movement, another important turning point in the history of the 
Turkish left was the establishment of the Yön [Direction] journal in 1961. In the 1960s, 
Marxist socialism spread among the more educated social strata, primarily students and 
the urban intelligentsia. The political freedoms guaranteed under the 1961 constitution 
enabled the socialists to express their views and from various political organizations. At 
the same time, most socialists were influenced strongly by Kemalist nationalism. In 
1961, the weekly Yön emerged as a platform for leftist writers to advocate for a “non-
capitalist way”. At about the same time that Yön came out, TĐP [Türkiye Đşçi Partisi, 
The Workers’ Party of Turkey] was established. TĐP defined itself as a legal party that 
6 
 
defended legalism which meant an open support for parliamentary struggle. However, 
the leftist factions out of TĐP claimed that the program of TĐP was irrelevant with the 
conditions in Turkey. Thus a competition between the idea of “democratic revolution” 
and the socialist program of TĐP came to surface (Belge, 2009, pp. 10-12).  
In the second half of the 1960s, a group of former TKP members propounded the 
idea of National Democratic Revolution [Milli Demokratik Devrim, MDD] in response 
to the impasse on the left which they believed was created by the TĐP’s reaction to the 
occupation of Czechoslovakia2 (Alpat, 1998, p. 178; Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 150).  
The MDD group saw the ideology of Kemalism as a starting point for action; 
they understood Kemalism as a revolutionary ideology which was anti-imperialist, anti-
feudal, national, and independent. According to MDD, the Kemalist revolution had been 
interrupted, the present status of proletariat was weak, and there was political and social 
backwardness in the country. Therefore, according to this view, a new national 
revolution was an absolute necessity before socialism. Civilian and military public 
figures known to be Kemalists were given prominence in the movement (Şener, 2010, 
pp. 175-179). MDD thus seemed to be defending not a strictly socialist revolution, but 
an “anti-feudal” or “democratic revolution” in which it was legitimate to cooperate with 
the “national” segment of the bourgeoisie (Yurtseven, 2008, p.84). What MDD 
defended was an alliance between the youth, peasantry, proletariat, state officials, and 
military. The most common motto of the period was “the army and youth hand in hand” 
[ordu gençlik elele] (Belge, 2007, p. 37).  
To be more precise, with the influence of MDD movement, the 1960s of Turkey 
was under the effect of the idea of an intervention by the military using an alliance of 
the “radical, patriotic and progressive officers” and the left in order to provide a top-
                                                            
2 The TĐP was established in 1961 by a group of union members (Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 93). In a short time 
the party became the voice of the left in Turkey and in 1965 elections TĐP entered the parliament with 15 
deputies. In the second half of the 1960s, TĐP experienced an internal crisis. With the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union the party divided into two. General president Mehmet Ali Aybar 
split from Behice Boran and her friends, who supported this occupation. Later, the party experienced 
conflict with the MDD, ASD, PDA, and Emek groups. Before the coup of 1971, it was closed down by 
the Constitutional Court (Aykol, 2010, pp. 43-43).  
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down social transformation (Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 62; Belge, 2009, p. 12). However, it 
was not possible to see the army and youth hand in hand; because it was not realistic to 
expect a peaceful relationship between the army and youth while youth was fighting 
against the police, another armed unit of the state (Belge, 2007, p. 37). The leftist youth 
needed a different platform to mobilize. In 1969 MDD supporters transformed the 
intellectual circles of the Federation of Idea Clubs3[Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu, FKF] 
into an organization they called “Dev-Genç”, the Turkish Revolutionary Youth 
Federation [Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu] (Aykol, 2010, p. 52; Alpat, 1998, 
pp. 104-105; Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 214). Dev-Genç thus became a youth organization 
that supported MDD. Although Dev-Genç existed only for two years and was closed 
down after the coup of 1971, its heritage continued to produce influential actors for the 
Turkish left throughout the 1970s. 
By 1970, MDD started to face ideological challengers, and this shake-up also 
created a crisis in Dev-Genç (Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 258). The cadres in Dev-Genç sought 
other options for the revolution, including more radical solutions. In this environment, 
guerilla struggle emerged as a key concept. Thus with this idea the cadres that took part 
in Dev-Genç later became the founders of THKP-C [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-
Cephesi], THKO [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu], TĐĐKP [Türkiye Đhtilalci Đşçi Köylü 
Partisi] and TKP-ML [Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist Leninist] (Aykol, 2010, p. 
52).   
How did guerilla war become the main dynamic in the Turkish left? With the 
coup of 19714, the left-wing officers that aimed to organize a leftist coup were 
                                                            
3 Federation of Idea Clubs [Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu, FKF]: FKF was established in 1965 and with its 
establishment the anti-imperialist tendencies in the youth started to develop in a socialist direction. In 
1969 its name was changed and it became Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation [Türkiye Devrimci 
Gençlik Federasyonu, Dev-Genç] (Alpat, 1998, pp. 104-105).  
4 The events of 1971 are also known as the memorandum of March 12 and considered a semi-coup. On 
March 12, 1971 the Turkish Military, claiming to be “annoyed” with the insufficient activities of the 
present government and worsening domestic strife, published a memorandum. As a result Süleyman 
Demirel (the prime minister of the government) resigned and a technocratic government was established 
as a body above all political parties. Thus an oppression process started in Turkey in which democracy 
was cut, the leaders of the youth movement were captured, imprisoned and executed, and there were 
attempts to restore social order by force (Alpat, 1998, p. 202). 
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suppressed by their superiors and leftist militants were captured and tortured by the 
military. As a result, the perception of ‘The Army and Youth Hand in Hand’ [Ordu 
Gençlik Elele] and the left’s mystical faith in the junta came to an end (Samim, 1981, 
pp. 72-73). Also, due to the state violence after the coup of 1971, the view that Turkey 
would end up with a military dictatorship rather than a progressive military intervention 
emerged. With the termination of the dream of a progressive military intervention, the 
leftist movement gradually radicalized and a leftist-led guerilla struggle emerged as an 
option to reach the dream of revolution (Akın, 2007, p. 96). 
In fact, as of 1968, the left felt that the revolution was the “only way” forward, 
and every means were considered as permissible to reach this ideal. Arms had already 
entered into the leftist movement as a defense reflex against the attacks of far-right 
nationalists. The perceived obligation to defend the movement legitimized the use of 
arms by the left, while the existence of armed organizations also rationalized the idea of 
an armed revolution. In addition, one segment of the youth was under the influence of 
the idea of guerilla war: Some Turkish revolutionaries were fascinated with the brave 
struggles in Latin America, Algeria, Congo, Vietnam, and Palestine, and the idea of 
encircling the cities from the countryside. At the same time, the dominant view among 
most of the leftist factions was that to support parliamentarianism was to remain 
passive. In this environment the struggle of the well-established Workers’ Party of 
Turkey [Türkiye Đşçi Partisi, TĐP] for a peaceful revolution was considered impossible, 
since the parliamentary means were blocked by the election threshold and the removal 
of the national remainder system5 [milli bakiye sistemi] in the 1969 elections. The 
removal of the national remainder system reduced the chance of the TĐP to enter 
parliament almost to zero. This is why the many who supported the left were persuaded 
by the impossibility of a peaceful transition to socialism. According to this emerging 
                                                            
5 The national remainder system was a system in which the votes of a party that could not get the 
necessary minimum quotient were pooled and then reallocated on a national basis. Thus rather than the 
absolute majority of a single party in the parliament, the system aimed at a proportional representation of 
small parties. This system was only applied in the election of 1965 (Hale, 1980, pp. 404-405). 
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point of view, even if the regime was “captured” by peaceful means, it could not be 
protected by peaceful or constitutional mechanisms. Therefore, arms would be the 
guardian of the newly established socialist regime. Under these circumstances, 
defending parliamentarianism meant to give in to passivity, and most factions resorted 
to armed struggle to materialize the revolution (Baydar & Ulagay, 2011, pp. 100-101; 
Akın, 2007, pp. 96-98; Kürkçü, 2007, pp. 496-497).        
In addition to these factors that rationalized the use of arms, the ability the leftist 
movement to operate freely was restricted by the alliance between the state institutions 
and ultranationalist ülkücü groups. On the one hand, the 141st and 142nd articles of the 
Turkish criminal code, which banned the formation of communist groups [örgütlenme] 
in the country, made the continued development of the socialist struggle nearly 
impossible. On the other hand, police operations, arrests, attacks against students, 
violence, torture and the cooperation between the police and the ülkücü movement 
showed that the “powers that be” would not allow the revolution. Consequently, armed 
struggle emerged in the 1970s as a phase of revolution that would save the leftist 
movement from its existing crisis (Kürkçü, 2007, pp. 494-497).  
While radicalization was escalating and violent means were gaining legitimacy, 
MDD encountered opposition from groups who considered MDD’s approach too 
passive or bourgeois, including the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of 
Turkey Turkey[Türkiye Đhtilalci Đşçi Köylü Partisi, TĐĐKP], founded by Doğu Perinçek 
and his friends in 1969. These groups broke off from MDD, tying their hopes to armed 
struggle and guerilla war (Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 240; Akkaya, 2007, p. 801; Yusufoğlu & 
Anadol, 2007, p. 478). Two factions had arisen by 1970: The “Red Light” faction 
[Kırmızı Aydınlık or Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergisi, the socialist journal Light] and the 
“White Light” faction, or PDA [Beyaz Aydınlık or PDA, Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık, the 
journal Proletarian Revolutionary Light]. These would split further as the 1970s 
continued (Akkaya, 2007, p. 801). 
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1.2.2.  The Major Factions of the Left in the 1970s 
 
1.2.2.1. TKP-ML/TĐKKO 
Like its predecessor MDD, PDA encountered internal divisions as early as 1971. 
Đbrahim Kaypakkaya and some of his friends criticized the ideological stand of the party 
and established TKP-ML/TĐKKO [Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist Leninist/Türkiye 
Đşci ve Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, The Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist Leninist/The 
Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army] (Aydınoğlu, 2008, p. 285). TKP-
ML/TĐKKO was a movement which chose the poor peasantry as the target audience and 
formulated people’s war in a Maoist line. According to TKP-ML, Turkey was a semi-
feudal country and working class was weak. Therefore there was a need for a people’s 
war organized especially around peasantry and based on siege of cities from the 
countryside. The basic dialectic in Turkey was defined as that between the existence 
both of feudalism and of masses of people [halk yığınları]. With the revolution, 
focusing on peasants and land reform but led by the proletariat, this dialectic would be 
resolved and imperialism would lose its base (Akkaya, 2007, p. 802; Akın, 2007, p. 99, 
Yurtsever, 2008, pp. 152-154). The distinguishing feature of the approach of 
Kaypakkaya and accordingly TKP-ML/TĐKKO was their definition of Kemalism, 
which was considered a partial or petit bourgeoisie revolution by other revolutionary 
organizations. In contrast, Kaypakkaya formulized Kemalism, too, as fascism (Bora, 
2007, p. 858). 
1.2.2.2. THKO 
THKO [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, The People’s Liberation Army of 
Turkey] was established in 1971 by Deniz Gezmiş and his friends, who broke away 
from Dev-Genç (Lüküslü, 2009, p.84). While they promoted a “completely independent 
Turkey”, there are very few sources regarding the THKO’s institutional perspective, 
because the founders of THKO considered revolution an issue that could be 
materialized through action rather than books, theory, or ideological journals (Atılgan, 
2007, p. 701). According to THKO, armed struggle was a necessity, because there was a 
duality in the society: imperialism and its traitorous allies on one side, with patriotic 
11 
 
revolutionaries, workers, peasantry, and low-ranked state officials on the other. The 
basic dialectic here was between imperialism and its collaborators, and the people [halk] 
(Atılgan, 2007, p. 702).     
THKO adopted guerilla tactics as their basic struggle method, since it rejected 
the parliamentary struggle, which it defined as a system that put “reactionaries” into 
power (Atılgan, 2007, p. 702). Thus the militants of THKO went to the al-Fatih camps 
in Palestine to train for an armed struggle that would be materialized from the 
countryside to the cities. In this struggle, THKO defended that people’s war should be 
waged against imperialism and the ones who would struggle were the peasants not the 
workers (Akın, 2007, p. 98). 
The coup of 1971 came as a severe blow to THKO. The leading cadres were 
either captured or killed6. The remaining cadres of THKO were released from prison 
with the amnesty of ’74 and started publishing the journal Halkın Kurtuluşu [People’s 
Salvation] in 1976. In the following process, Halkın Kurtuluşu was accepted as the legal 
name of the organization. Initially the Halkın Kurtuluşu faction analyzed such issues as 
“social imperialism”, “three-worlds theory”, and anti-fascism by adopting the Chinese 
model as its template for revolution. However, The Communist Party of China was later 
also criticized by the faction, which began to switch its support to Albania (Belge, 2007, 
p. 39; Aykol, 2010, pp. 74-75). 
1.2.2.3. THKP-C 
In 1971 MDD underwent another separation and Mahir Çayan, Yusuf Küpeli, 
Münir Ramazan Aktolga and Ertuğrul Kürkçü, who could not reach consensus with 
MDD supporters, established THKP-C [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, the 
People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey]. Çayan and his friends saw the probability 
of ending up with a military dictatorship higher than a progressive coup. Therefore they 
                                                            
6 Sinan Cemgil, Kadir Manga, and Alparslan Özdoğan were killed in a counter militant operation in 
Nurhak; Cihan Alptekin and Ömer Ayna were killed in Kızıldere; Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin Đnan, and 
Yusuf Aslan were executed.  
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supported a people’s war based on the alliance between workers and peasantry. This 
war would be waged from the countryside to the cities where the imperialist oppression 
was minimal (Akın, 2007, p. 98; Atılgan, 2007, p. 696). THKP-C had defined 
imperialism as an internal phenomenon. There was an artificial balance [suni denge] 
between imperialism and capitalism and an armed struggle, carried out by the proletariat 
and led by the intellectuals, was necessary to terminate this balance (Atılgan, 2007, p. 
698). 
In 1972, the leading cadres of the organization, excluding Ertuğrul Kürkçü, were 
killed in Kızıldere during a firefight. With the killing of the leaders, the movement lost 
power and support. In the following years, internal criticisms and conflicts within 
THKP-C resulted in the emergence of two mass movements: Dev-Yol7 [Revolutionary 
Way, Devrimci Yol] and Kurtuluş8 [Liberation] (Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 313).  
1.2.3.  The Inner Competition in the Left in the 1970s 
While the escalating polarization between the revolutionaries [devrimciler] and 
far right nationalists [ülkücüler] was turning into a bloody confrontation, the number of 
                                                            
7 Dev-Yol entitled the regime in Turkey as colonial type fascism [sömürge tipi faşizm] and claimed that 
the alliance between imperialism and bourgeoisie was organizing fascism top-down with the help of the 
state. In this formulation the state units were identified as official fascists who enforced fascism and 
ülkücü movement which was assumed as the collaborator of the state units was named as civil fascist 
movement (Erdoğan, 2007, pp. 265; Pekdemir, 2007, pp. 748-752). Dev-Yol criticized the revolution 
understanding that was completely taken from the Soviet Union, China or Albania. It emphasized the 
necessity of a model that was specific to Turkey by considering the social and political conjuncture in the 
country rather than the copied methods (Erdoğan, 2007, p. 269).  Its revolution formula was based on the 
Leninist theory of revolution: the capture of state mechanisms from down to top by terminating the 
existing units, the construction of socialism under the proletariat dictatorship from top to down. 
Undoubtedly in order to materialize this there was the need of an armed struggle (Pekdemir, 2007, p. 
754).  
8 Kurtuluş was a movement that arose out THKP-C and positioned itself by criticizing the practice and 
theory in THKP-C. In this direction, a new course was set and the thesis of THKP-C such as Kemalism, 
Kurdish question, öncü savaşı was critically analyzed. In 1976 Kurtuluş Sosyalist Dergi [KSD-Socialist 
Journal of Liberation] was published. In 1977 the newspaper Kurtuluş was published. Like Dev-Yol, 
Kurtuluş also did not take stand with the Soviet Union and China rather it adopted a middle way in 
between those (Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 370; Aykol, 2010, pp. 72-73).  
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extremist organizations also increased on the left. The emergence of an extremely high 
number of small organizations that adopted different revolution methods in the political 
arena has come to be known as “over-factionalization” (Sayarı, 2010, p. 202). These 
groups not only directed their hostility against the nationalist groups, but also against 
their fellow revolutionaries who chose different methods. There was an intra-group 
violence that stemmed from ideological differences, conflicting international 
sympathies, a struggle for the leadership of leftist militancy, and the adoption of force 
as a means of discipline, authority and solidarity (Sayarı, 2010, p. 202; p. 205). 
When we look at the period, it can be claimed that there was also mass support 
[kitlesellik] and institutionalization with the establishment of several socialist parties. 
However, this was not pointing to a united power for the left, because despite the rapid 
growth and the visual magnitude that it had, there was also splitting that gradually 
reached drastic dimensions. The left was suffering from over-division such that when it 
was 1980, there were more than 50 factions, organizations and groups that defined 
themselves as leftist (Aydınoğlu, 2007, p. 278; Lipovsky, 1992, p. 164). 
Inescapably, in this over-divided atmosphere, politics was practiced on the basis 
of conflicts rather than solidarity between different factions. The initial political 
discussions were mainly imprisoned in the superficial discussions of a world revolution 
which based either on the Soviet Union or China model. Which model one faction chose 
to follow in the revolution struggle determined the faction’s character, its allies and 
enemies. Since these two models were considered as irreconcilable, the factions who 
chose different models excluded and worked against each other. Consequently, factions 
evaluated the social and political context by limited horizons which trapped in their firm 
belief for the rightness of the chosen method (Ünüvar, 2007, p. 886).  
In addition to this, there were also problems that stemmed from the personal 
differences of the leaders, differences in the revolution strategies, and clash of interests 
between different factions. Baydar (2011) explains the existence of such problems with 
personal differences and asserts that the absolute infusibleness in the leftist arena was a 
product of personal weaknesses, mistrusts, and showdowns (Baydar & Ulagay, 2011, p. 
279). The desire of leading the leftist movement was highly tempting and inevitably the 
people who were in the claim of leadership organized and constituted their separate 
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organization with their followers due to these temptations. This tendency not only led to 
a division in the leftist front which would block the unity of action but also caused the 
emergence of an intense competition between the factions that were in the same 
ideological line (Belge, 2007, p. 40).  
As a result, the strong tendency of over-grouping led to mutual accusations 
among the factions and thus the energy of the left was consumed in this competition 
environment and wasted with the struggles and conflicts within the left (Akın, 2007, p. 
103). In this environment, the differences between the factions were not leading to 
development of new perspectives by combining different ideas; rather they were 
escalating the rivalry (Silier, 2007, p. 441). The left was dominated with 
miscommunication, obstruction of dialogue possibilities and development of hostile 
attitudes between the factions which were considered each other as rival or even enemy 
entities. There was a constant inability in terms of reaching consensus in the left such 
that even the factions that were ideologically close were unable to unite and construct a 
front. Thus mutual disagreements could not be overcome and cooperation among 
factions could not be provided in the left (Lipovsky, 1992, pp. 148-152; p. 160). 
1.2.4.  The Coup of 1980 and Aftermath 
Knowing what happened between the 1970s and today is key to understanding 
how my interviewees view their activist past and their position in society today. During 
this period, leftist organizations lost most of the influence they held in society and the 
prospects of carrying out their desired “revolution” collapsed. In this section, I will look 
at how the current literature on the topic describes the process experienced by the left in 
the 1980s. This process has three major prongs: political, economic and social. 
Therefore after a brief introduction of the coup of 1980, we will look at these three 
prongs.  
On September 12, 1980, the military took power with the claim of ending the 
political instabilities, fixing the worsening economy and calming growing public fear 
from the terror on the streets (Akman, 2010, p. 19; Aydınlı, 2009, p. 585). Under the 
military rule, parties were closed down, parliament was dissolved, strikes, membership 
to unions and associations, union activities and political activities of all political leaders 
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were banned. Local governments were replaced by the military leaders and the media 
and political activity freedom and university autonomy were taken away. In the long 
run, the military weakened the organization of parties by restricting the creation of new 
party organizations and banning the establishment of party branches. The structure of 
the parliament, party system and electoral law were changed and the new regime 
imposed a ban on any kind of activity that it considered as detrimental to the society and 
to national wealth (Dall’agnoll, 2006, p. 71; Mohapatra, 2011, p. 153).  
After the coup of 1980, the military government claimed to restore order and 
ensure stability in the country. With this aim the state oppressed the left since it was 
considered a detrimental element for national unity (Belge, 2009, p. 17). In this process 
a large number of leftists9 underwent a harsh imprisonment and torture process that 
caused societal level fear which kept many of them away from politics (Ahıska & 
Yenal, 2006, p. 40). Thus while the left was dissolving due to the state violence and 
pressure that it was exposed to, there were also other changes that the left had to 
confront. We can look at this process from three aspects: Political, social and economic. 
1.2.4.1. Political Transformations 
In the post-coup period the military contributed to the rise of political Islam in 
Turkey by using Islam in order to combat against communism and leftist ideologies. 
After the coup, the junta regime promoted an understanding of Islam that could be 
promoted by the “secular” state. In a sense, Islam was used as a depoliticizing force and 
social glue which could keep people away from socialist and Marxist ideologies and 
                                                            
9 According to the research results indicated by ntvmsnbc, 650.000 people were taken into custody, 
230.000 people were put on trial (7.000 people were put on trial with the death penalty and 517 of them 
received the death penalty. Among the ones who received the death penalty, 51 were executed. One of 
them was a militant of ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), 23 of them were 
juridical criminals [adli suçlu], 18 of them were leftists, and 8 of them were ülkücü.) During the military 
regime, 300 people died in “suspicious ways”, 171 deaths were documented as “resulting from torture”, 
30.000 people got laid off from their jobs with the excuse of “being prejudicial” [sakıncalı], 14.000 
people were expatriated, 30.000 people fled abroad as political refugees (Cömert, 2012).   
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movements. As a consequence of this situation, different versions of Islam emerged as 
alternatives to fill the gap in the sociopolitical life which came into existence due to the 
extinguishment of the left. While state-controlled religion entered into daily life as a 
part of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the tripod of “the family, the mosque, and the 
barracks” became central to state practices (Arat Koç, 2007, p. 43; Rabasa and 
Larrabee, 2008, p. 37) 
In addition to this, as a part of the state violence of the post-coup period, many 
Kurds who took place in the leftist movement were captured, jailed or killed. On the one 
hand, the violence and torture in prisons fed the anti-state feelings and contributed to the 
establishment of an armed organization to defend the Kurdish cause (Karakaya Polat, 
2008, p. 76). On the other hand, a reaction emerged in the Kurdish community against 
the coup regime which wanted to assure the termination of the Kurdish insurgence by 
controlling and shaping Kurdish identity. The state pressure and authority backed an 
assimilation policy. In this environment, the Kurdish movement became more identified 
by ethnicity than leftist politics (Robins, 1993, p. 662). 
1.2.4.2. Economic Transformations 
Until the 1980s Turkey’s economy was based on an economic structure called 
import-substitution industrialization which focused on the protection of the domestic 
market. State involvement, regulation of markets and protectionism were the core 
principles during the implementation of this economic policy. With the economic crises 
of the 1970s, the bourgeoisie showed their dissatisfaction and proposed freedom from 
the state with the adoption of the export oriented liberal economic model. The 
bureaucracy had to be forgone since it was an obstacle in front of the free market’s 
procession and this perceived necessity was pointing to a reduction in the role of the 
state. At that point, a consensus that supported the neo-liberal transformation which was 
on behalf of the bourgeoisie was reached between the bourgeoisie, military rulers, 
international organizations, and representatives of these international organizations such 
as the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, instead of keeping the welfare-state 
understanding which gave priority to the welfare of disadvantaged classes, the state 
looked after the upper classes’ and international creditor’s interests (as cited in Şener, 
2004, p. 7, p. 19). 
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With the adoption of export-led growth, neo-liberalism’s effect started to be felt 
in economic life. Free market economy, deregulation, foreign trade, opening to outside, 
interest rate liberalization, privatization, minimization of state interventionism and 
social expenditures of state became the major topics during that transformation. The 
foundations of these transformations were laid with the introduction of the January 24 
measures in 198010. The military coup terminated all kinds of social and political 
opposition (including strikes and union organizing) and this situation enabled the 
transition to and implementation of neo-liberalism. There was also a social consent 
which was provided through the discourse of neo-liberalism as the best option to 
overcome the hardships of the economic crisis. This discourse was rendered more 
believable with the propaganda made by Turgut Özal and his government when he came 
to power (as cited in Şener, 2004, p .13; Arat Koç, 2007, p. 41).    
If we have a closer look at the economic model adopted in the 1980s, we see that 
integration to the global markets was made possible partially by the liberalization of 
commodity trade. As a part of this liberalization, the controls on foreign capital 
                                                            
10 The January 24 Measures: During the 1970s, there was a shortage in most of the consumption goods 
including the basic ones, as an indicator of the economic crisis. The government, which was 
overwhelmed with debts, encountered a serious difficulty in terms of repayments. In addition, the 
inflation was rising as a reflection of the economic instability. In this economic context an economic 
program which aimed to overcome the effects crises was introduced in the early 1980. This package 
which was called the January 24 measures, was aiming to empower domestic capital. It suggested leading 
the political life according to the necessities of the economy. Thus, according to the assumed necessities, 
it allowed market forces to reign freely with less governmental intervention in the economy, readjustment 
of the tax system, deregulation of the labor market and privatization. This economic package was a road 
map for a rooted change and also a list of main recommendations to suppress the class movements and 
solution of leadership problem in political life (Dall’agnoll, 2006, p. 68). The January 24 Measures had 
two dimensions:  Firstly, it aimed to create a development model that was export oriented. Secondly it 
wanted to sustain this export oriented model with economic liberalization (as cited in Bali, 2002b, p. 26). 
After the coup, military rule put the January 24 Measures into effect. However, despite the claim of 
repayment of the foreign debts and assuring stability, decisions were basically aiming to terminate the 
obstacles that could hinder the transformation from the import substitute industrialization to the foreign 
expansion (Çay, 2006, pp. 68-69). The main goal was increasing the foreign trade and promoting foreign 
investment. In order to do that, Turkish lira made a convertible currency and thus, economy could follow 
an export led liberal path (Dall’agnoll, 2006, p.68; Kaya, 2007, p. 32). 
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transactions were eliminated and convertibility of the Turkish Lira was declared in 1989 
in the name of “global financial competition”. Along with the export revenues which 
increased with the export subsidization and discretionary devolution policies, foreign 
debt accumulation became one of the main mechanisms for financial trade liberalization 
(Boratav et al., 2000, pp. 3-5).  
In this direction, the first step in the liberalization of the economy became the 
termination of the existing trade restrictions via the cancellation of the quota list, the 
reductions of deposit requirements on industrial imports and provision of tariff 
exemptions on imported intermediate products. Also, export credits and elimination of 
export licensing requirements were used in order to support export. However, due to the 
misuse of these incentives with the practice of “fictitious exports” (i.e. over invoicing), 
export credits left its place to direct subsidies in 1985. The boom in exports continued 
with the introduction of the flexible exchange rate regime. Initially the determination of 
exchange rates was done by the Central Bank; however, this duty was assigned to 
market forces through the means of newly established Foreign Exchange Market in 
1988. Thus, Turkey turned into a country which was described as the “paragon of 
export-led growth” and an inspiring example of stabilization and liberalization (Çeçen 
et al., 1994, pp. 44-46).    
Taking these steps, Turkey was rapidly shifting to a neo-liberal economy. Since 
the 1980s, neo-liberalism, as a principle of economic thought and management, has 
become widespread throughout the world. Neo-liberal theory propounds that “human 
wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, 
free market, free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). In this theoretical structure, the role of the 
state is defined as creation and preservation of an institutional framework which can 
enable the aforementioned practices. Thus deregulation, privatization and withdrawal of 
the state from many areas of social provisions have become common (Harvey, 2005, pp. 
2-3).  
Similar to other countries following neoliberal policies, the Turkish state has 
significantly cut down its social spending. If we look at the reflection of neo-liberal 
theory on the Turkish economic context, in a nutshell, we see that along with the 
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governmental support for neo-liberalism in this time period, institutions, which monitor 
the international capital, like the IMF and the World Bank, uttered certain recipes that 
included solution recommendations and insisted on the implementation of policies that 
aimed at decreasing social spending. As a result, the state backed away from areas such 
as education, health and retirement insurance, and became smaller. Privatization became 
widespread and many private companies filled the areas which were empty after the 
departure of the state. Education, health, retirement became the issues of private sector 
and the insurance sector was boosted (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 329; Kahraman, 2007, 
p. 102). Nevertheless, while the state was becoming smaller in economic and cultural 
aspects as the most known characteristic of the neoliberal economy, it became bigger in 
the military aspect (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 347). Admittedly, the adoption of a 
growth model based on high inflation and debt caused an increase in the incomes of the 
middle and upper layers of the society; however, this increase was at the expense of the 
lower classes (Bali, 2002b, p. 21). While one privileged segment of the society was 
getting rich, the rest was getting poorer. Thus, the social gap between the classes 
deepened as a result of the economic transformation of Turkey.    
1.2.4.3. Social Transformations 
While Turkey was transitioning to a liberal economy, and thus was integrating 
into the capitalist order with the economic changes that it experienced, the society did 
not stay outside of this integration (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 379).In the new social 
texture, the importance of money visibly increased. Success was now a concept that was 
measured according to the amount of money that one earned. The dominant idea of the 
period was clear: more money meant more success. Moreover, money was the tool to 
reach the happiness of buying and consuming (Bali, 2002b, p. 61; Lüküslü, 2009, p. 
122; Navaro Yaşin, 2003, p. 231). Consumption was one of the main issues of the post 
1980 period since it was considered not only as buying what was necessary but also as a 
satisfaction, pleasure, happiness and even a life-style (Ahıska & Yenal, p. 56; p. 62; p. 
72, 2006; Şahin, 2005, p. 160). From this aspect the consumption hunger of the 1980s 
was a transition from being against waste to consuming more (Gürbilek, 2001, p. 16; 
Lüküslü, 2009, p. 124). 
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In this context where earning money turned into a basic goal, concepts like 
practicality [işbitiricilik], flexibility, and cleverness emerged as keys for achievement. 
These concepts were defining how to make money as well as pointing to the necessity 
of breaking the rules, regulations and law to some extent in the name of this goal (Bali, 
2002b, pp. 206-207). With the entrance of these concepts into daily life, they began to 
determine how social relations were valued as well (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 62). As a 
result of all these changes, individualism and loss of collective bonds emerged in the 
society. In this environment the interaction between social classes became much less 
visible and the spatial and income based divergence became more visible among classes 
(Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 316). 
1.3.  Methodology 
 
1.3.1.  Research Process  
When I first decided to research the experiences of the former leftists who had 
been politicized in different factions, I started to read the history of the Turkish left and 
the memoirs11 of the people who experienced leftism in various organizations in the 
1970s. Unfortunately, there were not many sources that dealt with the Turkish leftist 
movement in international journals. This is why most of the articles that I found were in 
Turkish and local publications. Moreover, the sources that I encountered related with 
the Turkish left mostly provided an overview of the historical and political aspects of 
the leftist movement. The current lives of the former leftists, how they perceived, 
rationalized or legitimized their transformation were missing in the literature that was 
available. To put it differently, an analytical approach regarding the social and 
ideological transformation of the leftists was either superficial or non-existing. Thus, I 
started to conduct this research focusing on this gap.     
                                                            
11 Basic memoir books that I looked at were Sezai Sarıoğlu (2001) Nar Taneleri, Nadire Mater (2009) 
Sokak Güzeldir: 68’de Ne Oldu?, Haşim Akman (2010) Otuz Yıldır 12 Eylül Yaşayanlar Anlatıyor, Oya 
Baydar & Melek Ulagay (2011) Bir Dönem Đki Kadın. 
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Over the course of three months from March to May 2011, I conducted in-depth, 
open-ended, and semi-structured interviews. I asked simple and short questions and 
tried not to intervene or lead my research participants during our talks in order not to 
give harm to the uniqueness of their narratives. I designed 15 questions and directed 
them to 12 people (5 female, 7 male). All of the interviews were conducted according to 
the time and date that was set by the interviewees and lasted around two hours. 
Excluding four of them which were conducted in the offices of the interviewees, all of 
the interviews took place in the houses of my informants. All of my interviews were 
held in a separate room without any interruption12. The snowball method was used for 
the selection of research participants. My aunt and uncle, who had been involved in the 
leftist movement in the 1970s, provided the initial starting point of my research. Since I 
reached most of my interviewees through their personal networks, it was not difficult to 
establish a relationship of trust.     
My research participants were usually open to talk about their past, though they 
still consider it a sensitive topic. However, at the same time, they were skeptical from 
time to time due to this sensitivity and vulnerability. At the beginning of our talks all of 
them asked me a set of questions which included “Why are you conducting this 
research? Are you an independent researcher or do you have any connections with an 
organization? Did your advisor tell you to examine this topic or did you find it on your 
own? Why are you dealing with the leftist movement?” Despite common acquaintances, 
these questions signaled their fear of speaking with a “spy” or undercover state agent13. 
Yet, these fears soon subsided as they became persuaded of my sincerity. The trust they 
had in my uncle and aunt helped facilitate this process.      
Even if, in some cases, our conversation started with certain drawbacks, later 
they turned into sessions of sharing and empowerment for my interviewees. Often, they 
                                                            
12 Only Seyhan was accompanied (by her husband) during our interview. I did not interview her husband 
but from time to time he also wanted add some points and shared his experiences in the left. 
13 Gönül, Murat and Đlyas directly asked me my purpose before the interviews and then indicated that they 
have faced many people hired by intelligence services. As a part of their “old habit” they wanted to “be 
on the safe side.” 
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expressed their gratitude for enabling them to share their personal feelings, opinions, 
interpretations and experiences. Participating in an academic research project, seeing 
that their past was not a forgotten memory and being the narrator of this memory filled 
them with pride. They appreciated my interest in history of the left in Turkey and in 
their personal history. Besides, I myself learned tremendously from listening to their 
stories and greatly admired their devout effort to change the world towards more 
equality and freedom. As a member of a generation who has always been criticized due 
to its apolitical stance, I was fascinated with their stories. 
Undoubtedly, my interviewees told me only their stories to the extent that they 
wanted to share. Whether as a result of forgetting or through a conscious effort not to 
remember and narrate, they slid over certain issues. For example, my interviewees 
skipped over their torture and prison experiences. Also they were sometimes disturbed 
or became defensive when I asked about integrating into the capitalist system or the 
reasons for the failure of the left. Ultimately, they arranged and chose what they wanted 
to share. Therefore, this study is based on what my research participants chose to share.  
My interviewees were from the main leftist organizations of the 1970s. At the 
beginning of this qualitative research project, I had set out to examine specifically one 
segment of the former leftists, who might be considered “bourgeois” today. However, I 
then decided to add people from different social strata in order to understand the 
multiplicity of experiences regarding the transformation from left militancy to economic 
and political integration into the current capitalist system, both “successful” and not. In 
addition, I tried to find people from different factions in order to increase the diversity 
of narratives, because each faction reflected a different point of view and tradition. Thus 
I reached people from Dev-Yol, Dev-Sol, TĐĐKP, Halkın Kurtuluşu, ĐGD, and Emeğin 
Birliği. Unfortunately, I could not interview anybody from the faction Kurtuluş, despite 
its status as a major movement of the 1970s. Among my interviewees, only Yağmur had 
taken part in Kurtuluş for some time, before choosing to join Halkın Kurtuluşu.  
1.3.2.  Profiles of the Interviewees 
As a part of my research project, I interviewed five female and seven male 
participants over the course of three months from March to May 2011. My 
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interviewees’ profiles seem to divide themselves into two groups according to their own 
perceptions of their economic status. While the first group consists of individuals who 
say their quality of life is comfortable and their economic status higher than before; the 
second group consists of individuals who are relatively unhappy with their quality of 
life and economic status. (As I will discuss in Chapter 3, this perception has an effect on 
how my respondents view the leftist movement.) In this section, I will briefly introduce 
my interviewees according to this classification, based on their own narrations: 
In the first group, my first interviewee Gönül was the daughter of a middle-class 
Alevi family. She was born in Şanlıurfa as the first child of a family with four children. 
She participated in the leftist movement as a member of the Dev-Yol faction. The coup 
of 1980 strongly interrupted her leftist activism. She was imprisoned for four months. 
After she was released, she continued her education and became a teacher. While her 
imprisonment led to her initial withdrawal from the movement, with the influence of the 
violent atmosphere in the post-coup period, she completely lost her connection with her 
faction: “I am talking about the times when the left was dissolved. Nothing remained 
from the movement.” 
After her departure from Dev-Yol, Gönül worked as a teacher for several private 
educational institutions. Even as her work experience enabled her to noticeably increase 
her financial potential, she claims that despite her integration to the capitalist system, 
she protected her “soul” and remained loyal to leftist values. In this context, she 
bashfully defined herself as a person who belongs to “upper-middle class”, but then 
added:  
Most probably since I know what I am, I don’t see myself in a different place 
[i.e., far from the leftist movement]. My appearance might be different. I have a 
home, car, and all these things. But I know who I am inside. I do not know what 
it looks like. But I keep the little girl alive inside me. This is why I still respect 
myself.     
My second interviewee Engin was born in Rize as the fourth child of a middle-
class family with five children. Initially, he participated in the leftist movement by 
taking part in the PDA. However in this platform, he experienced some ideological 
conflicts and, as a result, left it. Soon after, he joined the Halkın Kurtuluşu [People’s 
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Salvation] faction and struggled in this faction as an activist until his departure from the 
movement. 
When we look at his withdrawal from the movement, he narrated this process as 
an “awakening from a deep dream”, referring to his realization of the impossibility of 
the revolutionary ideal:  
I saw that the situation was getting worse. It was already apparent one year 
before the coup that there would be no revolution. The people who believed in 
the revolution were daydreaming. I had a close friend, Mete. After realizing 
what was going on [i.e., that there would soon be a coup], we started to study 
and aimed to graduate from the university as early as possible. We were not in 
the movement anymore when the coup happened.  
After splitting ways with Halkın Kurtuluşu, he graduated from the university and 
became a dentist. Now he is still working at a medical clinic. He defines his current 
status as middle class, asserting that he did not undergo a significant economic change: 
You can describe my class as middle class. My family was also from middle 
class. There is not a significant change in my class. Maybe there was even a 
downgrade in comparison to my family’s standards. I am a dentist and I have 
two children. My father was an official and had five children. I cannot afford to 
look after five children. But he was able to.  
My third interviewee Metin was born in Mersin as the second child of a family 
with two children. His introduction to the leftist movement started during his university 
years. He moved to Đstanbul from Mersin to study law, and at the university he became 
friends with people in leftist circles. Under the influence of his close friends as well as 
his belief in the validity of Maoist doctrines, he joined Halkın Kurtuluşu faction. 
However, when Halkın Kurtuluşu leadership began to support Albania instead of China, 
Metin experienced disagreements with his faction, and split ways with it. After this 
point he did not join any other factions, because, as he explained, similar to Engin, he 
became aware of the approaching coup and cut off his connection from any 
organizational unit: “I was outside of the organized struggle in order to protect myself.” 
During the post-coup process, Metin completed his education and became a 
successful lawyer. He continues to work in his own law office today. Considering his 
integration into the capitalist system, Metin defines his current class as “upper class”. 
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However, at the same time he emphasizes the protection of his leftist essence: “I still 
protect my values in the 1970s. I am still a leftist. Today I am even more leftist.” 
In this group my fourth interviewee was Zuhal. Zuhal was born in Đstanbul as an 
only child. When she started university, she joined the ĐGD14 [Progressive Youth 
Association, Đlerici Gençlik Derneği] faction under the influence of her uncle, who was 
a leftist: “My uncle’s friends found me at the university and took me to a branch of 
ĐGD, Đlerici Tıbbıyeliler Derneği [Association of Progressive Medical Students, 
ĐlTıpDer]”. 
After this introduction, Zuhal became so active in the movement that, in order to 
join the meetings of ĐGD, she confronted her parents, left her home, and lived with her 
uncle for some time. With the coup of 1980, which she still defines as an unforgettable 
and a “soul-shattering” event, she lost her connection with her faction for a short time. 
However, her withdrawal from the movement did not occur with the coup. She 
continued to take part in the movement until 1986. In this context, she explained her 
drifting apart from her faction as a “spontaneous” [kendiliğinden gelişen] process:  
Nobody from my faction called or found me. This meant that nobody remained 
from my unit. Our faction was dissolved. The movement collapsed. I cannot 
define a certain event that portrays my withdrawal from the movement. It 
happened on its own.   
During these years Zuhal had already graduated from the university and become 
a doctor. In the following years, without any bonds to an organization, she led a life 
which she described as “living in a stable manner without confronting her leftist 
beliefs”. She is still working as a doctor in a medical clinic and describes her social 
class as middle class: 
Being doctor sounds like being rich, I know. I earned money but not at a level 
that would cause a transformation in my values. Money is required to listen to 
                                                            
14 ĐGD [Đlerici Gençlik Derneği, Progressive Youth Association]: a pro-TKP association which was 
established in the mid-1970s. 
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good music, to read good books, and to have a holiday. I could not own a home, 
but I could do all these things. I am an individual in the middle class.  
My fifth interviewee was Đlyas, the sixth and the last child of a family from 
Kahramanmaraş. His father was a rich industrialist, so the financial conditions in his 
family were quite good during his university years. His sympathies toward the leftist 
movement began during his high school years. However his activism and real 
participation in the movement occurred while he was at the university. In order to 
complete his university education he came to Bursa, and, after taking part in some 
protests there, he became a member of the Dev-Sol15 faction. However, his participation 
in a leftist faction and adoption of revolutionary ideas caused reaction in his family. His 
father strongly objected to Đlyas’s leftist identity, a stance which led to confrontations 
between them. In the end, as a result of both the influence of his father’s threat of 
disinheritance and the danger that stemmed from being a militant at that time, he left 
Dev-Sol during the second half of the 1980s. He explained his departure from the 
movement as follows:  
Maybe I left the movement due to my inner contradictions. In my opinion, it is 
harder for a bourgeois person to take part in the revolutionary movement, 
because if you are bourgeois, it means that you have more to lose. While I was 
leaving the movement, I thought about all the things I would lose. Maybe this 
was the main reason for my withdrawal.   
After splitting ways with the movement, he first returned to the university, 
which he had subordinated to pursuing his ideal of revolution. He completed his 
education and became a doctor. He still works at a private hospital and defines his 
current economic status as follows:  
                                                            
15 Dev-Sol [Devrimci Sol, Revolutionary Left]: In 1978 a group of Dev-Yol supporters declared that they 
were in a conflict regarding some issues with the organization. After a while this group started to publish 
the journal Devrimci Sol [Revolutionary Left] and thus a separate organization process started (Aykol, 
2010, p. 84). Dev-Sol was claiming that Dev-Yol betrayed the heritage of Mahir Çayan and shifted to a 
rightist line. Moreover, Dev-Sol did not agree with the determination of Dev-Yol that stated the existence 
of revisionist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. Also Dev-Sol blamed Dev-Yol for its weak struggle 
against fascism and defined it as a passive reaction. The struggle method of Dev-Sol was armed and in 
this sense it had adopted more radical methods in comparison to Dev-Yol. For example, it established 
Faşist Teröre Karşı Silahlı Mücadele Ekipleri [Armed Struggle Teams against the Fascist Terror] and 
Silahlı Devrim Birlikleri [Armed Revolution Units] in order to organize armed attacks towards the 
perceived fascist elements (Alpat, 1998, p. 72).  
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I have a good job which I love. I have a family. I love my lifestyle. I do not want 
to give up these things. I am living comfortably. Now, what makes me happy is 
living like that. My conditions are well enough to sustain these standards.  
Murat was born in Ankara as the fifth child of a family with seven children. He 
defined his family as a “traditionally leftist family” that always voted for the Republican 
People’s Party [CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi]. He portrayed his family’s ideological 
stand as a latent reason for his sympathy towards the revolutionary ideals. However, his 
real introduction to the leftist movement came when he left Ankara and for Đstanbul to 
pursue a university education. In Đstanbul, under the influence of his friends, Murat 
joined the Emeğin Birliği [Union of Labor]16 faction and he struggled in this platform 
for three years.  
With the coup of 1980 his ties with his faction gradually loosened. Nevertheless, 
the event that caused his final withdrawal was not the coup, but his graduation from the 
university. After his graduation, he completely drifted away the leftist environment and 
entered into business life, something which he described as the major turning point of 
his life. As a construction engineer he established his own business, which he still runs.  
Murat defined his current social class as “petit bourgeois”, explaining his current 
financial status as follows:  
I have never experienced financial difficulties. My family was rich. When I was 
a student my father financially supported me. Today I earn my own money. I 
have good living standards. I deal with my job. I am living in the way that I 
should live considering the realities of today. 
Another interviewee, Seyhan, was the first child of a family with three children. 
She was born in the district of Samsun. Since there was no high school in her town, she 
                                                            
16 Emeğin Birliği [Union of Labor]: The defendants of the case of THKO [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, 
The People’s Liberation Army of Turkey] divided into two and the first group adopted the ideas of Enver 
Hoca and stood close to Albania. The second group opposed to this stand and defined itself in the Soviet 
camp. This group came together around the journal of Emeğin Birliği. In the leadership of Teslim Töre 
this formation transformed into a political body and it took the name Türkiye Komünist Emek Partisi, 
TKEP.  
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moved to Đstanbul in order to complete her education. Thus, her introduction to the 
leftist movement started in Đstanbul, in a boarding school. With the influence of a close 
friend, with whom she came to Đstanbul, she joined the Dev-Yol faction. In this faction 
she pursued strong activism, which continued even after the coup. However in the post-
coup period most of her friends fled abroad and she led an underground life in which 
she felt lonely and helpless due to her friends’ withdrawal from the movement. This 
feeling of helplessness pushed her to consider her own life. Thus she decided to switch 
to an apolitical life:  
Everybody, everybody that I struggled together with fled abroad. I became 
desolate. I stayed two more years in Turkey. I continued the revolutionary 
struggle. However, at some point I, too, gave up. I returned to university, I found 
a job, I graduated. But I could not attune to life in Turkey. So I too went abroad. 
In 1986 Seyhan moved to Sweden in order to start a new life and stayed there for 
almost 20 years. Now she lives in Đstanbul and she works as an accountant in a private 
company.  
My last interviewee in this group was Nehir who was the sixth child of a family 
with ten children. She was born in Đstanbul. Like most of my interviewees, she joined 
the leftist movement during her university years, being fascinated with the mass support 
that Dev-Yol had. She remained active in the movement until the 1980 coup:  
I was going to be assigned to another task. However, the person who was going 
to contact me disappeared. Maybe s/he was captured. For 7-8 months nobody 
got in touch with me. The organization was dissolved. In the meantime, I 
graduated from the university.  
Thus Nehir experienced a gradual withdrawal from the movement. Following 
this process, she started working at a bank. After working in various banks as a 
manager, now she is retired and is serving a company as a consultant. Today she 
describes her economic and social class as follows:  
I still think that the best option for the humanity is the left. Today I am 
economically in a good position. I guaranteed my life from a monetary 
perspective. I have a lifestyle which might be called bourgeois. But I gained all 
these things by working. I started from scratch.  
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As mentioned before, in the second group, I interviewed people who defined 
themselves as “economically underprivileged”. In this group my first interviewee was 
Fatih, who was born and had grown up in Đstanbul. He joined the Dev-Sol faction under 
the influence of his older neighborhood friends when he was in middle school. With the 
excitement of materializing the revolution, he dropped of school and devoted himself 
only to the revolution ideal, taking active role in the armed wing of his faction. His 
pursuit of militant leftism, described by Fatih as “rogue” and “armed”, lasted almost 15 
years until his departure in the second half of the 1980s. Unlike many of my 
interviewees, Fatih’s effort to change the system in Turkey continued in the post-coup 
period. After 1985, though he broke his ties with illegal structures, his struggle 
continued three or four more years at a legal level. In the late 1980s, he completely 
withdrew from leftist organizations. He still independently supports a more equal and 
free society without defining himself a leftist: “Being a leftist is a broad category. 
Depending on how you define the left, everybody can be a leftist. So I cannot say that I 
am a leftist.”  
After his departure from the movement, Fatih experienced many difficulties. He 
explained that he became upset at witnessing his former comrades’ “surrender” to 
money. He became lonely, which first pushed him to draw closer to some mafia groups: 
“I was alone and I knew nothing other than violence.” However, soon after, he left this 
group and established a new life. In this process he worked as a cameraman for some 
time. Now he has a small business selling handmade jewelry. Still, he expresses 
dissatisfaction with his current economic status, saying, “I could not integrate into the 
system. I tried, but it doesn’t happen. I haven’t been able to develop economically.” 
My second interviewee in this group was Tayfun, who was born in Ankara as the 
second child of a low-income family. He moved to Đstanbul in order to complete his 
university education, and it was there that he joined the Dev-Sol faction. Like many 
young people in the period, Tayfun was arrested after the coup of 1980 and remained 
imprisoned for six years. While leftist organizations were being dissolved outside the 
prison, his leftist struggle continued inside the prison. He told me that his belief in the 
revolution became a way for him to bear the difficulties of prison life. In the last year of 
his imprisonment he split ways with his organization due to a disagreement regarding a 
30 
 
protest. After this event he pursued a leftist line in the prison independent from any 
organizational unit.  
Tayfun described Turkey that he saw after he was released from prison as an 
“utterly different” country:  
Everything I left was different when I returned. I experienced a shock. Only my 
family was the same. All my friends were in other places. They were dissolved. I 
had to be realistic. I completed my university education, found a job and later I 
got married.  
Thus in the beginning of 1990s, Tayfun started a new life independent of the 
leftist circles. He still works as an engineer, but not at a company: “I am an independent 
engineer but I could not become an economically independent person. I could not 
develop economically. I could not liberalize economically.” 
Mehmet was born in Sivas as the third children of a family with four children. 
Mehmet’s interest in the leftist ideology started in his family under the influence of his 
father and brothers. His father was initially a very religious man; however, after 
examining many books, his knowledge in religion resulted in a reaction against religion 
and he became an atheist, also adopting some revolutionary ideas. During these years 
Mehmet’s two brothers had also started taking part in the leftist movement. This 
revolutionary wind in their home was interrupted with the killing of his brother. After 
mourning for two years, Mehmet’s older brother became an important figure in the 
leftist movement. Like his brother, he too was killed. Following this painful event, 
Mehmet said, his father could not stand the pain of the loss of his sons and also died 
within a month. These events became a triggering factor for Mehmet; after which he 
devoted himself entirely to the movement. “My brothers did not die for nothing.” he 
said. 
Thus Mehmet participated in TĐĐKP [Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party 
of Turkey, Türkiye Đhtilalci Đşçi Köylü Partisi] group for some time. However when I 
asked him about the faction he joined, he did not want to define himself as a member of 
any group: “I have never been someone’s man. I have never been a faction’s man. I 
have never been an organization’s man. I am a man who loved the left without any 
organizational bonds.”  
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Based on this definition, Mehmet still defines himself as an absolute leftist 
without any change. According to him, what changed was his economic conditions and 
social class: “I am an engineer. I do not even own a home. I am a tenant. I never earned 
money. In comparison to the 1970s, the only thing that has changed is that I have gotten 
poorer.”  
My last interviewee in this group was Yağmur, who was born in Đstanbul as the 
second child of a family with two children. She joined the movement during her high 
school years. With the influence of her social network, she initially joined Kurtuluş 
[Liberation] faction. However, later she experienced some disagreements with this 
faction and joined Halkın Kurtuluşu. Until the coup of 1980 she continued her 
revolutionary struggle in this faction. In the post-coup environment, she was arrested 
and sent to prison: “I stayed in prison for a short time. Within six months they released 
me. It was just six months, but I still bear the traces of those months.”  
After her imprisonment, she lost all the connection with her faction. She 
explained this process as a time period during which all factions were dissolved. Thus, 
she started a life without any organizational bonds. Painting became her shelter to fill 
the gap which emerged due to the collapse of her revolutionary dreams. Now, she 
continues to paint, also working as a hair dresser. She explained the economic standards 
in her life as follows: “I worked but I never earned huge amounts of money. I never 
gave importance to money. This is why I could not progress economically. I was just 
able to save the day.” 
1.4.  Outline of the Thesis 
Based on in depth interviews, this thesis aims to explain the ideological, 
socioeconomic, and gender-related “transformation” of the individuals who participated 
in various leftist factions by analyzing how they describe and legitimize the changes 
they have undergone.  
In the narrations of all my interviewees, the leftist past is portrayed as a source 
of pride and a key point that affected their flow of life. In other words, this sense, my 
research participants explain their participation in the leftist movement as a major 
turning point. In the second chapter I will look at the “participation in different factions 
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of the left” which can be considered as the first transformation that my interviewees 
underwent. Thus I will try to understand the determining factors and underlying reasons 
for the faction choice of my interviewees.  
Then in the third chapter I will look at transformations that my interviewees 
underwent as the survivors of a defeated movement. In this chapter I will also analyze 
the post-1980 period and combine the changes and transformations that Turkey 
witnessed in relation with the personal transformations that my interviewees 
experienced. Do my interviewees still define themselves as leftists? Do they still believe 
in the idea of revolution? Do they perceive a change in their lives or situate themselves 
as individuals still loyal and dedicated to leftist ideals? If there is a perceived 
transformation, to what extent is it accepted? These are some of the questions that I will 
try to answer in the third chapter.  
 In the fourth chapter, I will look at perceptions of femininity, womanhood, 
feminism and intimate relationships in the movement. Under these titles I will 
specifically focus on the sister [bacı] discourse, the auxiliary position of women, the 
attitude towards feminism, the prejudices or discriminations that stemmed from being a 
woman, the nature of intimate relationships in the movement, and the influence of 
organizational structures on these issues. Then I will discuss the transformations that my 
interviewees have experienced in terms of their views on gender and sexuality.   
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CHAPTER 2:  GETTING TO KNOW THE LEFTIST MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
Turkey witnessed a harsh clash between the two poles, the right and the left, 
throughout the1970s. For most of the youth of the period, resisting this polarization and 
being politically neutral was almost unthinkable. This happened for two main reasons: 
First, in this social context, leftist revolutionary and nationalist [ülkücü] movements 
were the main struggle platforms of the period and taking side in either of them was 
seen as a duty of citizenship in the eyes of the many young people. Being a 
revolutionary meant to live and struggle for the people in order to reach a freer and 
more equal society. On the other hand, being an ülkücü meant to be a patriot who was 
trying to defend her/his country from the divisive element of communism. In their own 
way, both sides held the ideal of “rescuing” the state or the homeland. Second, with the 
entrance of arms to the leftist movement, violence inevitably escalated. The 1970s was a 
period in which neighborhoods, streets, universities and dormitories were polarized, 
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divided into right and left camps and pitted against one another. As it can be understood 
from the meanings that were attributed to each of the parties, both definitions were 
virtuous according to their self-interpretation (Lüküslü, 2009, p. 94; p. 99; p. 114). If so, 
what were the factors that made an individual to take side in either of these ideological 
poles? 
In this chapter of my research, I will try to analyze the underlying reasons for 
my interviewees to join the side of the leftists in the first place. We will look at the 
various elements that contributed to or persuaded my interviewees in terms of 
membership to their factions. These included family persuasion (or dissuasion), moving, 
emotional reaction to events, interest in theory, and others. In this chapter, I will 
examine not only my respondents’ choice of leftism over the nationalist right, but also 
their specific choice of faction within the left. These are important questions to answer, 
because the reasons these people joined leftist movements in the first place has 
continued to have an effect on how they view themselves and leftism today. 
2.2.  Participation in the Leftist Movement 
I learned what Dev-Yol was thinking and defending after being a part of it; but I 
chose the left because there was justice [adalet], rights [hak] and law [hukuk] in 
the left…Being neutral towards what was happening meant to be insensitive to 
the things around you. And this was impossible for me. (Gönül) 
Considering the social polarization of the period, politicization was an 
inescapable process for most youth in the 1970s. According to Gönül, who explained 
her participation in Dev-Yol with the above words, guiding this process of joining the 
left was a belief that she was making the right choice and pursuing the right ideals: 
“After witnessing what they [ülkücüler] did, it was impossible for me to take place in 
the right.” At this point of our conversation, she mentioned the 1978 Maraş massacres 
and how they affected her as an Alevi. Defining fascism as a threat to her Alevi identity, 
she positioned the left as a shelter to escape the massacres perpetrated by the right. In 
this context, the right was a mistaken ideology that in Gönül’s memory represented 
something merciless, brutal, and capable of giving harm. This is why she asserted that 
there was the need of taking a stand and fighting against it. In this struggle, Gönül chose 
Dev-Yol and characterized the left as a knight who defended the rights of the oppressed, 
defenseless, and disadvantaged groups in society.  
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Like Gönül, Engin also emphasized the importance of the values that the left had 
in it as a reason for his participation to the movement. However, the major reason that 
explains his journey in the left was the participation of people he knew in Halkın 
Kurtuluşu (People’s Salvation) faction. According to Engin, learning theoretical debates 
were related with personal curiosity; accordingly, it was a situation that depended on the 
choice of the person. This is why he underlined that the factor which attracted the 
individual to the movement was not the theory; rather it was the friends of the person 
and the existence of the people s/he knew in the movement.  
Similarly, Murat who is a former supporter of Emeğin Birliği the main factor 
behind his involvement was “the influence of the social environment”:   
I think the social environment of the person is very important. My friends were 
from the leftist factions. I adopted their ideas. Then I became a leftist. I cannot 
think of someone who politicized by reading and then choosing the right path. 
Maybe one person among one thousand. These types of things happen 
[participation in a social movement], because you were influenced by your 
environment. I mean nobody comes to the movement after reading or seeing the 
realities. Maybe one in thousands…   
For Fatih, too, the determinant factor in the faction choice was the affect of 
relational proximity:   
I met with Dev-Sol when I was 15. Yes, it is early; but not very abnormal. It was 
normal during that period. To be honest, it is people and your love for them [that 
attract you]. Neither their ideas, nor their attitudes… You love people. Your 
choice depends on this. You do not have many options. There were three or four 
groups around us. I preferred them. I was closer to them. What I mean is human 
relationships influenced me.  
In Mehmet’s story we see his brothers and fathers as the catalysts who 
introduced him to the leftist movement. Before Mehmet participated in any faction, 
Mehmet’s two brothers were already in the leftist movement as high-level militants. In 
their home, there was a relationship of comradery [yoldaşlık] between his father and the 
sons such that in Mehmet’s depiction “the anarchic father” who went to demonstrations 
to protest unjust treatments in the country backed the struggle of his sons as much as he 
could. After a while Mehmet also found himself in the movement as the youngest child 
of an already politicized family. Initially, he helped his brothers who were in the high 
positions by running errands; however, after his brothers were killed, followed by the 
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death of his father, Mehmet became more immersed into the movement. At this point, 
for him, the left represented keeping the short but legendary lives of his brothers and 
their memories alive, and bravely embracing the ideal that his brothers had died for. 
Thus, he struggled in TĐĐKP [Türkiye Đhtilalci Đşçi Köylü Partisi, Revolutionary 
Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey] in order to defend the heritage of his brothers.  
In Seyhan’s family, her uncle was the first figure who introduced her to the 
leftist struggle. She discovered the leftist ideology by reading the books in her uncle’s 
library. As she was questioning the world from an ideological perspective, this 
questioning resulted in her development of sympathy for the left with the influence of 
her Turkish literature teacher, who was also a leftist. Later she left her hometown of 
Samsun and moved to Đstanbul in order to complete her education in a boarding school. 
There, a close friend introduced her to Dev-Yol faction:    
I went to a boarding school for high school. In fact, I mean, maybe I would not 
have proceed in the leftist movement. There was a friend who came with me. 
She was very militant. Since we came together, since we came as hemşehri 
[people from the same town], I was always with her. In terms of me joining 
something or being a part of something, she was influential. When we were in 
high school, we became a part of Dev-Genç. When I started the university there 
was no Dev-Genç. A separation was experienced; Devrimci Yol [Revolutionary 
Way] and Devrimci Sol [Revolutionary Left] emerged. When I started 
university, I had to choose. This year was very…We sat down and talked. 
Everybody [the members of Dev-Genç] was divided into groups there. I made 
my decision and came to Đstanbul as a supporter of Dev-Yol. In my opinion, if 
you asked me in the 1970s I would tell you that I found their ideas [the ideas of 
Dev-Yol] more consistent. But after all these years when I look back I think that 
it [my choice] stemmed from the people. I do not say this with pride, but this is 
how it was.  
In Tayfun’s story, firstly we see the execution of Deniz Gezmiş as an incident 
that he could not forget. In this context, we can mention his tendency towards the left as 
an embodiment of his reaction to the death of Gezmiş. The event which turned this 
tendency to actual involvement started with the influence of his friends, similar to the 
stories of other interviewees:   
There (in the university) was a group of friends. The group that we were in was 
Dev-Genç [Revolutionary Youth]. There was no special preference here. Let me 
tell it like that. I think the reason was, I did not think about it very much, but the 
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people whom I knew from the neighborhood were from the Dev-Genç faction. I 
had some conversations with them. Maybe I was affected by them.      
Tayfun is one of my respondents who continues to adhere closely to a feeling of 
leftism (see Section 3.2). Today the left presents Tayfun with the potential for freedom 
in a society in which he feels captive. He defines himself as an individual who is not in 
peace with the capitalist system, rejected by the system due to the socialism that he kept 
alive in him. He feels like a member of a group that is excluded. This is why he explains 
his reason for still being loyal to left as follows:         
The reason why you are in the left is its being the place where you feel freer, you 
live more humanely, you can make decisions related to your future on your own, 
and you can produce something for your society and children. This is our… 
People are in the left ideology because of this reason or I have the left ideology 
because of this. The reason is not something else.    
My next interviewee Metin is quite a successful lawyer who had taken place in 
Halkın Kurtuluşu and then broken his ties with this faction. He defines his relationship 
with the leftist movement in the 1970s as loving his faction rather than an organic tie. 
He defines himself as an “unusual” leftist since he always approached the left from a 
critical angle. Thus his claim raises a question in my mind and I ask if he was so 
displeased with the movement and so critical towards it why he became a part of it.   
In response to this question, he propounded the rising fascist movement and the 
necessity to intervene the violent essence of it: “We could not say ‘look people are 
scrambling for a better world’ while fascists were attacking them. We always supported 
the people close to us.” Metin explained this support as taking the side of the oppressed. 
Moreover he described being in solidarity with the oppressed as a projection of a family 
tradition in his narration: 
Our family had such a humane structure. One of the reasons that pushed me to 
revolutionism was that we had a family tradition of being close to, standing by 
the weak. Neither my grandfather nor my father, they never wanted leadership. 
But the feeling of helping other is very important.     
While helping the oppressed was making Metin a part of the leftist movement, 
he depicted pursuing China and the doctrines of Mao as the reason for his factional 
choice, Halkın Kurtuluşu. For Metin in the 1970s Mao was a revolutionary and a 
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philosopher whose ideas should be followed. Different from my other interviewees, 
Metin presented the stance of Halkın Kurtuluşu towards the Soviet Union as a primary 
reason for his participation to the movement. The theoretical approach was the major 
determinant factor in the faction choice of Metin such that in later times when his 
faction changed its line which was close to China, he disengaged from Halkın Kurtuluşu 
and continued his struggle in the left without any bonds with an organization. He 
explained the reasons that were influential on his journey in Halkın Kurtuluşu other than 
the theoretical infrastructure and his withdrawal from his faction as follows:      
The people whom we loved who were older than us were there. This was very 
influential too. I found it to be a softer movement. They [members of Halkın 
Kurtuluşu] did not give prominence to arms; they were establishing 
neighborhood organizations [mahalle örgütleri]. They were more active at the 
villages. They were dealing with theory more than the others. For example I saw 
Dev-Genç and Kurtuluşçular [supporters of the Liberation movement] as the 
bourgeois children. Dev-Genç’s attitude of finding the middle ground for 
everything… It was very… Later I split ways with Halkın Kurtuluşu, when they 
rejected Mao. I mean I conflicted with them when they said the words “Enver 
Hoca”. Who is Enver Hoca? If we gathered all of the armies of Enver Hoca, it 
could not even be near the number of militants in Halkın Kurtuluşu.  
Đlyas, from the faction Dev-Sol, responded to my question with the claim that his 
elder brothers may have influenced his participation to the leftist movement. When he 
came to the university he found himself in a politicized environment and then chose the 
left. His journey within the leftist movement started with sympathetic participation in 
the resistance movements but developed into militancy. In response to my question, 
“why Dev-Sol?” he replied: “The people whom I met first were from this faction when I 
came to the university.” Then Đlyas added smiling: “It was attractive for me to be a part 
of a mass movement. I acted with the instinct of being on the side that I perceived as 
strong. Maybe that was a human weakness.” 
Like Đlyas, Nehir also mentioned the attraction of being a member of a mass 
movement and the feelings that it brought along while explaining her participation to 
Dev-Yol:  
There was the effect of the mass movements. I mean the extensive 
organizational structure in the movement and the admiration it evoked… In fact 
the social atmosphere in Turkey was quite dynamic. My friends and I naturally 
found ourselves in a political circle... First of all, we felt happy. I felt like we 
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were making ourselves useful. I was happy since I was a part of this movement. 
There was a sense of belonging. It was providing us with an identity. We always 
felt ourselves different from the other people. I mean our truths were the best. 
We degraded the rest. I do not know what we meant for the other people but it 
was very attractive for us to take place in that mechanism. If the state made a 
military coup, we would fight and win. We had that thought. We never gave 
importance. Even if there was a coup, we believed that we would muddle 
through it, it would not influence us.    
The perception of immunity from everything and an indirectly uttered notion of 
immortality existed in most of my respondents’ stories. If there was an attack they 
would fight against it and win, if there was a coup, they would rise up against it and 
win. Death was a manageable risk or a probability that was never considered. Being a 
part of “the left” was a virtuous stand. In this framework, the left was like an ensemble 
of noble struggles. My interviewee Yağmur, a former supporter of Halkın Kurtuluşu 
explained this nobility by mentioning the struggle against inequalities, protection of the 
weak against the strong, helping the poor, being the voice of the suppressed and 
representing the disadvantaged groups and their demands. Then she added: “In our 
faction there was a togetherness in which you never felt alone. We were great. Being a 
leftist was being together with honored and fair people. In our small world we lived as if 
the revolution was materialized.”       
At this point I wondered how they lived as absolute socialists in a capitalist 
Turkey. “We shared everything”, she said. “But who paid the bills and for the tea?” I 
asked. “The one who had the money”, she said smiling.  
Finally, Zuhal’s leftism experience in the ĐGD was seen quite negatively by her 
family. Since Zuhal’s uncle, who influenced her participation in the leftist movement, 
was considered a monster that contaminated young minds, her family sought to distance 
her from him. The reaction of Zuhal to her parents who were worried about their 
daughter became much more severe. She left the house since she believed that her 
parents restricted her life in the name of protecting her. In this sense, her participation in 
ĐGD was in the form of a personal struggle for independence from family pressures:     
I left the house in the name of gaining the freedom of doing what I believed in. It 
could have been another thing. ĐGD was a symbol there. It was the medium of 
what I wanted to do. It could be something other than ĐGD; it could not be ĐGD. I 
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always wanted to be free. I could have used ĐGD as an excuse. I did not leave the 
house for ĐGD. I left the house in order to break from the pressure at home. 
Zuhal was the only one of my interviewees for whom participation in a leftist 
organization entailed a sense of rejection by her family. 
2.3.  Conclusion  
Van Zomeren et al. (2008) assert that the literature related with social 
mobilization and collective action could be organized and classified into three broad 
domains to explain the motives behind the participation of individuals in these 
processes. In line with this assertion, the authors determine these three domains as 
“perceived injustice, efficacy and identity” (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 505).  
If we closely look at these three domains, Van Zomeren et al. (2008) define 
perceived injustice as a powerful indicator in terms of participation in collective action. 
The desire to terminate the ongoing injustice and construction of a fairer system that is 
different from the existing one are the crucial elements that push individuals to take part 
in social movements. Among my interviewees, this injustice perception and struggling 
against inequalities were very visible in the discourses of Gönül and Yağmur.  
Secondly, the authors point to perceived efficacy as a determinant factor in 
joining social movements. This category is based on “resource mobilization theory” and 
identifies people as rational actors (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, pp. 505-507). Here 
rationality refers to the idea that people join collective action when the expectations 
regarding benefits of participation in a certain action outweigh its costs. To put it in 
other words, people act with the instinct of maximizing the gains and minimizing the 
costs and therefore according to rational choice perspective individuals engage in social 
movements in relation with the perceived effectiveness and risks of participation. In this 
framework, high costs are located as barriers to participation (Klandermans, 1984, pp. 
583-584; Klandermans and Oegema 1987, p. 520; p. 527; McCarthy & Zald, 1977, pp. 
1216-1218; McAdam, 1986, pp. 67-70; Opp 1985, pp. 87-89, p. 93; Tilly, 1978, p. 73-
75; pp.100-102).  
In addition to this literature that focuses on the individual efficacy there exists a 
literature that emphasizes the importance of “group efficacy” or the belief in the power 
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and possibility of success of a group, an organization or a movement in terms of 
creating a drastic social change (Drury & Reicher, 2005, pp. 35-38; Mummendey et 
al.1999, pp. 229-230; p. 234; p. 238). What is emphasized here is the “generativity” that 
is the desire to contribute to future generations (Erikson, 1963). In this context, 
generative individuals pursue the goal of reaching a better society and act with the 
incentive of contributing to a better world which is more equal and just (Peterson & 
Duncan, 1999, pp. 108-110; Stewart & Gold-Steinberg, 1990, p. 543; p. 546).  
Thirdly, Van Zomeren, et al. (2008) mention identity as another category that 
has a significant importance in terms of engaging in collective actions or social 
movements (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 507). According to “social identity theory” 
(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), individuals attach positive meanings and 
emotional components to their group membership. Thus three steps occur during this 
identity construction process: Firstly, the individual develops awareness for her/his 
membership. Secondly, the individual attaches values to her/his membership and 
belonging. Thirdly, the individual makes a differentiation between her/his belonging 
and other people’s belonging who are out of her/his group. In this framework, being a 
member of a faction, organization, movement, group or community causes positioning 
“group” identity as an identity above “personal” identity. This positioning inevitably 
leads to creation of a self-definition based on membership. While “I” is transformed 
into “we”, personal identity turns into collective identity. Therefore being a member of 
a certain group and identification with this group emerges as an important factor that 
triggers the individual’s participation in a social movement (Jenkins, 2004, pp. 103-115; 
Turner et al., 1987, p. 118; Hirsch, 1990, pp. 244-245). In my interviews, identity 
construction and attribution of positive meanings to group membership were visible in 
the discourses of Mehmet (after the killing of his brothers being a leftist had become the 
core element of his identity), Zuhal (participation in TKP was her declaration of being a 
free individual and thus as a stepping stone in her identity formation), Nehir and Đlyas 
(for them being members of leftist factions were being a part of a strong and admired 
mass movement and thus being a part of “we” rather than “I”).  
When we analyze the discourses of my interviewees in order to understand the 
factors that influenced their participation processes, we see that the dominant tendency 
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is referring to the effect of social networks. In the political mobilization literature, too, 
the influences of social networks and interpersonal ties are described as important 
points in joining social movements (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Klandermans 
1997, p. 520). However, before moving to these common discourses in the narrations 
that defines social networks and interpersonal ties as a determinant factor in social 
mobilization, let’s look at how my respondents consider and define their participation in 
their organizations and politicization processes.  
Undoubtedly, the ways in which my respondents were politicized continues to 
have an important impact on their self-image and their view of the left. When asked 
about the personal transformations they had experienced, nine of my interviewees 
referred to their politicization in the left as one of the major events of their lives. The 
years they spent in the political platforms were both a source of pride and a key point 
that affected the flow of their lives. This is why, without hesitation most of them 
positioned their past in various factions of the left as one of the turning points in their 
lives. For example Engin defined the death of one of his closest friends, a faction leader 
in the 1970s, as the most important turning point of his life. In his story, his friend’s 
death emerged as a triggering factor that pushed him to the revolutionary struggle:  
I became very angry after my friend’s death. He was killed. We were very close. 
After his death my rancor against the existing system increased. I started to 
struggle for only the revolution. I devoted all my energy to the revolution. I did 
not betray our dream after his death. 
In most of the narrations the years spent in the factions were defined as 
inescapable destinies. While Fatih explained this destiny as “experiencing what should 
be experienced”, Seyhan described this inescapability with the feeling of social 
responsibility:  
It was not like today. The atmosphere was different. Turkey was changing and 
we could not stay away from this change. We had to be a part of this change. 
You cannot be insensitive towards the things that happened around you. I was a 
sensitive person and with my all sensitivity, the left was the only place that I 
could be in.  
In this direction Yağmur explained her being a revolutionary as the only way 
forward and the sole option in her politicization process:  
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I could not do anything other than being a leftist. I would certainly join the leftist 
movement. I even cannot think of not joining. If you ask me the turning points in 
my life I can tell my participation in the left, my disastrous marriage and the 
coup of 1980. These three are the major events of my life. 
A life lived without a leftist perspective was considered as an unthinkable option 
for Nehir, too. She portrayed her experience in her faction as an important event that 
developed her personality: 
Of course the most important turning point in my life was taking part in the 
leftist movement. It became the main determinant factor of my life; because, my 
stand, my ideas that shaped in the movement affected the rest of my life. I never 
deny my past. I mean I am so happy to have a past like that.  
Mehmet described the relationship between joining the leftist movement and his 
identity as follows:  
If I am Mehmet today, the reason for it is definitely the years I spent in the left. 
The thing that made me Mehmet is that period. I learned everything there. My 
life changed in the left. My brothers died in the leftist struggle. How can I deny 
the centrality and significance of the left in my life?  
Like Mehmet, according to Zuhal, too, her past in her faction ĐGD was a 
transformative and life-changing experience: 
I am a brave person. I am stubborn. I always do what I believe in. How did I 
learn all these things? I learned to be like that in the left. The revolutionary years 
educated me. Of course one of the most important events, the event that affected 
me the most is my participation in the left.    
As much as their participation in the leftist movement can be considered one of 
the important turning points in respondents’ lives, when we specifically look at their 
participation process in the factions, we see that this process was not a process that 
developed as part of a plan. Rather, it was a coincidental process to a very large extent. 
Almost all of my interviewees pointed to their social network as the primary reason for 
their faction choice. In this sense, they defined the process in which they took part in the 
leftist circles as a process which emerged mainly with the influence of the people they 
knew and already politicized in the left. Most of them did not base their involvement on 
an ideological factor. In most of their stories, there was a family member, friend or 
someone from their social network who facilitated their introduction to the leftist 
44 
 
movement. In this context, they uttered that they had the tendency to act together with 
the familiar people and adopt their political stand. Thus by the help of these “catalyst” 
people who accelerated their politicization, my interviewees explained that they found 
themselves in the leftist circles. In this context, adopting the ideological stance of a 
particular faction emerged later because ideology was represented as an issue that was 
examined, discussed and accordingly understood after participation had begun. In the 
next chapter, I will examine how the more flexible idea of ideology interacted with the 
more fundamental idea of leftist identity. 
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CHAPTER 3:  IDEOLOGICAL AND ECONOMICAL TRANSFORMATION  
OF THE FORMER LEFTISTS 
 
 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Perhaps the word used most reluctantly by my interviewees was 
“transformation”. When the issue at stake was a transformation in their lives since the 
1970s, interviewees generally raised an objection, followed by either a correction or an 
explanation to prove that their current, relatively well-off status was not a betrayal of or 
a conflict with their activist past. In my interviewees’ minds, the word “transformation” 
implied “being unable to be like who I was in the past” or “choosing not to be like who 
I was in the past”. For that reason, the word “transformation” [dönüşüm] was considered 
with suspicion, even revilement. Ever anxious about losing the “soul” of militant leftism 
in the 1970s, my informants sometimes took a defensive position. Rather than using this 
visibly irritating word, they strongly emphasized a feeling of gradual “change” 
[değişim]. As a result of the guilt and the subsequent defense against this guilt, they 
used a common discourse: “The only thing that changed in me is my outward 
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appearance; my soul and self are still the same”. (This is articulated most explicitly in 
Engin and Mehmet’s stories below.) 
When we look at the narratives of my interviewees regarding their life after the 
coup of 1980 and their class positions (as they identify them), it is possible to observe 
two different groups. The first group consists of those who integrated into the post-1980 
environment relatively easily, making choices that resulted in climbing the social 
ladder, rather than maintaining an absolute belief in revolutionary ideals. Second was a 
group who did not succeed economically in the liberal capitalist system; their ideology 
remained closer to what it had been forty years ago and they emphasized their chosen 
noncompliance with the norms of a liberal capitalist economy. Looking at the main 
tendencies in the first group's discourse, we see that economic change, for instance, was 
an area in which they showed minimum resistance. For some interviewees, a higher 
material quality of life and new white-collar occupations were visible indicators of their 
increased social standing, even if they were reluctant to come to terms with this 
“transformation” in their lives. In addition to economic changes, another area in which 
my interviewees made some concessions on the word “transformation” was in 
discussing their belief in a socialist revolution. As a matter of fact, the only point in our 
interviews at which the word “transformation” was used comfortably and without 
hesitation was when we discussed the issue of revolution. From today’s perspective, 
most interviewees said, materializing the revolution was impossible; a gradual, broad 
transformation or change was considered more feasible. (There was, however, also a 
smaller group of two respondents who still supported revolutionary ideals by preserving 
their hope in the revolution, totally rejecting the notion of gradual transformation.)  
In this chapter, I argue that these two groups’ relationship with their activist past 
and their present ideological stances are a result of concrete factors and follow 
predictable patterns. These factors are varied and affect each interviewee in different 
ways, but include the suppression of the left after the coup of 1980, the rise of 
consumerism, my interviewees’ relationship with money, their current political 
ideology, political participation, their perception of the capitalist system. The economic 
transformation that took place in the first group’s lives positively affected their feelings 
of integration into society, even if they felt more of a distance to their old socialist 
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ideals. Voluntarily or involuntarily, most of my interviewees had managed to integrate 
into a liberal, capitalist system by accepting the ownership of property, the principle of 
“fair pay for fair work”, and support for individualism. The second group of 
interviewees, who could not complete or manage to provide their integration into the 
capitalist system, the level of economic transformation also determined the reputation 
and respect they felt they had won in society. Therefore, according to this group that 
resisted integration, economic conditions after 1980 also affected their social 
relationships.  
The fact that this second group said they tried to integrate into the capitalist 
system but could not succeed has had an effect on both their psychology and ideology. 
These interviewees say they are sick of being considered “outliers” [tutunamayanlar], 
but they nevertheless live in constant conflict with the system they live in. Their 
perceived “disconnect” from society means being unable to be a successful capitalist, 
while, according their discourse, it is worthless to be an anti-capitalist in a capitalist 
world. Moreover, being anti-capitalist is not an ideology they can simply choose; they 
say it was imposed on them since the left was suppressed by the coup, regardless of 
whether they feel their ideals have a chance of success. The collapse of their old activist 
groups and their inability to reach their old goals remain like a scar, always reminding 
them of their failure, that is, the death of their ideal. On the other hand, some maintain 
that the revolution is still not a lost war. In this context, there is no real “failure”, but an 
ongoing “war” that should never be ceased. Those who acknowledge the collapse of 
activist organizational structures accept that such a struggle ought to take place at a 
safer, more personal level.     
In this chapter I will examine the transformations that my interviewees’ 
underwent under two headings. First, I will examine in detail my interviewees’ 
responses to questions about the economic and ideological changes they have 
experienced since the height of their activism in the 1970s. These two dimensions have 
been considered in tandem; to be more precise, economical transformations act together 
with the ideological changes since economic changes seem to have created an ideology 
among my respondents that reflects their changing level of welfare. The social and 
economic transformations that Turkey underwent as a whole are discussed in relation to 
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my interviewees’ responses. Second, I will look at the changes and deviations in the 
faith of revolution and then our next topic will be integration to the capitalist system 
with an analysis of economical and ideological transformations that my interviewees 
experienced. 
3.2.  Integration into the Capitalist System: Economical and Ideological 
Transformations 
 
3.2.1.  Economical and Ideological Transformations in Turkey in the 1980s 
Undoubtedly, the coup of 1980 was a traumatic experience for many people. 
From 1980 to 1983, democratic rights could not be exercised and in this undemocratic 
atmosphere, the state was exalted and sacralized. In order to legitimize this intervention, 
the military government produced an “illness” discourse, according to which the system 
was not robust anymore since it was infected with ideological viruses. The main reason 
for the chaotic and anarchic environment of the country was considered to be the young 
population. The public believed university youth in particular was under the effect of 
the “harmful” foreign ideologies and due to this rapidly spreading and socially 
poisonous illness, basic institutions could not function. Thus, military intervention was 
analogized as a precaution or even an operation to save the life of the patient. Here, the 
patient was the state and the source of viral illness that would kill the patient was the 
ideologies in the young brains. Therefore, the military started a policy of finding and 
destroying “the guilty” as a part of the process of treatment. Based on this diagnosis, 
students and all social institutions that were considered as the responsible actors of the 
environment of conflict were taken under the military’s control and “disciplined”. 
While the illness metaphor had diagnosed the “feebleness” in society and determined 
the elements that subverted the social order, at the same time it was used to legitimize 
and underline the necessity of the intervention. To be more precise, the illness discourse 
gave Kenan Evren (The Chief of General Staff and the leader of the coup of 1980) an 
opportunity to pretend to serve as a responsible doctor who was focused on the life of 
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his patient and thus, he highlighted the so-called socially sensitive character of the 
intervention in order to purge the coup of its cruel and violent political character17 
(Gürbilek, 1992, pp. 70-71; Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 43, p. 336). Aside from this 
traumatic and critical interpretation of the post-coup period, others view this period as a 
time during which democracy is built, human rights developed, civil society 
organizations proliferated, and integration to the global markets was achieved. 
According to this viewpoint, while the military intervention is legitimized by referring 
to the violence in the streets, unstable economic structure, and polarization in the 
political arena; to a large extent the coup is seen as a necessity to restructure the 
political and economic system. Thus the post-1983 period is considered as a period of 
demilitarization and transition to a new system in which the regime is civilized and 
democracy is consolidated under the neo-liberal policies (Kılıç, 1998, p.92). 
Throughout the 1980s, there was a conscious erasure of memory and breaking of 
connections with the revolutionary political atmosphere of the 1970s. The 1970s were 
located as an anarchic period which opposed the liberal and individualist discourse of 
the 1980s and terms such as labor, worker, and exploitation were one by one erased 
from social discourse and memory (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 379). After the coup, 
political parties were closed down, the politicians were banned from political activities, 
curfews were applied, social life was interrupted due to the harsh precautions that were 
taken in order to assure stability, and an absolute insecurity and a traumatic anxiety 
emerged in society. Many people underwent a grueling and inhumane imprisonment 
process which caused deaths, psychological disorders and societal level fear. While this 
fear was fed by organized state violence and suppression, it deepened with the 
                                                            
17 In the first notice of the National Security Council, the military intervention of 1980 was explained as 
follows:   
Turkish Republic has been exposed to ideological and physical attacks in the last few years due 
to with the provocation by of the enemies inside and outside of the country… The destructive 
and divisive elements focuses increased their activities at a drastic level… Instead of Kemalism, 
reactionary [irticai] and perverted [sapık] ideologies were produced and, in a systematic and 
traitorous way, all education institutions, administrative system, judicial bodies, organization of 
security, institutions of workers, political parties and lastly our citizens were exposed to attacks 
and come within an ace of division and civil war. 
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economic crisis and uncertainty in the social life that stemmed from existing ambiguity 
even for the near future (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 40). Undoubtedly, the 1970s were 
the years of high social and political sensitivity. However, this culture was considered 
dangerous both by the public and the state. The public had paid the price of social and 
political sensitivity with severe losses and therefore was in fear. In other words, the 
violent memories and experiences of pre and post-coup period had created a collective 
memory in the public that would support the depolitization process. On the other hand, 
the state also did not want to face a second ideological threat which would challenge its 
authority. Therefore, after the coup of 1980, the main aim was raising an apolitical 
generation and creating an apolitical society. While politics was taken out of daily life, 
popular culture was used to fill the gap which was emerged due to the departure of 
politics from daily life. Popular culture not only prompted the popularity of certain 
products and activities but also prompted certain behavior patterns, point of views and 
thinking styles. As a part of this shift in society, success became the rising value and the 
measure for the level of success was measured around material capital, making 
“money” central to all interactions and (self)evaluations. In this framework, money 
represented the happiness of buying and consuming. While earning money was 
idealized as the main target; as a reflection of this ideal, the society aimed to earn more, 
spend more and consume better (Bali, 2002b, p. 61; Lüküslü, 2009, p. 122; Navaro 
Yaşin, 2003, p. 231). (This is seen very strongly in my interview with Yağmur, among 
others.) 
Consumption emerged as a central issue in the post 1980. After the coup period 
consumption was not only spending money anymore; at the same time it was a 
satisfaction, pleasure, happiness and even a life-style. In this formulation while people 
were buying something, they were also obtaining the attached meanings which were the 
prescriptions for reaching aforementioned feelings (Ahıska & Yenal, p. 56; p. 62; p. 72, 
2006; Şahin, 2005, p. 160). Money was not an object that brought along status in the 
1970s; however, this belief did not last for too long.  The culture of saving which had 
shaped the 1970s left its place to the culture of consumption that tempted people’s 
passions in the 1980s. From this aspect, the consumption hunger of the 1980s was a 
transition from being against waste to consuming more and thus producing more waste 
(Gürbilek, 2001, p. 16; Lüküslü, 2009, p. 124). 
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Moreover, by means of the technological advances; cheap, fast, easily 
spreadable and distributable mass production was possible. This situation created an 
increase in the number of available products and a market which was in search of the 
consumption of these goods. In this equation, people had to be transformed into 
consumers who were persuaded with the belief of the consumption need in order to 
sustain the production and consumption cycle. In order to stimulate that need, cities 
became giant open air shopping malls with thousands of shop-windows, cafes and 
avenues that exhibited these products. However; that transformation was not enough 
unless consumption was a cycle which promoted re-consumption. Due to that reason, 
the concept of fashion came to the forefront and shortened the life time of the 
consumption products with the promise of being in line with contemporary fashion 
(Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 370; as cited in Şahin, 2005, p. 159). That situation paved the 
way for the emergence of a capitalist trade industry which devoted itself to the 
organization of people’s weaknesses for consumption.  
How did this industry organize people’s weaknesses? At this point media played 
a major role by gaining another function: it taught the masses how to be a consumer and 
kept the consumption stimulation alive through advertisements (Bali, 2002b, p. 
58).Why was this consumption necessary? Transition to free market economy was 
considered as a necessity as a part of Turkey’s articulation to the world economy. The 
sustainability of the market economy depended on consumption. Therefore, 
consumption was promoted by the market in order to be able to be fed by people’s 
expenses. In the process of consumption, the media was the catalyst that internalized 
this process for the masses with its wide accessibility and availability to audiences. On 
the one hand, the media made people feel that they had the choice to consume what they 
wanted; on the other hand, it created a perception of selection freedom among multiple 
options determined by market dynamics (Şahin, 2005, p. 160; p. 167; Wuthrich, 2010, 
p. 225). Thus, new consumption patterns spread with discourses provided by the media. 
Mass medium had the power of enabling cultural transformations and the creation of 
popular culture. While the media informed and educated people in order to consume by 
broadcasting; it also produced a discourse that supported the global capitalist market 
structure in order to sustain consumption. In a sense, the media swayed masses by 
combining the product, service and ideology (Şahin, 2005, p. 159). 
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3.2.2.  The Interviewees  
Gönül: The Search for “Non-Ideological Leftism” 
When Gönül looks at what she inherited from the left, even if she is happy about 
what she learned from the movement, she also harbors some regrets about the 
movement and even criticizes it. In our interview, she said that the leftist movement 
changed the course of her life, making her into another person. On the positive side, she 
made new friends and had new experiences. Her final calculation is that her 
participation in the movement was negative: “Since I had a criminal record, I could not 
even more forward in my career. I always wanted to be a professor, but I could not. I 
quit a master’s program and only completed it later on.” Even if she had the opportunity 
to accomplish her dreams in later years, her career was irreparably scarred, and she 
could not find the courage to pursue her academic ideals. Through all her regret, I 
cannot determine whether she finds the leftist movement or herself responsible for the 
failure of her career goals. As she asked me, rhetorically:  
Can you please tell me what the chance was of me finding a job as a philosophy 
graduate? I could either be a teacher or an academician. During those years I 
could be neither of them. Okay, I accept that I could not be at the point where I 
should in my career. But this was what I could do.  
One can sense here a feeling of guilt, an attempt to rationalize her integration to 
the capitalist system. In this context, Gönül justifies her participation in a system that 
she tried to change with the message that “there was no other way”. When I asked her 
directly if she considered making an effort to change her life rather than (more 
passively) accepting the changes to her life, Gönül told me about the background behind 
her transformation:  
The rules of the game changed in a single day. The day the rule changed was 
September 12, and the incident that changed the game was the military coup of 
1980. The movement dispersed. Nothing remained. While being honest, 
courageous, sharing, kindhearted, and defiant was important before, now the 
amount of money in your pocket suddenly became important.  
She also underlined the realities of daily life, saying that one needed a home and 
a job to survive. Then she made a clarification: “This was not related to the changed 
priorities, this was related to the conditions of Turkey in the 1980s.” In her story, when 
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the rules changed, she had to become a part of the system in order to adjust to these 
changes. 
The necessity to adjust to new rules, meanwhile, derived from the trauma of the 
event: Gönül defined the post-coup period as one in which all her hopes, loved ones, 
faith, and comrades disappeared. It was a time which she described as “losing 
everything and everybody you know. A time period in which you give up your 
comrades in order to protect them”. The fears of arrest by the police and of causing her 
friends’ arrest prevented Gönül from meeting with her friends. In order to continue with 
her life, she said, she wiped the slate clean and did not see her friends for 30 years. 
Here, the coup emerges as the reason for the rupture of friendships and the terminator of 
strong ties. Thus, she summarized the reality behind her transformation as follows:  
You are left alone with absolutely nothing left to your name. It is so painful 
because you are not ready to face all these realities. You have to live a life you 
had wanted to change. Unfortunately, when you cannot change it, it changes you.  
Gönül’s change involved her integration into the capitalist system. Though, in 
our discussions on ideology, Gönül still described herself as a leftist, she also adds that 
she lost her faith in the ability of mere “good will” to save the world. She and her 
colleagues’ dreams of revolution in the 1970s included an armed struggle, something 
about which she now has significant doubts. She expressed a simultaneous loss in her 
motivation to chase after ideals deriving from a strong sense of their futility:  
You can think that you are pursuing a great thing. However, ‘they’ [i.e., the 
state, foreign powers and intelligence services] manipulate you. Technological 
advances enable them to watch your every step. I do not want to be considered 
as paranoiac or as conspiracy theorist. [She stops here and thinks for a couple of 
seconds] Also this should not be perceived as a kind of “learned helplessness.  
Here Gönül implies that she and her comrades tried but were unsuccessful in 
bringing about change, something which led her to believe that powerful actors in 
society would never allow people an opportunity to change the system. Nevertheless, 
she still insisted that there will be a transformation in the world system, something she 
said was independent from all ideologies. Gönül said she no longer trusted any “–isms”, 
saying no movement could be free of egos and careerist concerns. Ideology could be 
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perfect on paper, she said, but people are the actors who would actually have to carry it 
to fruition. 
For her own part, Gönül defined herself simply as an “anti-racist leftist” (a 
phrase which in Turkish, unlike English, does not include the suffix “-ism”). Gönül did 
not believe that she went through a major ideological and social transformation: “I am 
still a leftist because I do not evaluate being a leftist as doing certain things.” She does 
not have to be active to be a leftist, merely to feel sympathy with its ideas. She 
described herself as a wiser person, less idealistic but more sensitive, developed, and 
aware of what can actually be done. Moreover, her field of struggle changed, too. Gönül 
said that she realized many things that she disregarded during the 1970s, like protecting 
the environment, were more worthy of attention today.  
When I asked about the economic changes and her process of integration into the 
capitalist system, Gönül said that even if people “became capitalist”, they preserved 
their socialist aspect as well. She said she does not view her career development and 
earning money as a deviation from her former ideals. Rather, the way profit is used is 
important; Gönül even considered a transition to capitalism as a force for good that 
could enable one to contribute to the development of young generations with financial 
and social capital it had provided. Here, she said that there was no need to exalt the past 
and transform it into an untouchable or an incontestable taboo. Settling an account with 
the past, criticizing it, and accepting the inevitable change, feelings and beliefs were 
normal for her. In this context, we could say that Gönül viewed the acceptance of a 
transformation natural; what was abnormal would be a disregard of experience. 
From this aspect, Gönül considers her transformation as an inevitable and 
nonhazardous type of change. She asserts that she still protects the soul she had during 
the 1970s and defines her luxurious house, car, and life style only as physical 
appearance: “This is what you see from the surface; but, I know what I have inside me. I 
am still the same free girl. She is still alive. This is why I still respect myself.” After this 
comment I ask whether her present job conflicts with the ideals and viewpoint of the 
Gönül of the 1970s. Suddenly she becomes sad and reluctantly accepts the existence of 
the contradiction in her life. However, then she legitimizes this contradiction saying that 
she quit her job when she was in a very good position. She claims that she protested the 
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system in a way that was peculiar to her. “I have always criticized the system. I have 
never behaved in a classical way. I told the bad parts of the system to my students and 
then we tried to find a solution altogether.” At this point she implies that if you become 
a part of the system without losing the awareness about what it is like, your actions may 
be regarded as a struggle against the system. 
Engin: “Justice, Not Leftism” 
Another one of my interviewees, Engin, did not want to categorize his current 
ideological stand, since he said his ideology did not fit any of the classical definitions. 
His main principles are being libertarian, egalitarian, and just. He defines his justice 
concept as opposing the enslavement, exploitation, and homogenization 
[kimliksizleştirme] of the people. However, apart from all these, he cannot identify 
himself as a leftist since the definition of the left is relative. According to Engin, a coup 
officer, a revolutionist, a nationalist, and a liberal can also define themselves as leftists 
based on their perceptions of the left. Due to that reason, he does not want to stick to the 
“-isms”. He says that he has conflicting ideas with every ideology but if one evaluates 
him by taking the main concepts of the left into the consideration, he sees himself as a 
person who can be defined by the left.    
At this point of our conversation I ask about his process of integration to the 
system. He accepts that Engin of the 1970s does not support the status of Engin today: 
“I had never thought of a life in which I had a family and children.” There is an Engin 
in front of me who had always dreamed of himself as a warrior who would change the 
world. His current life is safe and stable whereas he was in an absolute adventure, action 
and danger during the 1970s. In this context, Engin confesses that he lives a life that 
young Engin could never visualize. Then he adds: “Engin in the 1970’s cannot accept 
this new lifestyle; because this one is out of his imagination.” Here I ask him if he feels 
uncomfortable about his integration to the capitalist system or not. He says no and 
claims that he has never been “mentally” integrated to the system. This statement 
immediately reminds me of a quotation from the movie Robin Hood: “You might take 
my body, but you can never take my soul.” Unfortunately, I think aloud and mistakenly 
say this sentence; but rather than get angry with me, Engin starts laughing. He says that 
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my quotation was a perfect explanation for his situation. Then he starts explaining his 
rejection of mental integration:  
My relationship with money is a bad one. I do not value money and do not care 
about the ownership of property. Money only makes sense since I have children. 
Only for their future or to ensure their safety, I care about money.  
Whatever the reason, we see the axial shift in terms of the position of money in 
his life. He legitimizes the position of money through his children’s needs. He does not 
earn for himself and he still does not give importance to money but it does not change 
the result: He makes a good living through his integration to the capitalist system.  
Engin informs me that he has changed in many aspects. For example today, he 
does not believe in armed struggle anymore and considers it as a last option when there 
is no option for self-defense. In his framework, if one uses violence to make people 
accept something for a reason apart from defense, it does not work:  
Violence does not solve anything; rather it makes everything more complicated. 
I also forwent the idea of forcing the society to do something through a top-
down or bottom-up pressure. It was wrong to try to impose the system in our 
mind to all social strata regardless of their class. I advocated a proletarian 
dictatorship without considering it as a dictatorship or maybe I believed in the 
necessity of this dictatorship in order to reach the absolute freedom.  
He implies that at these years he lived in a dream world or in a wonderland that 
lacked objectivity. According to him, what made him change was the years passed. 
When he was in the leftist movement, he was a young boy of 16 who was trying to 
materialize the revolution, now he is a mature family man with different priorities. 
Fatih: A “Modern Dervish” 
Similar to Engin, Fatih does not label himself as a leftist. Being a leftist is a very 
general identification for him that depends on how the left is defined. In this context, he 
is a “freelance leftist” who still rejects ownership of private property: “I live with a 
luggage as a tourist: always ready to leave and without personal attachment to any 
particular place.” I ask if this independent and non-attached person is a lovable man for 
the Fatih in the 1970s or not. He smiles and sincerely wishes: “I wish he would have 
met someone like me”. He does not consider himself as someone who conflicts with his 
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political convictions in the 1970s. He does not deny changes in beliefs and faith in the 
revolution and the deviations from the target of the 1970s. However, now he is in 
another platform of struggle. He believes in something different in comparison to the 
1970s and pursues it. What he chases is not a socialist revolution anymore. It is a 
nameless struggle. In his own words, it is an orphan struggle without any past, future, 
dependence, and relation. He says that when you are inside a movement it is both an 
emotional and a physical entrapment. For this reason, in order to protect his objectivity, 
he wants to be independent. If this is a story of struggle, he as a “modern dervish” (his 
terminology) is the hero. 
As a modern dervish, he tries to keep his disconnectedness to the capitalist 
system. He defines this process as a conscious preference and then admits, smiling like 
a little boy: “I tried to integrate at some point, it did not happen. Definitely, it does not 
happen”. By a trial and error method, he decides that even if he wants to be a part of the 
system, the system does not accept him. Even if he criticizes his friends because of their 
integration he also confesses that he attempted to do the thing he criticized.  
Tayfun: The Trauma of Reintegration into Capitalist Society 
The following two stories are closely related to the competing visions of the 
post-1980 period described in the introduction. Among my interviewees Tayfun is the 
first interviewee who openly indicated that he still supports the use of armed struggle. In 
his opinion, if you want to change something, you cannot do it without guns. In his 
story of the 1970s, the use of armed struggle was a defense tool against the counter-
guerilla and fascist attacks. He explains why he preserves his logic for today as follows: 
“If you want to rebel against something, on the one hand you have to defend yourself 
and on the other hand you have to struggle against the state.” Therefore, to provide the 
sustainability of this process the use of arms has a huge importance in his narration. 
However, we should not think Tayfun as a person who is still loyal to the same ideals at 
the same level. Tayfun has also undergone through many transformations during his 
leftism journey. For example, he does not believe in organized struggle anymore. The 
hierarchical organizational structure and discretionary decisions made by the central 
committee of the organization undermined his belief in terms of continuing the struggle 
within an organization. Nevertheless, he underlines that the belief and ideology was 
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right but sustaining the struggle under an organizational structure was wrong since the 
organizations “got stuck on primitive issues” (egos, careerist concerns, hierarchy, 
authoritarianism, discipline obsession and so on). He argues that the main struggle 
should have been against imperialism not towards the personal interests and ego based 
concerns which he considers as the zones of impasse for the movement.     
Tayfun defines his reintegration process as a traumatic experience. After his 
imprisonment, when he returned to Đstanbul, he encountered a drastic change. Nothing 
was the same; the people and the streets were different. The old friend groups were 
fragmented; the city was more crowded and full of new buildings. There was almost 
nothing which had remained the same at the end of five years that he spent in prison. It 
was not the world that he knew and this unfamiliarity caused a shock. At that point, he 
decided to be realist and positioned the revolution as a far probability for Turkey in his 
mind. As a part of his new ideological framework, he returned to the university and 
finished his studies. Then, he completed his military service and married a woman who 
did not have connections with the leftist circles. Here his emphasis for his wife’s being 
an apolitical woman attracted my attention and I wondered why he chose an apolitical 
person to marry. However, he gave an evasive answer:  
My wife loves me a lot, I know that and I love her too. But it is… I mean I did 
not think about our marriage a lot. Of course I thought. I thought a lot. I decided 
by thinking. It was not a swift decision. 
He made these confusing remarks and stopped. Even if I could not understand 
what he meant I could not insist for an answer because apparently, he did not want to 
talk about this topic. At the same time, it was an emotional moment that he was talking 
about his feeling of failure in terms of integration to the capitalist system. Thus, I let 
him continue with what he wanted to talk about and he kept on telling his story where 
he resumed:  
I could not keep up with the process. I see my situation as an economical 
recession. I still could not get rid of the residues of that period [the 1970s]. 
Indeed, in order to develop economically you have to sacrifice some of your 
values. I cannot integrate into the capitalist system. You have to cut and throw 
your past away. Then, you can integrate. You should easily tell lies, you should 
flatter, and you should reject personal relationships with the poor in order to earn 
money. I am an engineer. I have the knowledge and I should put my knowledge 
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into someone’s service. I have to tell lies. I should say “if he does it for three 
liras, I can do it for two liras”. People are doing this but this is against my non-
competitive nature so I cannot develop economically. When you cannot develop 
economically, it reflects on your personal relationships. You have to sacrifice 
some of your interests since you do not have the budget for them. You cannot go 
to cinema, you cannot eat out. This has a negative effect on your life; because, 
you have to share this deprivation with your family.  
Here we see his guilt feelings stemming from feeling of imprisoning his family 
to share the consequences of his choices. His perceived inability to integrate into system 
or his rejection decision in terms of integrating to the system is binding also for the 
people around him. He implies that he suffers because of this feeling. This situation 
sounds like a burden that preoccupies him as he tells his story. 
Along with introducing the preservation of the values as an obstacle for 
integrating into the capitalist system, Tayfun at the same time explains why he could not 
integrate into capitalism in relation with the transformations that the world underwent 
during those years. In his narration, after 1980, a new era started and capitalism cruelly 
attacked freedoms. Tayfun regards this process as “normal” since it was impossible to 
create a new world concept without narrowing down the rights and freedoms of the 
classes and groups. As a result, a new world order was created by ruining the balance in 
the world. Under the domination of the capital concept instead of communities, 
individuals came to the forefront. However; “the individual” could not come to the 
forefront with arbitrary characteristics:   
Specific characteristics were exalted and imposed on the individuals. Then, the 
individual acted in accordance with the format that was installed to her/him. The 
prescription was simple: Unless you behave like that, you cannot be like this. 
The individual absorbed these directions and transformed into another person.  
Tayfun sees himself unsuccessful in terms of behaving compatible with the 
“format” that was the key for integration.  However, he also accepts that he and his 
comrades had a format during the 1970s. I say “the format of Deniz Gezmiş” and he 
smiles and says yes. This format which sounds like a program uploaded to a system is 
the responsible actor of his disintegration. Even if there are some minor changes in his 
viewpoints, he underlines that his core ideologies are still the same. This is why he 
defines his present-day self as a person who could be loved by the Tayfun of the 1970s. 
He does not deny that he wanted to be a part of the system but even if he had tried, his 
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integration could not occur in the post 1980 process:  “Even if I tried to be a capitalist 
from time to time I failed. This is true, I failed. In fact, I could have done it, but it did 
not work.”  
Metin: Rational Acceptance of the System 
Metin approaches the post-1980 period more positively, telling the story of a 
successful integration without denying the privileges of his present condition. He 
defines himself as a successful lawyer who went through an integration process in terms 
of being a part of the capitalist system. Moreover, he considers this transformation as a 
rational transformation or being in accordance with the requirements of the era. He 
defines himself as a free market advocate but not as an absolute liberal. Social policies 
are an important part of his ideology. He does not have any problems with the 
capitalism as long as competition is kept under control through anti-monopoly laws. 
Within this framework, he evaluates the developments in the post 1980 period very 
positively. Nevertheless, he too rejects having gone through an ideological 
transformation. Since integration with capitalist system is an inevitable necessity for 
him; he does not think that it is an obstacle in front of sharing leftist ideals. This is why; 
despite his integration he emphasizes his stand as “leftist”. 
When Metin sums up his ideas, he explains that he has a unique leftist ideology 
which cannot be imprisoned to any of the existing political parties. However, he still 
defines himself as a leftist without any change from the 1970s, even more leftist since 
he keeps his revolutionist soul, equality and justice values. According to him, what 
changed is only the method he defends to reach the ideal: “Getting stuck in the solutions 
that prescribe “one way” is like foundering in quicksand. To go one step further there is 
a need to make a clean break with the past and stop discussing it.” In this formulation, 
discussing the past keeps it alive and focusing on further glories to make a deep change 
is impossible without forgoing past glories. Here we see how Metin rationalizes his 
erasure of the leftist past. He is aware of the fact that in order to integrate into the 
system that he rejected, first he should transform the ideology that forces him to reject 
it. Therefore, he develops a unique ideology that will not conflict with present day 
Metin.    
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He defines this ideology as a struggle for the democracy independent from class 
relations. He dreams of political parties that can represent all kinds of interests and 
defends parliamentary struggle alongside active and non-violent street struggles. In this 
context, what he proposes is a dynamic struggle process that has both parliamentary and 
civil dimensions. Today he is completely against illegal organizations. The rejection of 
armed struggle and carrying on struggle in the illegal platforms are two issues that he 
accepts as changes in his perspective. However, he rejects a drastic ideological change 
and does not consider his economic transformation as significant. In his narration, 
economic transformations resemble acting according to the requirements of today. 
Moreover, he thinks that the socialist determinations of the 1970s related with 
economical issues were wrong or incomplete:  
Sharing something according to everybody’s needs is problematic since needs 
are unlimited. In addition, competition is a necessity to push the society. The 
Soviet type of socialism became unsuccessful because it demanded people earn 
nothing and work for someone else rather than their personal interests.  
Metin expresses that he does not find this approach and the application of it to 
today’s world practical, pauses for a second, and then continues with a smile: “I know 
they will call me a liberal and a capitalist when they read my sentences.”     
At this point, he does not reject his capitalist stand today. He is just 
uncomfortable with using the word capitalist as an insult. In fact, even if he calls 
himself a capitalist, he assumes that he has the same “soul” as before, with modified 
ideas. The metaphor of “the same soul” emerges in different parts of our conversation as 
a port he approaches to rationalize (or minimize) his transformation. To put it in other 
words, he always uses the “same-Metin assertion” to prove that there is no intra-
personal conflict. Therefore, he alleges that he is compatible with his past. 
Despite his claims to have adopted a “humane capitalist” worldview, Metin still 
considers today a transition period on the way to an ideal classless society. In order to 
reach it there are “one hundred steps” and today presents “the tenth step”. However, this 
view of history as a constant, one-way transition conflicts with his previous claims 
regarding his notion of the past and history as a “completed stage”. In the beginning of 
our interview, he proposed considering the past as a completed, expired event. He even 
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used the expression “taking a clear break from the past and looking forward in order to 
proceed” but in the discourse above, he spoke as a person who still believes in the 
revolution. Also, there is the guilt feeling of living according to capitalist standards. He 
considers today as a transition period where the concepts of money and class are 
preserved. However, this is a temporary preservation; at the end of the transition these 
notions will disappear. This is why he explains that his current stand does not betray his 
leftist past. His integration into the capitalist system represents a pragmatic acceptance 
of the current situation while awaiting the fulfillment of an “inevitable” classless 
society. 
Mehmet: The Continued Necessity of an Armed Struggle 
Mehmet is the only interviewee who rejects any kind of transformation and 
defines the changes in his ideas as the “strengthened versions” of his previous thoughts. 
In this context, Mehmet’s ideas about armed struggle are still more or less the same: 
arms are a necessity since they are the only tool that can create a change at the social 
level. As a part of this idea, he asserts that none of the movements can be successful 
unless they include armed struggle. Also, he does not display any ideological change in 
his political stand. He still clings to his past and rejects the notion of his becoming 
different. Therefore, if Mehmet in the past is a leftist who deserves five out of five in a 
scale that measures the volume of the leftism, today he evaluates himself as a leftist 
who deserves 25 since he developed his worldview during the past years.    
He is proud of his past and keeping his leftist part alive despite the people who 
see the participation in the movement as only a part of being a student: “After 
completing your education, what is expected is giving up the faith in the leftist 
movement and directing your life in another path.” He explains that he did not do this, 
and according to his framework, the ones who did this became successful if the 
determinant factor of success was earning money. Here seeing leftism as a student’s 
hobby and then continuing life in an apolitical platform emerge as factors that enable a 
soft integration into the capitalist system. However, as I said previously Mehmet did not 
or could not do this, and he explains the consequence of this situation with his own 
words as follows: “If you do not or cannot give up your faith in the left, they start 
labeling you as a traumatized individual.”  
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Mehmet frames continuing the leftist struggle as a trauma in the eyes of the 
people; because, it refers to living together with a perceived failure. Moreover, 
continuing the struggle means the protection of the leftist values; hence, the rejection of 
being capitalist by exploiting people in order to earn money. He claims that due to his 
values, he could not and cannot be successful in business life. He says that being 
successful requires being cruel, competitive, and shrewd, but he is a person who had 
absorbed the values of equality, justice and communality of the leftist movement. He 
believes that since he prefers his values to integration into the capitalist system, he 
cannot earn money and says, smiling: “This is my reputation [nam]: the best engineer 
with no money.”  His leftist pride controls his life and he is sad because of people’s 
criticisms and sarcastic words:  
Everybody mocks me. The question is why a person like me becomes like this. I 
would have been a boss or the biggest name in the sector. But I could not. I am 
like a worker and they also say I am like this. Nobody sees me as normal. They 
approach me with pity [acıma], what a pity that I am like that.     
Murat: Pragmatic Passivity 
Interestingly, Mehmet’s stereotype of students who would give up leftism with 
their graduation corresponds to Murat’s own story. In Murat’s story, his leftism 
emerged as a part of the studentship and ended with graduation. However, even if Murat 
confesses the lack of his political activism after graduation, he displays a significant 
rejection in terms of accepting the capitalist tendencies in his current life. When I 
directly ask about his transformation, he does not accept that he underwent a capitalist 
change. Moreover, he insists on defining himself as a socialist. The only criticism he 
has for himself is his lack of activism today. He explains that what led him to 
“passivity” was graduation from the university, getting married, and taking the 
responsibility of his wife and children:  
You have to earn your own money. During the university years there is no need 
to think about these issues since your family supported you. However, after 
graduation you have to direct your energy towards earning money rather than 
struggling for the revolution. In addition, there was the fear that stemmed from 
the coup regime and its harsh policies in those years.  
Linking his withdrawal from active support of the leftist movement to 
graduation signals the association of leftism with university and studentship. Marriage 
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refers to a rupture in his life; because, it represents an increase in his responsibilities and 
marks his transformation from a “student” to a “family man.” With the increase in the 
responsibilities on his shoulders, he rationalizes his effort to earn money. “Violence” in 
his story refers to state terror in the post 1980 period. The risk of dying or undergoing 
severe tortures emerges as deterrent factors and they cause continuous fear and anxiety. 
However, even if Murat addresses fear as a reason for severing ties with the movement, 
he also frames this fear as a noble fear, which relates to his anxieties about what would 
happen to his family and their future if something bad happened to him.   
Even if Murat counts these reasons for his withdrawal from the leftist 
movement, he does not link them to any ideological shift that he has experienced. In 
fact, he does not believe that he has experienced ideological shifts. Since he strongly 
believes in his commitment to socialist values, he ignores the conflict in his ideas and 
his life style. When I ask him what would be the reaction of Murat in the 1970s if he 
saw that Murat today constructs buildings with the workforce of the laborers, he says 
that it is not an unexpected thing for Murat in the 1970s to do these things as a 
construction engineer: “It should not be a shock for Murat, he knew what I was 
studying. I am not doing something irrelevant.” At that point I intervene and ask about 
the apparent contradiction between the socialist values that he claims to preserve and his 
employment of workers; in other words his contribution to class-based social relations. 
He asserts that there is no contradiction here and adds that the important thing is paying 
the workers what they deserve in return for what they produce. 
Yağmur: The Rejection of Consumerism 
My interviewee Yağmur drew attention to society’s desire to consume, calling it 
the opium that silences society. She based this idea on her own transformation: “After 
prison, my friends who were not involved in politics did not want to see me and ran 
away from me not to label themselves as a leftist in the eyes of the police. I turned into 
a feared person.” This situation caused social isolation for Yağmur and under these 
conditions she assumed the best strategy for survival as transformation. However, she 
defines this transformation not as a total change, rather transforming in some aspects in 
order to fit into the social context. According to Yağmur, these transformations were not 
incidents that were independent from the changes in the post-1980 period. She sees a 
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correlation that she defined as non-coincidental between the social changes and the state 
led changes. This is why in her framing what we live today, is what is planned by the 
state and wanted from us to live 30 years ago. In this framing, while the state paved the 
way for the conditions of today; people were transformed into individuals who became 
addicted to the system by overconsumption and hence lost their ability to raise their 
voice under the effect of artificial pursuits.       
Yağmur sees herself as outside of the consumption trend in society; as a matter 
of fact she does not have the required money to be a part this trend. She considers her 
integration as a necessity which could not be successfully completed. Therefore she 
calls her situation as an “imperfect” integration:  
My relationship with money is not strong. I still deny money being the central 
focus of the life. I never aimed to earn big money. I did not make any 
concessions to earn money. It is enough to have money that would enable me to 
buy this cigarette.  
As an extension of this observation, she thinks that Yağmur of the 1970s would 
not reject her; even if there is a reduction in the level of her political activism. She is a 
passive left sympathizer today in comparison to the militant Yağmur of the 1970s. At 
the same time, she sees her integration, even if it is imperfect, as a reason for the 
reduction in her activism: “I am a part of the system too. Being totally out of the circle 
is impossible. I cannot be an outsider. I have two children inside the system.” 
However, after uttering these sentences, Yağmur feels guilty and changes her 
discourse towards defending her current political performance. Even if she confirms 
that she is not an intensely politicized person anymore; she is reluctant to accept the 
ongoing passivity in her life: “Okay, maybe I am not in the streets. But there are tons of 
ways. Today I paint and draw pictures. My rebellion is hidden in these paintings.” Thus, 
we see a Yağmur who reflects her ideology to art and uses art to express herself, instead 
of street demonstrations.  
At this point of our interview, I ask her how she defines herself ideologically. 
She calls herself as a socialist whose line is uncertain [çizgisi belirsiz sosyalist] and 
continues to explain the changes in her view of life:  
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During the 1970s there was a standard way of dressing which consisted of boots, 
parka [coat] and jeans and you were categorized based on what you wore. The 
old Yağmur was a person who got stuck in appearances or images but today’s 
Yağmur is aware of what is important is what you have in your head rather than 
how you look. Also I am more realistic and consistent today. I am not a dreamer 
who chases an ideal anymore. To be honest, I also do not have the courage to 
chase a dream anymore.  
Here we see that she codes the revolution as unrealistic and pursuing the 
revolution ideal as an inconsistent action. In this context, pursuing the revolution ideal 
conflicts with her pseudo-capitalist life; because, although she does not accept full 
integration, she lives in this system as a part of it. At the same time, she does not see 
herself in a brave position that could resist against the system by tying hopes to the 
dream of revolution. What killed her courage was her prison experience and what 
silenced her was the torture that she was exposed to:  
I learned how to be silent in the prison. Resisting talking is the best strategy 
when you are in prison. You had to stay silent. There was faith in the movement 
and we were conscious. The ones who did not talk got out of prison early; the 
ones who talked stayed in prison and received longer sentences. Because, if you 
talk, the things you say comes back to you. You have to say “I did not do 
anything.” “Then who did?” they [the military officers and the police) ask. You 
can say “I was alone.” or “I was with this person.” If you tell the person’s name, 
then s/he says that Yağmur already had done these things.  
Zuhal: A “Petit Bourgeois” Lifestyle 
Like Yağmur, Zuhal also says that she does not chase ideals anymore. However 
this sentence is not a confirmation of an ideological shift. While defining her social 
class as “petit bourgeois” and describing her ideology as “left”; Zuhal does not accept 
any transformations in terms of her leftist values; such that she introduces herself as a 
person who has lived in a consistent manner without conflicting with her beliefs. In this 
framework, what has changed is her personal development. She indicates that she has 
made cultural investments to herself and has developed herself intellectually throughout 
the years. This is why, Zuhal in 2011 is a wiser, more realistic, more selective and 
rational individual who does not chase after dreams. Here the word “dream” represents 
the revolution ideal and she does not reject that she does not pursue this ideal anymore. 
However, by emphasizing her commitment to leftist values, she stresses that what she 
gave up is only the revolution ideal.  
67 
 
In Zuhal’s story too, the preserved leftist values are located as a hindering 
element in terms of her relationship with money. Undoubtedly, this does not mean that 
she rejects the necessity of money to survive. What she underlines is keeping money at 
the periphery of life as a secondary issue. Notwithstanding, she also supports using 
money as a tool to fulfill personal tastes and interests. In her life, there is a living 
standard in which she can engage in her hobbies. Here there is a contradiction: She uses 
money to satisfy her desires and claims that she keeps money in the periphery of her 
life. However, she also implies that her living standards are at the core of her life, then 
how can the medium that provides the materialization of these standards be positioned 
at the periphery? 
Among my interviewees, there is a general tendency to reject the importance of 
money in their life and Zuhal’s story is in line with this common orientation. Protection 
of the leftist values always emerges as an element that is used in order to vindicate their 
present relationships with money. Developing relationship with money and valuing 
money is considered as surrendering to the capitalist system and since my interviewees 
resist accepting their integration to the capitalist world, they always rationalize and 
legitimize their current positions. The protection of the leftist values and soul and 
preservation of the sensitivity towards the issues in the world are the topics that are 
underlined and repeated in order to prove their non-compatibility with the system.  
Đlyas: “I Am Not a Leftist Anymore” 
In contrast to this general tendency, Đlyas openly declared his close relationship 
with money at the beginning of our interview. In conjunction with this confession he did 
not deny the change in his privileges:  
I still believe that there is a constant inequality in the society. But I make this 
assessment independent from any right or left ideologies. This is a determination 
made by a bourgeois person which is me. I am not a leftist anymore. I do not 
think that I am a leftist or socialist. However I also do not think that the things I 
believed in and wanted in the past were wrong. I mean we wanted the right 
things. I still say I wish it could have happened. However for today I cannot 
know to what extent I can relinquish my life standards for a struggle or to take 
place in a struggle.  
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Đlyas sees the inequalities as undesired but inevitable consequences of the 
current system; however, he does not fight to terminate these inequalities anymore. He 
is already unsure as to what extent he can sacrifice what he has. Today he is a well-to-
do doctor with high standards of living. Undoubtedly, the present state of Đlyas’s 
luxurious life is beyond the imagination of Đlyas of the 1970s. He states that if it was 
possible, his past self would criticize him for transforming into another person and 
scrutinize what happened to him. However, he says that it is hard to protect loyalty to 
the same values, after quitting the movement. That’s why he criticizes the people who 
continue the struggle on a soft platform without organizational ties. According to Đlyas, 
this is an easy and a joyful way of “saving the county while drinking beer”. 
Sarcastically, he assesses this event as lying to oneself or deceiving oneself and defines 
the people in these kinds of softer struggles as “intellectual masturbators, non-
revolutionaries or pseudo-freedom fighters” far away from society.  
Đlyas implies that at least he is honest enough to confess that he is not leftist and 
revolutionary anymore. He does not attend any protests or demonstrations; and his new 
relationships are independent from any ideologies. The only thing he does as a political 
act is voting “with zero leftism” and he underlines that he is happy with his new life. 
While he is courageous enough to admit his transformation, what he criticizes in other 
former leftists is salvaging their conscience without the required devotion to 
revolutionist values. According to Đlyas, if revolution is a circle, you have to be at the 
center. If you occupy the periphery and contend that you are still leftist, this is 
hypocrisy, insincerity, and nothing more than self-satisfaction. 
Seyhan: “Pretend Like Nothing Happened” 
Like Đlyas, Seyhan also admits her capitalist transformation and ideological 
shifts without hesitation and resistance. First of all she defines today’s Seyhan as a 
person who is more aware of her personal needs and desires, unlike Seyhan of the 
1970s. She explains her participation to the leftist movement as a social status problem. 
Today she does not see any means in being a part of this type of movements since she is 
purified from collectivist understanding that disregards individuality. She feels like part 
of a small unit in a world in which she looks through an individualistic window. What 
she sees is a Seyhan at a certain standard of living in a peaceful mood and enjoying 
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what she is doing. She confesses that she has completely isolated herself from politics. 
In her current life which has no relation with any ideologies or political ideas, she seeks 
happiness independent from any kind of political institution.  
Why did she forgo the process of seeking collective happiness and start running 
after personal happiness? What forced her to review her ideology and to shift from 
extreme activism to extreme passivism? Seyhan says that she was one of the few people 
who took an active role in the movement after the 1980 coup. However, when the 
movement dissolved, her comrades fled abroad and she was left alone. Since she was a 
part of the illegal branch of the faction she belonged to, she lived an underground life in 
which she only chased the revolution ideal in absolute isolation. Due to illegality, 
secrecy and security concerns, she did not have any connections with her relatives and 
friends. Therefore after her comrades’ departure to other countries, she confides that she 
felt abandoned to her fate. She describes this feeling as “lonely helplessness”. At this 
lonely stage, she thought about what she had risked her life for and thus the integration 
process began. She decided to withdraw from the movement, turned back to a legal and 
apolitical life, and found a job.  
Her integration to a life that was far away from ideological struggles was a 
traumatic experience. She started her journey with the aim of materializing the 
revolution and ended it in a small accounting office with disappointment and few 
expectations. Living a life that she never dreamed was a painful process. She explains 
that she felt like she was a standard and ordinary person. This is why her survival 
strategy was forgetting her disappointments and restarting everything as if nothing had 
happened: “You have to draw a line to the revolutionary past. You have to pretend like 
nothing happened related with it. You try not to think about these things. In fact, this is 
not a conscious thing.” In order to draw that line with her past, Seyhan tried hard to 
adjust to the system and then went abroad to make a softer transition. She aimed to 
restart everything in an environment where she was a complete stranger. At that point 
being a stranger was an advantage that prevented other people from judging her and 
made it easy for her to forget everything.     
However, after a while the relief that stemmed from her being in a foreign 
country left its place to other feelings. The first sentence in her diary when she went to 
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Sweden was feeling like a newborn baby, but after a couple of months she wrote 
“wherever you go, you carry what you have in your mind with you”. She explains that it 
was a hard, traumatic process in which she experienced many fleeting emotions: “I left 
Turkey with the feeling of escape under the instinct of saving my life.” 
When she turned back after almost 20 years later, she was neither a leftist nor a 
revolutionary. She admits that Seyhan in the 1970s would not support her stand today; 
the old Seyhan might even blame the new Seyhan for being a part of the bourgeoisie. 
Today’s Seyhan finds the movement and the actions it took wrong. She sees a mistake 
in the nature of the movement and articulates this as follows:   
My uncle was a former leftist when I was an active militant so we were in 
conflict all the time. One day he said: Seyhan you try to materialize a revolution 
but your mother and aunt did not know how to read and write. First materialize 
the revolution at home, teach them how to read and write. First free these people, 
rather than Turkey.   
Today she believes that while trying to liberate the society; she and her 
comrades ignored the captivity in their own circles. With her current perspective, she 
criticizes the methodology that they adopted in order to materialize the revolution and 
finds it primitive and deficient. In the 1970s, while her uncle regarded her participation 
in the movement as a youth adventure or a misdirected passion, she objected to him. 
However, today, she agrees with her uncle’s insights and confesses that she even does 
not have a political ideology.  
Then we come to the “why” part of our conversation. I ask why she lacks a 
political ideology and she says that there is no political organization in today’s Turkey 
that can represent her ideas. I ask why she finds all organizations as unrepresentative 
institutions. Seyhan explains that there is no political organization that reveals her 
aspiration in terms of being a part of it. Her political activity is limited to voting for 
CHP [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party]. Here, voting CHP is 
framed as a social responsibility since she does not have any better options even if it 
does not completely match with her worldview. It is more of a matter of taking a stand 
against the rising religious wind in Turkey. Although she claims that she lacks a 
political ideology, she has a worldview that she qualifies as utopian. In this view she 
dreams of a world of fair representation in which nothing is forbidden. She still 
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preserves her equality and justice values; however, she also adds that she cannot and 
does not devote herself to an organization and there is already no organization that 
would be worth her devotion even if she considered devoting herself. 
Nehir: The Trauma of Breaking Bonds 
Like most of the interviewees, my last interviewee, Nehir, asserts that she looks 
at the world from a leftist perspective and therefore, based on this presumably 
unchanged reality, she does not see any ideological transformations in herself. In her 
view, what she has experienced are ideological modifications by sticking to her leftist 
essence, rather than absolute transformations: “I did not change my beliefs, but I 
changed the way I utter and defend my beliefs. I still believe that the left is the best for 
humanity.” She explains this methodological change in her beliefs by experience and 
knowledge accumulation:  
I learned to see the whole picture. I always step out of the frame. While 
evaluating an incident I always think about the “who, why and how” aspects of 
the issue. I also consider the invisible players so I do not accept the things as 
they are presented.  
While considering today’s Nehir as an actor who is more critical and rational in 
her evaluations; she believes that she does not conflict with her values in the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, she also admits that her present lifestyle is out of the imagination of Nehir 
in the 1970s: “This status, this life style… I had never thought about it. I could have 
died in the struggle. Death was a part of what we were doing. That’s why I did not make 
any long term plans.” Here she defensively links her new life’s being out of the 
imagination of the old Nehir, to the death risk that blocks doing long term plans rather 
than possible conflicts between her new life and the values of Nehir in the 1970s. This 
is why she does not think that Nehir in the 1970s would judge her for living a bourgeois 
life in the first place. However, when I directly ask, she admits that there is 
contradiction between how she lives today and how she dreamed to live 30 years ago.  
Economically Nehir is a person who can be considered in the upper middle 
class. Already she does not deny that she feels economically independent and secure. 
While defining how she reached this welfare level by working hard, but without 
exploiting and dominating people or currying favor with someone; also she emphasizes 
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that her educational background and her integration to business life as part of the rising 
financial sector has made her adaptation easier. At that point she makes a clarification: 
“I do not want to be considered as a person who reached this economical level by 
sacrificing her values in the 1970s.” Due to this concern, she underlines that she 
preserved her values and basic principles, and by doing so she remained at a certain 
position in business life. Then she adds: “If I had given up my values, I would have 
reached higher positions.” 
With this sentence she implies that she integrated to the capitalist system to 
some extent by sticking to her principles. The integration is a painful process in Nehir’s 
story even if it is a successful one. She says that during her integration she had to 
witness the cruel structure of the capitalist system that she attempted to change with 
revolutionist ideals: “Even if you have a good position in business life; you cannot stand 
the rottenness in the environment.” This situation causes a desire to abandon everything. 
In fact, this is the feeling which leads to transformation in order to survive. Here the 
logic is attuning to new rules in order to preserve the existence in the system. Then in 
this cycle one considers the positions as the means, not as the aim. Since a position is a 
means, thus, one does not feel guilty while receiving the salary that the system pays 
her/him in return for one’s service.     
Even if Nehir identifies the integration process as a painful experience, she also 
tells that despite this reality her transformation was a soft one. After the dissolution of 
the movement with the coup, there was a recovery attempt. In that period, the 
organization assigned her to a key position with the aim of reuniting the old cadres. 
However, she rejected taking this responsibility, since she did not find struggling with 
this organization and structure viable. Thus, her negative answer already caused the 
breaking of the ties with her faction. Undoubtedly, losing the ties with the organization 
at this point meant losing her reason to live and the social environment she had. In this 
context, it was a traumatic experience to a very large extent but since she had no 
connection with the organizational structure, this situation also made her integration 
easier. She counts the factors that hastened her integration as follows:  
I had lost my belief in the organizations so I was aware of the fact that I had no 
other option other than integration. So I started my career in the finance sector. 
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This became a catalyst for my integration. I prepared for the exams, passed them 
and started working in a bank. This preparation and studying process filled the 
gap that had emerged as a result of the passive life after the coup. Also, I 
continued my relationships with some of my friends from the faction in this 
traumatic process. We supported each other and shared our pains.  
Post-coup period represents three things for Nehir: Firstly it is the breaking of 
bonds with the organizational structure and movement, secondly it is the integration to 
the capitalist system, and thirdly it is a traumatic experience. I have already discussed 
the first two aspects of this period for Nehir; here I would like to look at the traumatic 
aspect of the post-coup period. Nehir defines this period as traumatic not only because 
she lost her social setting and the institution that she felt self-belonging; but also 
because of an absolute guilt that caused huge pains in her life.  In an environment where 
almost everybody was experiencing torture in prisons and under custody, Nehir felt the 
burden of not getting caught. She suffered for being out of prison even if none of her 
comrades blamed her for this: “I felt as if I was incomplete. As if I am out of the events. 
Everybody got caught. Not to get caught was like guilt.” From this aspect, integration to 
the capitalist system and building up a new life emerges as a lifesaving defense 
mechanism because it helps to forget. In the new system her new identity was 
independent from that of “comrade Nehir”. She views this new identity as a necessity 
because she got stuck between embracing a dead ideal and its revolutionary ghosts and 
staying alive by accepting the new conditions. Thus, in order to survive, she chose the 
second option and her story of change began. 
3.3.  Transformations in the Revolutionary Ideal and the Media  
In accordance with the discourses of my interviewees, the faith in revolution 
appears to have been preserved for most of the interviewees, even if they do not call it a 
“revolution” anymore. Undoubtedly, there is an undeniable and visible change in the 
idea of revolution. In most of my interviewees’ narration, there is the emphasis of 
“social change” rather than a revolution; because, revolution is framed as an old dream 
or a notion that belongs to adventurous old times. They believe in transformation or 
change and find their occurrence inevitable. However, the method for changing society 
that they foresee today is different from the revolutionist ideal of the 1970s.   
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The change in my interviewees’ perceptions of revolution occurred after the 
suppression of the leftist movement after 1980 and took place because of several 
elements in society. The media was one of the strongest elements used to create a sense 
that the left was on the “losing side”. The press had been dominated by the dead bodies 
of the youngsters who were punished since they were revolutionary; and hence the 
projection of being revolutionary in the collective memory was coded as dying. The 
price of believing in the revolution and pursuing the revolution dream was death and 
this price served as a factor that mobilized the end of the leftist adventure by the 
militants to some extent (Gürbilek, 2001, pp. 26-32).  
Undoubtedly, the state was carefully underlining the prospect of death and had 
substantial control over the media to convey this message. The 1982 constitution made 
the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) totally dependent on the state. During this 
state-run media period, regulation and control were the main concerns in order to follow 
the flow of information. Since the only medium, TRT, was kept under full control of the 
state, there were no other actors that could report alternative news. Therefore, without 
any obstacle, the state acted as the absolute authority that could, for the sake of the 
individual, determine what the individual should and should not know, filtering all the 
news with an overlapped strategy of censorship and official ideology propaganda 
(Gürbilek, 1992, p. 53; Kahraman, 2007, p. 133; Wuthrich, 2010, p. 225).  
If we look at the media during the 1980s, Gürbilek (2001) has pointed out an 
explosion in the number of losses of life shown in the media. Photos of the dead were 
presented with a subtext of a morality lesson and to instill fear. This presentation 
depicted what one would find if s/he did not follow the rules of the state. Death thus 
was a deserved tragic end with the message of “the state and police capture you; there is 
no place to hide.” Death punished those who opposed the unbreakable rules of the state 
and what should be drawn from this lesson was death’s being a disaster that stemmed 
from being on the extreme political sides or deviations from the social norms and rules. 
Therefore, death was presented the bitter end and the cost of doing the wrong thing, 
rather than the inescapability of mortality (Gürbilek, 2001, pp.26-27; pp. 30-32).  
To be more precise, in the early 1980s, television news was preoccupied with the 
capture of youth activists and militants, the invasion of organization houses, and the 
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execution of organization members. From that perspective, the junta government used 
the media as a propaganda and legitimization tool. The media also created fear and 
anxiety due to its violence based content in the news (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 253). 
The dead bodies on the screen were the proof of the result that one could encounter if 
s/he behaved against the state’s will. Therefore, “the public will” was the loser against 
“the state’s will” and the attempted message was the superiority and strength of the 
military. Combined with the image of violent defeat in the media, the actual instances of 
imprisonment, executions, and torture made political apathy the safest option (Ahıska & 
Yenal, 2006, p. 40). 
Change, Not Revolution 
As noted in the introduction, two groups of respondents were of two different 
opinions on the potential for revolutionary success. For example, my interviewee Engin, 
who can be placed in the first group, explains his current understanding of revolution 
with the discourse of “international change.” He states that social change can only be 
materialized when the larger masses are persuaded to change the existing system with 
the dissatisfaction that stems from the rottenness of the existing system. Persuasion 
emerges as a key concept in Engin’s discourse because he sees this step as a prerequisite 
of social change. Only after the majority of people are convinced of the need for 
transformation, the required will, effort, and determination can be brought together in 
order to create “voluntary change” on a large scale. He sees this voluntary change as an 
evolutionary process which can be defined as the result of the structural malfunction 
and destruction of the existing system. According to Engin, not only Turkey but the 
entire world will realize the necessity of a change. Thus, Engin believes in the revised 
form of the world revolution and calls it as an international transformation that results 
from the constant consumption, destruction, and exploitation in the system.  
Fatih, a low-income handicraftsman, definitely agrees with Engin and explains 
the inevitability of a change in the world order as follows:   
We look as if we try to end all life on this planet. If there was an outsider s/he 
would write a certificate of insanity to the world. We are living in madness and 
it cannot continue like that. There has to be a change.  
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However, this change that Fatih defines is no longer a socialist revolution. He 
asserts that he does not believe in revolution that he dreamed of in the 1970s but at the 
same time he repeats the ideals of the revolutionary ideal of the 1970s: “I cannot name 
this change, but the world has to get rid of nationality, race, and class.” He asserts that 
his previous faith in revolution was a blind faith that did not take into account other 
competing ideologies. Therefore, he considers the revolution as an extremist and radical 
dream of the 1970s. According to his discourse, today is not the age of revolutions 
anymore. He still hopes for change but not at a local or national level. His dream is an 
international change that is not imprisoned on any ideology or religion cell. While 
dreaming of a new world order, he defines it as nationless, stateless, raceless, and 
borderless.   
In Fatih’s discourse, we also see that he tries to be careful while talking about 
the revolution. By experience he asserts that revolution can also be a dangerous concept. 
Therefore, he does not support the classical revolution anymore and as a reflection of 
this situation, he does not want to entitle the order of the world in his mind: 
Names are always noble and bright. And the revolution is also a noble word. But 
good intentions always have the risk of causing evil things too. I witnessed that 
good will and the idea of liberation of the peasants and workers sometimes came 
along with killing in the name of revolution. If the revolution is materialized it 
will provide an uncontrollable power to the revolutionaries. Look at Cambodia. 
Look at Stalin; he was no different than Hitler. These are terrible. I no longer 
identify with any –ism.  
With these sentences he underlines the risk of exploitation of power, the 
blindness that stems from over commitment to the revolution dream, paranoia and 
skepticism that consider all other ideologies as usual suspects. In this frame, the 
revolution accompanies various risks. There can be violence in the name of revolution 
and the reason for it can be ensuring the new system’s stability, oppression of the 
opposition, cleansing of the residues of the old system, or creation of submission. 
Therefore for Fatih, the age of revolutions is over and now it is the time of 
transformation and change at the global level.    
Like Fatih, Metin defines today as a time where classical revolutions are no 
longer possible. When I ask Metin what caused the changes in his belief in the 
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revolution, he explains that he never supported a radical revolutionary method and has 
always been a non-classical revolutionary. This is why he claims that his transition from 
advocating armed struggle to a parliamentary struggle was a soft change. Then he said 
something that made us both laugh: “Factors like getting older, rise in the blood sugar 
and increase in blood pressure made this process easier.” Here we see that he considers 
the armed leftist struggle as a youthful adventure in which you can risk your life. Now 
he is a mature individual and advocates safer and more conventional methods of 
political struggle. In addition, we see that not only his ideas related with the method of 
struggle but also his ideas about the old enemy, the capitalists, have changed 
significantly. Metin indicates that his determinations related with the capitalists were 
wrong: “Me, who was against the agreements done by the capitalists, today thinks that 
the capitalists were more intelligent and more aware of the importance of a warless and 
armless society.” 
At that point I cannot understand what Metin means; because even if I try to 
keep it secret, my expectation is hearing something against the capitalists. I experience a 
small shock without showing him and I ask why he considers the capitalists to be more 
intelligent. Then he clarifies his point as follows:  
An armless and warless society was a society of no exploitation. This society 
was defined in the socialist international and the political system of it was named 
as communism. Today all of the international agreements start with this armless 
and warless society concept. Therefore; I believe that some change is achieved at 
the societal level. The world came closer to communism; however, the 
communists did not come close to the capitalists.  
In this framework, which suggests that capitalists come close to socialists; social 
transformation will be realized by the upper classes. He does not consider the working 
class as the catalyst of the revolutionary process anymore and positions the bourgeoisie 
as the initiator of a possible change. Without answering the question how, he claims that 
the differences in the world will be eliminated; as a result of this process, the leaders, 
ethnicities, religions, and classes will disappear. The classless society which was aimed 
by the socialist revolution is still viable for him. However, in his narration the feasibility 
of this idealized structure will not be reached with a socialist revolution but with a 
bourgeois democratic revolution. 
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I find his transition from the workers’ socialist revolution idea of the 1970s to 
the bourgeois democratic revolution idea of today confusing: Why would he openly 
claim to advocate something he once rejected? However, he does not accept my 
criticism and restates that he had always been a non-classical revolutionary who 
approached the leftist movement with a critical lens even in the 1970s. While explaining 
that he supported the universal rules of the democracy without getting stuck in the 
proletarian dictatorship; Metin depicts himself as a person who always criticized and 
rejected the dogmatic concepts of Lenin and Stalin: “Accepting these concepts with 
absolute commitments were quicksand. My revolution motto was ‘everything can 
change’ and I still support this motto independent from any movement.” I was neither 
persuaded nor satisfied with the answer he gave me; moreover I could not exactly 
understand what he meant but I did not want to hurt him by insisting on talking about 
this topic. Insistence could sound as blaming, yet my intention was learning his current 
viewpoint without judging him. 
Seyhan was a very open person in terms of describing her political stand. As a 
part of this openness, she explained her distance from politics without hesitation. Today 
she defines herself as an apolitical individual who wants to focus on her life rather than 
social concerns. In the absence of the belief for the left, she does not have the dream of 
changing the world anymore: 
I have no energy and time to devote to pursuing the dream of revolution. I am 
now 49 years old and I have a limited lifetime. I want to spend rest of my life in 
a meaningful way and away from adventurous dreams. I even do not go the May 
1st demonstrations. My withdrawal from the leftist movement is at that level and 
I openly say it. 
When I directly ask Seyhan if the revolution will happen one day or not, she 
vacillates for a couple of seconds and suggests that she believes that the system will 
continue as the way it is. In this framework, there would be technological revolutions 
but no classical revolutions even if the capitalist system transformed into something 
else. What Seyhan believes in is change; however, this will not be a change through a 
socialist or communist revolution; rather it will be the result of an evolution. In this 
change, the determinant factor will not be the Marxist and Leninist ideologies or 
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prescriptions. However, Seyhan does not have insights about the nature of the new 
system after such a change; she only defends the inevitability of evolution.   
Like Seyhan, Đlyas also does not hesitate to define himself as a capitalist today. 
When I ask what he thinks about the revolution from his current perspective, Đlyas 
confesses that he does not believe in the materialization of a revolution with armed 
struggle in the near future. According to him, the revolutionaries, that is, the socialists 
lost their power and the advances in technology enabled the sovereign powers to ensure 
their security with more modern methods. This is why even the attempt of revolution is 
a distant dream in today’s world since the revolution was a technologically lost war. 
Đlyas does not see a struggle like that of the past as feasible anymore, and he does not 
have any predictions for the fate of the revolution in the long run. What he expects is 
evolution. However, he also admits that it is possible that he cannot dream a revolution 
since he went through a severe ideological and economic transformation. He explains 
his loss of belief as follows: “Individuals create the psychology and ideology of the 
situation they are in. Probably I am doing the same thing.” 
When I ask how he gave up the idea of the revolution, he says that first of all he 
lost his belief in the indestructibility of his organization. The police decoded the 
members from the most protected castle of the organization: the central committee. 
After witnessing that even the people in the core of the movement could not sustain 
their struggle, Đlyas lost his faith in the revolution. He thinks that the movement could 
not protect its supporters. At that point, he confesses that he personally felt the existence 
of a life in danger; however, the movement did not care about his concerns. This was a 
breaking point for him where he questioned his sense of belonging and perception of 
considering the movement as a family. When the family concept that he had attached to 
the movement collapsed, so did the image of revolution.  
Secondly, he mentions his father’s influence on his withdrawal from the leftist 
struggle. His father was a rich industrialist who was extremely opposed his son’s 
participation in the socialist movement. Therefore, his father tried all ways to dissuade 
him from the leftist struggle. In the end, after seeing all talks were futile, instead of 
shouting out, his father tells Đlyas this sentence in a calm way: “You cannot be a 
revolutionary with your father’s money. You cannot make a revolution with my money. 
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This is why I will disinherit you if you continue to be in the movement.” This was an 
influential threat for him and even if he got extremely angry due to his father’s reaction 
in the past, today Đlyas confesses that his father was right. From that aspect, the left and 
leftist ideology was an adventure that was financed by his father. It seems that Đlyas’s 
social class made it difficult to truly internalize the dream of classless society. 
However, as we talk, Đlyas gradually falls under the influence of the old days and 
gives up his position of defending the impossibility of the revolution. He asserts that the 
world cannot continue like that because if the situation continued as it is, the world 
would turn into a science fiction studio that consisted of only slaves and masters. 
Suddenly, he says “…or the revolution should be materialized”. Đlyas who has recently 
talked about how he lost his belief in the revolution suddenly starts talking about the 
materialization of the revolution. Moreover, he does not only mention the revolution as 
a probability but expresses the inevitability of the revolution. It is as if the Đlyas of the 
1970s has come to our interview for a few minutes and defends the revolution again. He 
lights up a cigarette and says: “Capitalism will terminate itself. The deadlock that stems 
from not being able to sell what you produce will end capitalism. When the system 
cannot solve its impasses there will be a shift towards a worldwide socialism.”  
Here, Đlyas contradicts himself and speaks as a person who still preserves the 
ideals of the 1970s and we discuss revolution, socialism, and war against capitalism 
with the excitement of the 1970s. However, after all this talk, his final point is: “I give 0 
point to my leftism out of five. I am not a leftist anymore.” 
Among my interviewees, the most unexpected answer regarding the issue of 
revolution comes from Zuhal. I ask whether a revolution is possible or not in today’s 
world and in fact I mean a socialist revolution. In response to my question Zuhal says 
“Yes, I still believe that five percent of the population can change the society with 
armed struggle or without armed struggle. My expectation would always be a socialist 
revolution. Unfortunately, now I also expect an Islamic revolution.” Zuhal still believes 
in the revolutionary ideal but this is a scary ideal for her right now, because she foresees 
the risk of an Islamic revolution. She utters her fear for an Islamic revolution and states 
that if this five percent which attempts social change is composed of radical Islamists. 
While socialist revolution is not a feasible expectation for her since there is no five 
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percent in Turkey willing to devote itself to the revolution ideal, in her 
conceptualization, the revolution has become a negative word associated with an 
Islamic revolution. 
A Possible Socialist Revolution? 
In contrast to those who do not believe in the possibility of a revolution, there is 
a second group among my interviewees who still stick to the revolutionary ideal. They 
still claim the feasibility of a revolution. If we generalize, they are the ones who define 
themselves as the “disconnected” individuals, except for one interviewee. Here 
disconnectedness refers to the inability of integration with the capitalist system and their 
low income level. Among this group only Fatih rejects the possibility of a revolution 
due to his disappointment with the movement. The rest claim that one day the 
revolution will happen and still consider it attainable.   
Mehmet, who defines himself as “an engineer who does not earn money”, is still 
loyal to the revolutionary soul of the 1970s. In his story, the 1970s represent bright 
memories, excitement of changing the world, and being a part of the adventure. He 
evaluates his current life as unsuccessful according to capitalist paradigms. Maybe 
because of this reason, the revolution is still a tempting and real ideal for him. If the 
revolution materializes, this will terminate the factors that make him unsuccessful in a 
capitalist world. He still believes that one day the revolution will happen even if it does 
not take place in his lifetime.  
The revolution should not have to be instant. It is a process that happens every 
single second, step by step. This is why; in fact we are in a dynamic 
revolutionary process and one day, when the revolution is materialized, there 
will be a brotherhood/sisterhood [kardeşlik] of the people in an equal and just 
society.  
In line with Mehmet, Tayfun also asserts that we are in the age of revolutions. 
He expects to see the creation of a classless society, because he believes that cruelty in 
society can only be overcome through the termination of relations of exploitation 
among classes. This is why he emphasizes the need for a socialist change. Tayfun 
believes in the power of the revised proletarian ideology and thinks that if it can be the 
common denominator of the classes, socialism can be a reachable dream. His 
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prescription is materializing a revolution by inverting the existing system and 
destroying the power supplies of the capitalists. I ask if this is an easy thing to do or not. 
He answers: “It is an ideologically easy but a practically hard goal. We should not lose 
our hope. If everybody believes in it, then the revolution can come true. Continuing 
with the existing system will end in an absolute disaster.” 
3.4.  Conclusion 
Broken lives… All I see is broken lives. All my friends in the movement, they 
could not find good jobs. We could not mend our ways. We could not be the 
people we hoped we could be or that other people expected we would be. We are 
50 years old and we could not become anything. We lived just for the revolution. 
It was our aim and ideal, so you live the most efficient years by chasing this 
ideal. Then you go to prison and lose years. You have a criminal record. When 
you get out of prison you are 30, you have nothing and you can never have 
something later.  
Undoubtedly, these sentences are quite dramatic. With these sentences, Yağmur 
summarizes a kind of disconnectedness from life, an inability to create attachment with 
life. She defines a vicious cycle in which one feels noncompliant with capitalist society: 
Being a real part of the system that you had wanted to terminate is impossible in her 
narration because on the one side she defines conscience and socialist values and on the 
other side she underlines obstacles created by the system that prevent integration. In this 
formulation, there is a system that does not embrace you and also you are already too 
unsuccessful (in your career) to embrace the system. 
I have shown in this chapter that there were concrete aspects of the social and 
economic transformations in Turkey after 1980 that both prevented some (former) 
socialists from integrating fully in a capitalist economic system and resulted in 
psychological consequences like alienation. Relationships in the post-coup era were 
largely defined according to financial standing. Özal period’s neo-liberal political and 
economic reconstruction policies initiated the era of opportunities in which one could 
take opportunity through free market. While the idea of “striking it rich” became 
popular and spread among the society, this new trend also brought the notions of 
individualism and the individual’s free will to define her/his own path. Individualism 
and self-centeredness were idealized. Earning a lot of money with the least effort was 
adopted as the motto of the period. In this view, success was equated with the amount of 
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money you earned and spent. Kozanoğlu (1992) defines individuals in this period as 
those who existed with their fears. While in the 1970s there was the fear of getting shot 
and dying; in the 1980s this fear was replaced by the fear of not being able to be rich 
and consume (Bali, 2002b, p. 34-35; Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 43, p. 56; Kozanoğlu, 
1992, p. 17).  
At the same time, the 1980s were the reaction years to the poverty, starvation, 
and social and economic crisis of the 1970s. The transition to the liberal economy and 
free circulation of foreign goods not only signaled a change in economic policy but also 
a change in lifestyles. After the market’s occupation with goods that symbolized high 
civilization, technology, and welfare, in a sense, consumption was a way to reach all 
these standards. Earning money had been the ultimate goal that determined one’s 
success. Therefore, one had to know how to make money with practical means if s/he 
wanted to be successful. In this context, this “practicality” [işbitiricilik] was referring to 
the necessity of breaking the rules, regulations and law to some extent in order to get 
what one wanted. As a part of this mindset, personal relationships with fellow 
townspeople [hemşehri], deputies, fellows, relatives, and communities gained 
importance as the catalysts of the practicality. The main motto of the period was 
“having an eye to the main chance” [işini bilmek] and the value loss that came into view 
due to this motto was naturalized and legitimized by positive but superficial concepts 
like success, practicality, broadmindedness, courage, and cleverness (Bali, 2002a, pp.  
206-207).    
As a part of this perception change, values and priorities in the society changed 
shape as well. Competitiveness, entrepreneurship, risk taking, individualism, openness, 
flexibility and attuning yourself to the instable market conditions were the rising values 
of the new period. Business life progressed with the increased investments and entrance 
of multinational companies to the market. A job market that needed a worker class that 
could fulfill the demands of the private sector with the aforementioned values and 
qualifications emerged. Thus, in relation with the market’s need, a worker class came 
into existence and constituted a middle class that transformed its cultural and 
intellectual capital into economic capital (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 62). The new 
middle class was made up of capitalist entrepreneurs and professionals of the new 
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economic system. These professionals and entrepreneurs adopted similar life styles and 
consumption patterns in order to create class cohesion and thus the members of this new 
class came closer with a class consciousness. While the adoption of similar tastes and 
sharing of the same life styles among the members of the new class were pointing 
towards togetherness under the common denominator of class unity; at the same time it 
was leading this emerging class to introversion. Since each class was trapped in its own 
borders without having contact with the rest, spatial segregation and income gap 
between classes became more visible (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006, p. 316).              
This changing historical framework affected my interviewees’ perceptions of the 
past and of themselves. While those who achieved membership in these introverted 
[dışa kapalı] classes enjoyed their integration into the system, those who fell out of this 
structure were left with the feeling of isolation and exclusion. Thus, a traumatic reality 
emerged: the cost of being political can be higher than one expects. All of my 
interviewees, even if they were integrated into the system or not, still live with that 
paranoia, as a result, nobody for example wants to see their children as a part of any 
ideological movement similar to the one in the 1970s. Their current belief in revolution 
can thus be considered more superficial in comparison to the past, despite their claim of 
commitment to the ideals of the 1970s. The revolution is now a dream that was 
expected to be materialized by other groups, the ones who do not belong to their family, 
since the idea of revolution still represents lost friends, personalities, hopes and futures. 
In other words, there is a collective memory that coded rebelling against the state and 
attempting to change the existing system as a dangerous and fatal adventure. Therefore, 
joining a movement today was considered as a retrial of a lost war and a struggle simply 
to be lost again. This mindset creates a protective instinct among parents who do not 
want to see their children as a part of any ideological struggles. They are not against 
political activism; however, they definitely oppose illegal activities beyond legal 
borders.   
For some of my interviewees, the heavy prices they paid for participation in 
socialist organizations had become a reason for rejecting the revolution notion while for 
some; these prices are the reason for still believing in the revolution. According to the 
first group, if the revolution could not be materialized despite the soul of the 1970s, it is 
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impossible to materialize it with today’s realities. For the second group, there is still the 
feasibility of the revolution with the hope of seeing it after all sacrifices and losses. This 
expectation is like an emotional entrapment. Since they invested a lot to the revolution 
ideal and lost much in the name of this ideal, they want it to come true. However, at that 
point a contradiction also exists because they cannot provide a concrete reply to the 
question of “who will materialize the revolution”. They do not want to see their children 
in a political struggle; hence, the expectation is the materialization of the revolution by 
the children of others. If we look at my informants’ potential to materialize a revolution, 
we see that the ones who still have connections with political structures do not have a 
revolutionary dream anymore and the ones who claim to preserve the revolution dream 
have already given up active political struggle as part of an organizational structure. 
They are like “freelance leftists” who are independent from any kind of illegal or legal 
unit. Even if they utter their ideas regarding the revolution as something that might 
eventually happen one day; belief in the revolution is questionable and blurry. 
Therefore, rather than a belief, the revolution concept sounds as a dream in their stories.    
For example when I asked my interviewee Gönül if she would supports her son’s 
active involvement in a movement like hers, she said, “Certainly not.” Gönül explained 
she believes that the world is not the same world in the 1970s:  
I know the technological advances. Every step you take is known by them (the 
state, intelligence services and foreign powers). I am a mother and it is really 
different to be a mother. I do not want him to be a part of all these things.  
She said that she becomes happy when her son behaves “extraordinarily” 
[sıradışı] however; this extraordinariness comes along with a concern for legality. Her 
son cannot be a member in a leftist organization because she says that she knows the 
consequence which is the termination of all hopes. She accepts that this could be a 
learned helplessness; nonetheless, she prefers a less dangerous struggle for her son. He 
can play an instrument, compose a song, sing, construct a building or draw a picture but 
he cannot be in the streets to change the system. Now she supports silent and safe 
demonstrations, therefore, she attends legal protests and is concerned mostly with 
environmental issues. 
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Engin who believes in a transformation rather than a revolution, opposes violent 
forms of struggle when the issue came to the involvement of his children to an 
ideological struggle. Like Gönül, Engin states that he does not want his loved ones to be 
harmed. His children can be in any of the legal movements as activists, but not as 
militants. He remembers the processes that he underwent and life-threatening dangers 
that he averted. He wants to protect his children from all these things. According to 
Engin, on the one hand participation in such movements is very instructive; on the other 
hand, these environments are very risky. He told me that in this kind of chaotic 
environments, the place where you should stop can be blurry and one can stand alone 
only with her/his conscience at some point. Due to that reason; there is a huge risk of 
doing wrong things that one can regret later. He ends the conversation like a typical 
father: “I trust my children but what if the people around them are not as honest as my 
children.”  
Even Tayfun, who speaks openly about his loyalty and faith in revolution, does 
not want to see his children in the movement. Interestingly, in his discourse, being 
leftist and in active struggle can now only be a hobby since Turkey is not the same 
Turkey it was in the 1970s. He is a leftist who paid the price of his ideals by spending 
five years in the prison. He does not want to see his children suffering or undergoing the 
same processes. According to his current perspective, dealing with politics is dangerous. 
Undoubtedly, he does not advocate an absolute insensitivity towards world events. The 
other way round; he underlines his faith in revolution and the necessity of its 
materialization. However, now he dreams of a revolution that will be materialized by 
other people not by the people for whom he cared. He feels the pressure of wasting his 
life because of an ideal; he therefore wants his children to prioritize constituting a 
comfortable life and doing their job well. After that point, his children are free to do 
what they want. He just wants to be sure that they do not risk their lives and futures. In 
Tayfun’s narration, we see regret. He devoted his life to a movement and the result was 
staying in a prison for five years. Therefore, he wants his children to guarantee their life 
and then decide whether to be a part of a social struggle or not.  
Like Tayfun, for some of my interviewees, there is still a certain claim which 
asserts the continued feasibility of the revolution. If we categorize these people we can 
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identify the common feature of this group as the feeling of inability to create 
meaningful bonds (either in a career or in a social organization) within the capitalist 
system. Financial standing and perceptions of welfare play a key role in their feelings of 
integration into the system; those with a low income level live with a constant feeling of 
exclusion. In these stories, there is continued hope of taking revenge against the 
capitalist system which has condemned them to be outliers. The prospect of revolution 
(the victory of the socialist “victims” of Turkish capitalist society) offers them a hope 
that the perception of failure in their lives will be transformed into success. 
Most of my interviewees, however, do not use the word revolution with the 
typical meaning of capturing state power. That kind of revolution refers to an extreme 
and dangerous attempt and thus emerges as a notion that belongs to the adventurous 
years of youth. My interviewees retain sensitivity towards injustices in the world, and 
thus they underline the continuation of the “leftist soul” and leftist values in their 
political stance even today. However, now any call for change is for one on a more 
conventional platform: Legal protests or environmental struggles appear as new social 
concerns in their stories. While explaining this shift in their struggle understanding, my 
interviewees mentioned moments of personal enlightenment experienced since the 
1980s, and how they learned to be critical and skeptical about utopian ideals. Many of 
interviewees were proud of this new “wisdom” and “maturity”, claiming that they are 
now more competent in terms of understanding and evaluating their own leftist past. 
With this maturity, they criticize the revolutionist soul of the 1970s and question the 
purity of the dream of the revolution that they believed in. 
In their discourse, interviewees resisted making the claim that their ideology had 
been “transformed” by their changed economic and social condition. Their reluctance 
took the form of defense, legitimization, and rationalization when they confessed their 
attempts at integration into the capitalist system. Why do they need to defend and 
legitimize their integration? Undoubtedly, here the preservation of the past and keeping 
it alive is associated with the respect that one has towards her/himself. Since an 
acceptance of capitalist economic structures might be considered by (former) socialists 
to be a betrayal of their ideological past, we often observe explanatory sentences which 
try to show the innocence and rightness of the current stand of my interviewees in life. 
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As a part of this discourse, my interviewees present “being a part of the system without 
losing the awareness about the nature of it” or “being mentally distanced from the 
system” to keep their leftist soul pure as strategies or even as resistance points. 
Moreover, there are also interviewees who accept their integration and call it a rational 
choice or in accordance with the conditions of the era. They do not see integration as an 
obstacle to leftism and claim the existence of the same “soul” sympathetic to claims of 
economic injustice. Therefore, what many of my interviewees assert is that they have 
experienced an economic integration in the capitalist system rather than an ideological 
one.   
When I directly asked my interviewees to name their ideology, most of my 
interviewees hesitated to call themselves leftists. With their accumulated experience, 
many of them confessed that they oppose any kind of “-isms”. Here, leftism and being 
leftist emerge as a general definition beyond membership in a specific organization, and 
even if they define themselves in the left, the exact coordinates are blurry. To be more 
precise, they see themselves within the boundaries of the left as a general framework; 
however, they do not talk about a rigid and solid definition for their ideology. The 
flexibility in defining the left has an important function here because it leaves room for 
an interpretation of leftism in which they still can play a role. 
In all of the stories, an uncomfortable relationship with money is presented as a 
sign of rejection of the capitalist system. Even those who achieved integration with the 
system use negative relations with money as an evidence of their distance from the 
system, not in the sense of rejecting a career, but in the sense of “not liking” or “hating 
money to some extent”. In addition to a general discomfort with the concept of money 
and property, interviewees who described themselves as outliers also emphasized their 
inability to earn money because of their continued belief in leftist values. In the stories 
of those that had difficulty establishing careers, earning money emerges as a betrayal of 
leftism, a finding which establishes a correlation between the preserved leftist values 
and relationship with money.  
Lastly, we can mention the loss of belief in the organizational structures of 
1970s leftism and references to the egos and careerist concerns of their leaders as 
reasons for the abandonment of ideological struggles and the emergence of the idea of 
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the impossibility of the revolution. In this perceptual framework, many of my 
interviewees pointed to integration into the capitalist system, while perhaps continuing 
an individual struggle, as the only feasible way to stay true to their old values. In their 
narratives, exiting the socialist movement and breaking organizational ties emerge as a 
turning point. In addition, many of my interviewees claimed that life events like 
marriage and responsibility for children also forced them to accept a non-activist 
lifestyle.  
In each story, we see an attempt to replace the disappointment in the failure of 
the revolution after 1980 with attempts to transition to a new life. While some of my 
interviewees see their integration into post-coup society as successful and satisfactory, 
others find their stories incomplete and failed. The determining factor behind the group 
my interviewees belonged to was their relative economic success after the 1980 coup. 
Those who could not establish a successful career after the revolutionary years define 
their position as being disconnected or excluded from the system; their faith in a coming 
revolution is therefore stronger. On the other hand, in the stories of successful 
integration, interviewees most often felt the need to justify “being a part of the system 
without forgetting leftist principles”. 
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CHAPTER 4:  WOMEN, THEIR STATUS, FEMINISM AND INTIMATE 
RELATIONSHIPS IN LEFTIST MOVEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
In addition to questions of ideology, practical and daily aspects of participation 
in the leftist movement were also an important part of how my respondents continued to 
think of the movement today. In an environment full of young people of both genders, 
for instance, questions of gender roles, relationships, sexuality, and feminism arose 
constantly. In this chapter, I will look at the leftist movement’s rise in the 1970s from 
three different aspects, with specific focus on women:   
1. The place of women and womanhood in the leftist movement  
2. Perception of feminism in the movement  
3. Intimate relationships in the movement   
Based on my interviews, in the first part of this chapter, I aim to problematize 
the stereotypical image of women in the movement, suppression of the sexuality of 
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women with the discourse of sister/bacı and the secondary position of women as an 
errant service provider or a service provider of complementary tasks. In this direction, I 
will look at the definitions that are used for a woman (a weak, fragile or dependent actor 
who should be protected), the meanings that are attributed to being a woman in the 
movement (a peaceful, tolerant, reconciliatory, sacrificing, and renunciative comrade) 
and where women are placed in the discourses of sister [bacı] and the mother [ana] (a 
sexless comrade who is purified from her femininity).  
In the second section, I will analyze the perception of feminism in the 
movement. None of my interviewees approached feminism positively; in fact, most of 
them openly uttered their discomfort. In this section I will specifically look at their 
reaction and the reasons for discomfort in relation to feminism.   
In the third part of this chapter, I will examine the intimate relationships in the 
leftist movement, the influence of the organizational structures on the relationships, 
their sanction power and deterrence on the militants. Thus, I will analyze the concept of 
“love” and its manifestations in the movement. Lastly, in the conclusion section, I will 
look at these issues under the light of my interviewees’ “transformation” and try to 
reflect the transformations that my informants displayed regarding the issues I discussed 
in each section.  
4.2.  Women’s Status and the Perception of Woman and Womanhood in the 
Movement  
When we look at the perception of the woman in the leftist movement, we see 
that the left was also an entity which was ruled by men in a similar manner in which 
they controlled many parts of society. Contrary to what was believed, the left was not a 
rebel zone that was independent from all socially accepted norms, codes and roles. If it 
was a kingdom, this was a kingdom where the rules were defined by men. Men were the 
rule makers and the determinants of the norms and behaviors (Berktay, 2010, p. 280). 
The image of woman was largely weak and fragile and therefore she was assumingly 
incapable of doing many things. As Baydar and Ulagay claim, we see the reflections of 
this image in the leftist movement with the mentality of women’s incapacity to develop 
ideas (Baydar & Ulagay, 2011, p. 110). Gönül Dinçer (in Akal, 2011) expresses this 
mentality as follows based on her experience in the left:  
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It is a well-known fact that women abstained from taking the floor in a meeting 
or an organization in which there were men. Even if they took the floor; it is 
known that they swallowed the quizzical smiles and belittling. Important duties 
like drawing up a proclamation, publishing a newspaper or training had been 
monopolized by men. (Akal, 2011, p. 171)       
In one sense, while the political arena was dominated by men, at the same time 
there was the notion of “emancipation for women” as an auxiliary ideal in the 
movement; women and their problems remained as a patch, which could not be sewed 
to any place in the movement. Rather than terminating the inequalities woman faced, 
the movement contributed to the reproduction of these inequalities through the adoption 
of the traditional social roles. For example, despite the revolutionist soul in the 
movement, the division of labor at home continued to carry a traditional soul. 
According to Akal, revolutionist husbands expected from their revolutionist wives to do 
the domestic work and this point of view was rationalized by women with the idea of 
serving a comrade instead of serving a husband (Akal, 2011, p. 207).  
Admittedly, there is clear evidence that men in the different factions gained 
certain privileges over the secondary status of women. The woman was a 
complementary element for man, submissive coworker, devoted sister and secretary of 
the movement with the paper works assigned to her as part of her natural 
responsibilities. Women activists could not raise criticism over this division of labor as 
they would face condemnations for not being truly revolutionary. The citation in Akal’s 
book (2011) from Hatice Yaşar’s article defines this position of “silenced woman” on 
the left: She is the perfect collaborator of men who paves the way for them. She is the 
one who undergoes tortures with her revolutionist identity and gets out of prison with 
her female identity as the actor who has to support her male comrades as a requirement 
of her natural duty. She is the sister, the mother, the server of the old comrade-new 
senior, and the faithful follower of her husband who has to support him unconditionally 
to make him think the independence of the country better, while she is dependent (Akal, 
2011, pp. 251-252).   
When we take a closer look at the movement, in addition to the weak, fragile, 
and hence useless (or useful under a strict division of labor) woman image, we 
encounter with the sexless and harsh representations of women or a woman figure that 
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holds the characteristics which are defined as “manly”, such as strength, fearlessness 
and courage. Besides, women mostly constituted the sympathizer base rather than that 
of high-level militants. The number of women activists in all factions was less than 
men. For some of my interviewees, the low numbers of women were related with the 
number of female students in the universities during these years. Since the number of 
women who were enrolled in university programs was not as high as that of men, the 
interviewees considered the relative absence of women in the movement as normal. For 
some, the existence or the non-existence of women was not an issue that they paid 
attention to since they focused on the ideology of the revolution. These interviewees 
were only aware of the numerical underrepresentation of women participants in the 
movement. When I asked questions to pursue this issue, they criticized the secondary 
position of the women in the movement with their current viewpoints. However, they 
underlined that their mind set in the 1970s lacked this critical lens, and rationalized the 
position that was assigned to women without questioning.  
Women interviewees also confessed that, as activists, they had not questioned 
this auxiliary position. Strikes, worker movements, studentship, organizing the public to 
support the leftist movement, demonstrations and protests occupied their daily lives and 
left no room to think about the problems of being a woman in a male dominated society. 
While the focus was on these issues, demanding freedom for women was considered as 
too personal or as a bourgeois concern.  
According to Fatih, women were usually at the sympathizer level, their numbers 
in the movement were low, and usually they were not in key positions. While saying 
this, there is a visible embarrassment which tries to justify the unfair conditions that 
women came across. Fatih and some of the other male interviewees emphasized the 
positive effect of women on the movement. Yet, statements such as “They were very 
good girls.” and “They always made good decisions.” were usually followed by a “but”: 
“They were also very harsh.” Fatih explained that it was very scary for him to witness 
women using violence as he perceived them to be “naïve”: “I always dated girls outside 
the movement. I always hated the aggressive and violent women. Therefore, I distanced 
the struggler and the attacker woman model in the movement from myself. They were 
scary for me.” Even when I reminded him that women were pressured to behave like 
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that, it was a futile attempt such that his answer signaled the traditional role that is 
expected from a woman: “I have always expected complaisance and politeness. They 
should smooth down the sharp and provocative ideas. When I could not see this, I was 
disappointed.” In this narration, we see the woman as a buffer zone that terminates 
possible conflicts among the men. Easing men’s lives is considered as a mission of 
women and the expectation from the woman is her absolute devotion, with submission 
and softness.   
Tayfun also drew attention to the small number of women in the movement. 
However, he defended the movement against the criticisms regarding women’s low 
status. He admitted that the leftist movement could not develop or even attempt to 
develop a policy related to the subordination of women; nonetheless he did not blame 
the movement:  
It was a different process. In fact, we did not consider women as secondary 
actors in the movement. We had no time to think about these issues. The 
movement was not developed enough to think about these things. It was 
primitive. We took action before deepening.  
Tayfun became nervous and sad when he started talking about these things. He 
took a defensive position and wanted to prove that disregarding the oppression of 
women was not on purpose. He emphasized that there was superficiality in lots of 
subjects and underlined that the ‘woman issue’ was one of them: “What we wanted the 
most was the revolution and we even could not develop sufficient policies to 
accomplish it.” He drew attention to the childish and impatient nature of the movement. 
Their priority was a revolution which would set everybody. When there is such a great 
mission, gender inequalities had to remain as a taboo. The problems of women were 
mostly associated with the exploitative nature of the capitalist system. Thus, it was 
believed that with the introduction of socialism everything would be peaceful. 
According to this formulation, all deviations and discussions from the main target had 
to be postponed to a time after the revolution.  
With Zuhal’s words we look at the situation from a woman’s perspective and her 
words validate the existence of the woman comrade whose gender and individuality is 
suppressed. During our interview, she defined the woman’s status in The Progressive 
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Youth Association [ĐGD-Đlerici Gençlik Derneği] faction as being the “sexless sister”. 
She suggested that all her discomforts related with her faction were related to her 
private life. The movement had changed her life style and physical appearance, even if 
she was uncomfortable with getting stuck in the sister concept. Nevertheless, she 
offered the impression of obedience. In order to fit into the sister concept, she changed 
the way of her dressing, had her long hair cut and limited her behaviors:  
It was told to me not to wear skirts. I asked why. They claimed that I could not 
fight if I wore a skirt. I was very beautiful and attractive with my long hair but I 
had my hair cut too short.  
Thus, Zuhal implied that there was pressure from the movement to make women 
adopt a certain clothing style. She explained this style as “the only costume” that 
consisted of pants, parkas, and boots. 
Metin mentioned that he and his comrades tried to improve the position of 
women in their faction; however, he also added that all these attempts had not gone far 
beyond putting words together and making stylish sentences. Nevertheless, he did not 
regard this process as paying lip service. He claimed that they never ignored women 
since their problems represented an issue which was embedded in real life. However, 
his narration resembles an endowment for women: “We wanted women to have higher 
status, we said let’s improve their status. We made sentences like we wanted to do this 
not because they were women, but because they were human.” He summarized this 
process as a theoretically debated but a practically unconcluded issue.  
Even though Metin admitted the superior position of men and the male 
domination in the movement; he did not find the betterment of women’s position 
realistic. He gave examples from the women deputies in the parliament. He classified 
two types of women in the political arena: masculine women and bootlicker women, 
whom he defined as dysfunctional. He continued with the Tansu Çiller period, the first 
woman prime minister of Turkey, to show the violent behavior patterns of women who 
become politically active. Çiller period is a period which is famous for its violent 
character and harsh measures against the Kurdish issue. While showing Prime Minister 
Çiller as an example, Metin generalizes the mistakes in Çiller period to all women and 
underlines the aggressive nature of the female politicians. Like Faruk, he wants women 
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to bring their naive reconciliatory womanhood into politics. Women represent a fragile, 
peaceful, tolerant and warm assistant to men. Therefore, we can claim that according to 
his narration the role of women in the political movements had to be relaxing the 
extremes by creating a conciliatory buffer zone. In this narration we see that what is 
meant by betterment of women’s position is actually a new imprisonment in another 
cell, which is the leftist discourse.  
Metin identifies the status of women in the movement in ownership 
relationships. According to that formulation, women are positioned as possessions of 
men, which means, the women are defined as wives or girlfriends of a man. Women did 
not even have a name in the movement. She was the girlfriend of one man and she was 
the aunt [yenge] of hundreds. Metin explains that the responsibilities and duties she had 
taken through her connections with the men in the movement were not due to her 
personal skills or successes. He attributes this situation to the feudal and peasant-like 
understanding in the movement and calls it as one of the major impasses which still 
could not be solved.  
When I ask Mehmet about the women’s status in the movement, his answer is a 
reaffirmation of the secondary role of women even if he tries to reject it. He explains 
that there was a woman they sold newspapers with and starting from that statement he 
comes to the conclusion that the movement had a sufficient number. When I insisted on 
the ratio of women, he explains that there were a lot of women, 10 or 15 women, whom 
he knew and respected. This situation reveals the rationalization of the rarity of women 
in the movement. He believes that 10 women versus 100 men is a normal ratio. Like 
many other interviewees, his perception of women’s role in the movement is articulated 
through the “sister” discourse:  
We used to share everything. We were always together. If we were planning to 
stay in the same house, we did not sleep in the same room. Even if they were our 
sisters, we did not stay in the same room with them. 
The main message here is the protection of women’s honor which is the 
movement’s honor and what is underlined is not having sexual intercourse with sisters. 
In this viewpoint, brothers of the movement are the virtuous soldiers who never 
surrender to their personal desires.     
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In contrast to many interviewees, Đlyas rejects the idea of woman as a second 
class citizen in the movement. He categorizes the movement between the legal and the 
illegal level. While the legal level symbolized the level that sympathizers were in, the 
illegal level represented the dangerous underground organization composed of “real 
militants”. He argues that at the legal level, approximately 30 percent of the members 
were made up of women. In Đlyas’s classification, the illegal level was not suitable for 
women due to its dangerous and underground nature; therefore, women mostly showed 
up in the legal level. However, he explains that this did not pose an obstacle in terms of 
the women moving up and switching between the levels in the movement. His 
observations regarding the high positioned women militants were as “conflictual, 
radical, reckless and fearless”.     
While presenting the legal level as the suitable sphere for a woman in the 
organization structure with these determinations, Đlyas’s words refer to the image of 
women as “fragile” and “in need of protection”. In this framework, being a woman in 
the movement is either taking place at the legal level and practicing leftism in a safe 
zone or taking place at the illegal level as a sexless but “manly equipped comrade” in 
the eyes of Đlyas.  
When I ask what it was like to be a woman in the movement, Seyhan thinks for a 
couple of seconds and then confesses that she had never considered herself as a woman. 
Rather she saw herself as being a part of the movement, a part of a great ideal which 
would be fulfilled. Here we see that her identity is shaped through the membership to 
the Dev-Yol faction. Therefore, she is not a woman, student or Turk anymore; she is 
solely a leftist. Interestingly, she underlines that being sexless was not just the problem 
of the women. While saying that they were neither woman nor man, she defines men 
also as sexless. She does not consider this situation as a sacrifice or a renunciation. 
Then, she suddenly asks me: “These things have never been brought to the table. Is this 
renunciation? I really do not know.” 
Nehir explains the status of women in the movement as being the service 
provider of complementary tasks. She links that situation with the peasant nature of the 
movement’s development:  
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The movement was not only limited to the cities, it was spread in all of Anatolia. 
Consequently, many of the people in the movement had grown up in the feudal 
culture. They tried to apply what they had seen as right in this new environment. 
I mean, if a man who had grown up in Anatolia sees a woman as second class 
citizen, he thinks that woman has to be in the second order in the movement. 
This mind-set did not change even if he had gone to university. These 
unintentional framings rationalized the passive situation of woman in the 
movement.    
Nehir portrays women in the movement as submissive comrades who were not 
aware of their rights. She links this lack of awareness to the underdeveloped woman 
rights movement. She defines these times as the years of silence: “It was not like now; it 
was not common to put your discomforts and expectations into words as a woman”. 
This silence comes along with the forgetting of identity. According to Nehir, neither in 
her mind nor in others’ mind there was a woman identity that was associated with 
womanhood. Undoubtedly, this is the result of femininity’s being erased by the 
discourse of the sister.  
Yağmur structures the years she devoted to the leftist movement as a “partially 
stolen maidenhood”. She does not direct any anger or reproach to her faction. In 
contrast, it is a remembering moment in which she is self-critical. She differentiates her 
generation from today’s generation and explains that nothing, neither possession nor 
fashion, was tempting them. However, she claims that this was a voluntarily 
renunciation. She also mentions the stereotyped physical appearance in the movement 
and puts the blame of this stereotypical appearance on the wrong and distorted ideas 
created by the people in the movement: “First of all we were judging people according 
to their appearance. We were not aware of what bourgeoisie was. Being well-groomed 
was being a bourgeoisie wannabe.” In this process, the simple and modest clothing style 
was positioned in order to struggle against the exaggerated bourgeoisie way of dressing. 
However, this time they create their own uniform, which is another type of 
standardization. She confesses that after many years she realized that not the clothes, 
but the ideas made sense. I ask why she complied with the movement’s unwritten rules. 
She notices a contradiction and speaks in a low voice: “We were against 
standardization. We protested. We did hunger strikes against standardized clothing in 
prisons. Now what I see is we were also standard. We were the same, standard as well.”        
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4.3.  Perception of Feminism 
The relationship between Marxism and feminism debated a lot in the past 
century and interpreted differently in different places of the world. According to 
Hartman, for the Marxist analysis that takes the relations with the economic system as 
the core of the social problems, laying emphasis on woman-man relations was dealing 
with unimportant issues. Therefore, it can be claimed that this approach in which classes 
were the basic unit of analysis and the woman was a part of the working class was 
suffering from gender blindness since it evaluated the relations between the woman and 
man within the narrow context of the “capitalist-worker” relations. According to that 
point of view, the emancipation of women depended on women’s being paid workers 
like men and their participation together with men in the revolutionist movement 
against capitalism. The main struggle should be towards the common enemy which was 
capitalism and all the energy should be consumed to fight against it. However, this 
opinion was quite problematic. This formulation could not bring emancipation to 
women since the oppression of women did not emerge only due to capitalism. 
Therefore, the transition to socialism that was based on traditional male sovereignty 
would not end the problems of women. A society could have been a socialist society, 
but could sustain remaining as a patriarchal society (Hartmann, 2006, pp. 2-8; p. 36).  
When I asked my interviewees what they thought about feminism I saw that they 
disregard this critical approach and problematize feminism from the angle of classical 
Marxism. As a reflection of this situation, the attitude towards feminism among both my 
female and male interviewees is quite negative. They either do not care or are not 
interested in feminism or do not like the idea of feminism. Very few of them support the 
feminist movement in Turkey (and only to some extent), and even the female 
participants are skeptical towards the feminism. For example, Zuhal was a woman from 
ĐGD faction and she was at the same time a member of ĐKD [Đlerici Kadınlar Derneği, 
Progressive Women’s Association]. She defines her membership to ĐKD as a 
complementary task of being a member of ĐGD which was an organization of TKP 
(Türkiye Komünist Partisi, The Communist Party of Turkey). Therefore, her 
membership to ĐKD just aimed at supporting another faction of the TKP. She states that 
she found ĐKD as an “association of housewives” and because of that reason she did not 
go to its meetings very much:  
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Their problems [the problems of women in ĐKD] did not interest me. I was a 
student, maybe I did not think of being oppressed as a woman one day. Also 
ĐKD was politically behind ĐGD. While we were trying to fulfill the revolution, 
ĐKD was talking about other things.  
She presents her membership to ĐKD as a contribution to increasing the number 
of people in ĐKD. In other words, she supported ĐKD just to keep it alive: “I just became 
a member to increase their membership numbers. I have never worked there and had no 
activity there.” I ask whether she wanted to do something for women when she was in 
ĐKD. Here, she makes a clear distinction between her membership story and her ideas 
about the problems of women at that time. She implies that she became a member as a 
result of the pressure from TKP; therefore, this involuntary membership did not cause 
the development of sensitivity for gender issue. She explains that she did not care about 
the issues concerning women, since she did not feel as she had fallen behind men:  
I was going to be doctor; nobody would be able to suppress me. I did not care 
about the other women. Also, it was a very active period and we were thinking 
that the revolution was very soon. We were going to do it and it was going to 
happen. Impossible was nothing.  
She speaks with the confidence of a guaranteed high social status as a doctor. 
She thinks that her occupational identity made her safe as a woman. Most probably 
under this discourse there are the traces of the traditional perception which says that the 
oppressed woman is the woman who is economically dependent on man. In addition, 
the dream of revolution and the belief that it will happen very soon, serve to block the 
focus on any other issues. Moreover, the leftist movement’s obsession with the 
revolution creates hatred for the second wave feminist movement in the 1980s. Zuhal 
asserts her anger at the feminist movement in the following: “The feminist movement 
never concerned me. First they suppressed the left and then they allowed the rise of 
feminist and homosexual movement as a decoration or accessory.” She blames the 
feminist movement for replacing the leftist movement with the discourse of being 
against the patriarchal sovereignty. In her framing, while the feminist movement 
touched on harmless issues which would not make the state angry like domestic 
violence, abortion, sexual abuse and harassment, it became visible over the oppression 
of the leftist movement and grew gradually. She explains that they were ready to die for 
the sake of the society and most of her friends died. In contrast to the leftist movement, 
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feminist movement is neither a wave that one would die for, nor a wave that is worth 
dying for. Due to her perception that positions the feminism as a movement that took 
the advantage of the oppression of the left and enjoyed the absence of ideologies, she 
does not believe in the sincerity of the feminism. Therefore, both in the past and now 
she considers the feminist movement as a “Septemberist”18 movement which came out 
of the suppression of their struggle by the coup and because of that reason she acts 
reactively towards the feminism.  
Contrary to Zuhal, Metin states that he supports the feminist movement and links 
this situation to having close connections with feminist women. He explains this 
situation with a cliché sentence: “I have feminist friends as well.” Having feminist 
friends emphasizes his stand of not opposing the feminist movement. However, his 
approach towards feminism is neutral rather than supportive. He admits that there was a 
negative perception during the late 1970s and explains why he and his friends in Halkın 
Kurtuluşu faction were skeptical about the feminist movement: “We read the books 
written by the CIA agents and we were influenced by them. We read that when the 
opposition emerged in the US, the CIA inserted Islam and feminism in the leftist 
movements.” Here, feminism is framed as a divisive ideology or a movement that has 
been previously used by foreign powers in order to defeat the left. This is why he had 
not trusted feminism which he believed a poisonous movement, was produced by the 
state. He confesses that he and his friends feared that the sovereign powers would 
continue their domination through splitting the struggle.  
Nevertheless, when Metin presents his ideas about today’s feminism, he wants to 
underline his relatively changed perception of feminism. He advocates the need for a 
feminist movement and defines its existence as a necessity and a natural outcome of 
women’s rights. He thinks that women need enlightenment since they think that they 
                                                            
18 While the left and right were suppressed by the state, the feminist movement found a ground to grow 
freely and this situation brought the collaboration accusations due to the believed collaboration between 
the movement and the September 12 coup. Therefore, in order to emphasize the perceived relationship 
between the junta regime and the movement, the feminist movement was called as a “Septemberist” 
movement inspiring from the date of the coup (Koçak, 2007).  
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will be nobody if they lose their sexuality. In this framing, he still exhibits patriarchal 
ideas. Feminism functions as a mediator to create this enlightenment. According to 
Metin, first women have to change their mind and then men should accept the 
difference in women’s mindset and change their mind. We see in Metin’s ideas that 
feminism refers mostly to the problems related to woman’s sexuality. Therefore, he 
frames feminism as an enlightening movement that will assist the sexual liberation of 
women.  
Yağmur evaluates the evolution of the feminist movement negatively. She 
directly says without hesitation: “I do not lean towards feminist things, woman things.”I 
ask why and she gives an answer which makes both of us laugh: “Most probably 
because I love men.” After this unexpected comment, I try to explain the feminist 
movement by telling her that the feminist movement is not based on hatred against men. 
However, she interrupts and switches to a serious mode. While explaining her ideas 
about feminism and feminists, she starts with feminism’s being on the extreme edges: 
“They have always been on the extremes of everything. They talked about women’s 
rights but they have always been in the cities. What about the ones in the Eastern 
Anatolia?” She also presents the movement as an urban movement which got stuck in 
the discourses of power and freedom. In a sense, she finds feminism as exclusionist and 
questions to what extent feminism has reached women in all social strata. At that point I 
compare the leftist movements and feminism, reminding her that the left also had the 
claim of protecting the worker and the peasantry but the boundaries of the question “to 
what extent” was unclear for its efforts as well. Thus, I ask if it is not the impasse of all 
movements that have transformative concerns or that try to influence the society; she 
thinks for a couple of seconds and says: “I never thought like that, I do not know.” 
4.4.  Intimate Relationships 
Romantic relationships are one of the most controversial areas in this research. 
Some of my interviewees suggested that they faced no restrictions in their romantic 
relationships as activists; others expressed a huge sanctioning power of the organization 
over the militants and sympathizers. However, the general trend shows that the 
organization presents a restrictive determinism in intimate relationships. According to 
Akal (2003) romantic love is a concept that is kept as a taboo based on two factors: 
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secrecy of the movement for the sake of the revolution and feudality and traditionalism 
embedded in the movement (Akal, 2003, p. 209). As a consequence of this framework, 
the private lives are far from being personal, rather they are communal and so there are 
lots of interventions in the private life from the movement which are legitimated in the 
name of the revolution (Baydar & Ulagay, 2011, p. 298). 
When we look at the narrations of my interviewees’ regarding romantic 
relationships, we see that it is not supported to build-up relationships with the people 
who are outside of the movement. Mostly, romantic relationships occur between 
individuals in the same faction. Most probably this commonality stems from the fear of 
encountering a threat to the unity of the movement or stems from a pride that positions 
one’s faction as the one which is the best among all. To be precise, if we think about the 
main aim of different factions, we see that all of them pursue the idea of the revolution. 
What distinguishes the factions from one another is the method they adopt. Here, we see 
the tendency of coding your faction as the one that chose the best feasible method. 
According to that formulation, if you know the best method to reach the ultimate goal, 
the rest of the factions have to be mistaken. Thus, people from the different factions lose 
their attraction since they are incapable of being a part of the best method you 
perceived. Therefore, if a relationship emerges, it usually happens between the members 
of the same movement.  
In addition, based on the discourses of my interviewees, we can mention the 
dominance of heterosexual normativity in the movement. None of my interviewees 
referred to homosexuality while they talked about intimate relationships. All of them 
defined their perception of romantic love with reference to the opposite sex. While 
homosexuality was never uttered as a sexual orientation, my interviewees narrated their 
history over a woman-man relationship dichotomy as if homosexual orientations were 
non-existing in the movement. Therefore, in this study, the approach toward 
homosexuality and the stand which organizations took against same sex relationships 
are missing.  
According to Gönül, she and her comrades in her faction even did not look at the 
faces of other people outside of the movement. The outsiders were being coded as 
“unaware” [farkında olamayan/farkındalıksız] and to some extent abnormal people; 
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thus, the politicized ones did not perceive the apolitical ones as the people with whom 
they could get into contact. Besides, the people from other factions were as well not 
considered possible relationship partners. Gönül emphasizes that she received date 
proposals also from men in other movements but for her, these were unacceptable. She 
tells that she eliminated the people by taking into consideration only political and 
ideological things. Moreover, even her faction friends were able to reject the invitation 
of a man from other factions, since they were sure that she would also reject this 
proposal. Here we see that the faction acts as a mechanism that takes the initiative of 
decision-making instead of the individual. However, Gönül did not complain about it in 
order not to betray the memories of the good old days. For her, they were “the children 
of impatient times who were running after their dreams”. This is why; she says: “It [the 
intervention of the faction] was normal in those times. We never questioned or never 
raised our voice, so I cannot blame my comrades.” Nevertheless, she admits that 
becoming a part of the movement influenced her relationships and her decision to 
marry, and even played a determinant role in the flow of her life.  
Fatih validates this influence and determinant role by referring to the perception 
of relationships in his faction. He is from the Dev-Sol faction and he explains that they 
considered the woman-man relationships as “lümpen”19 relationships. Left ideologies 
and his faction constituted his whole world. As a result, he confesses that he degraded 
the rest of the factions and did not like them because of their political stand. Fatih 
underlines that the major goal was to realize the revolution. In this formulation, his 
faction focused on the revolution obsessively such that everything was ambiguous for 
them other than the revolution. Woman-man relationships were framed as a tradeoff 
between liberating the world and satisfying primitive sexual desires. According to this 
perception, loving a woman or a man is a deviation from the main goal. However, Fatih 
says that he had many girlfriends. He links this “luxury” to his faction’s being local or 
being like a village far away from the city. At the same time, being a member of the 
organization’s armed force increased his immunity to the organization’s criticisms 
                                                            
19 In the Marxist discourse lümpen means the one who does not have the social class consciousness or 
points to the lack of intellectuality. 
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about him having a girlfriend. He had the gun so the power and this gave him freedom 
to some extent. Nevertheless, he says that he also suffered due to criticisms related with 
his personal life: “My friends always told me: Brother, this is not you.” 
In an environment where love is considered as a behavior that does not fit the 
intrinsic codes of the movement, romantic relationships were treated as crimes. In order 
to have a relationship one needed the permission of the organization, and therefore the 
organization was able to direct one’s private life since it was over one’s personality and 
emotions. In a sense, it is a reflection of the revolutionary ideal in real life, therefore; as 
the representative of the perfect dream you believed, it has the authority of affecting 
your life. For Fatih, relationships among different factions were not permitted. He says: 
“You need to give up one of them, either your faction or your girlfriend. In fact, you can 
also persuade your girlfriend to join your faction. However, it is a very problematic 
thing as well.” Here the word problematic refers to the risk of including a stranger to the 
movement: One’s girlfriend can have adaptation problems after the transfer, she can be 
treated as a spy, she can face discrimination as a member who is from the rival faction, 
or she can really be a spy who secretly collects information. Therefore, inviting a new 
member to the movement is a problematic issue.  
Similar to what Gönül and Fatih say, Tayfun supports the invisible nature of 
love in the movement: “We always hid our love. We kept our feelings inside of 
ourselves.” What is different in Tayfun’s narration is the organization’s sanctioning 
power. He explains this suppression of feelings as voluntarily obedience to the invisible 
rules through personal choices. When I ask about the influence of the organization in 
this process, he defends the legitimacy of the organization’s expectations in terms of 
putting love in an auxiliary position:  
If I have a girlfriend I will try to spend more time with her. I will try to take her 
wherever I go... I cannot take her everywhere; there will be places that she 
cannot come. Therefore, you keep yourself under control. It is like an auto-
control. You think that it will not go on like that, it will end very soon.  
Here again we can see that there was the expectation for an impending 
independence, the revolution. The faith in revolution enables them to direct all their 
hopes and energy into the movement. All plans refer to the post-revolution period. 
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According to this framework, there is a short period of time left to reach the ideal; so 
love is an issue that can be postponed. The effort and devotion that is put in the 
revolution ideal is considered like working hours in an office. The main mission is the 
revolution; therefore, after the main mission is completed there will be office hours for 
falling in love. Everything is systematized, scheduled and sterilized from personal 
emotions. Revolution needs strong people and in order to be strong they shut down their 
feelings. 
Zuhal, explains the restrictive influence of the movement on the romantic 
relationships from a different angle: The domination of villagers in the movement. What 
she means here by referring to the domination of villagers is the conservativeness of the 
movement and traditional mind set regarding woman-man relationships.  
There was the domination of the villagers in the movement. Our leaders were the 
puzzled villagers new to the city life. It was forbidden to be hand in hand and as 
lovers. When we dated with someone, in a sense we were stigmatized.  
She emphasizes the rural nature of the movement and the leaders’ shock when 
they came to the city due to their unfamiliarity with urban life. According to her, the 
leaders continued their relationships in the form that they had in their villages in order 
to protect their beliefs and values. That’s why the movement adopted distant 
relationships between sexes which were formed under the sisterhood discourse. She 
explains the effect of the sister/bacı discourse through a tragicomic memory:  
One of our friends went to prison. He did not stay very long. He came out of 
prison one month later. He was also engaged with one of our friends. When he 
came, his fiancé was in the room as well. She saw him and said “Welcome Đrfan 
fellow [arkadaş].” I started laughing. If he had been my fiancé, I would stand 
up, run and kiss him. 
This narrative draws attention to the embrace of certain behavior patterns by the 
faction members. According to Zuhal, this stems from both the shyness of the leaders 
and loyalty to the rural social codes in the framing of the woman-man relationships. As 
a result, she compares the movement’s rural, primitive and naive relational 
representation versus her urban, advanced and conversant representation. Her 
conclusion is that the main revolution should have been materialized in the minds of the 
people. 
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Zuhal also mentions the superiority and the privilege of the movement vis-à-vis 
private lives. The sanctioning power of the movement is based on the sense of 
responsibility that it imposed on the sympathizers and militants. Non-participation due 
to a personal excuse was considered as pacification. Therefore, in order not to be 
labeled as a soft and pacifist person, members actively took part in all actions. She 
explains that she hurt her boyfriend plenty of times to preserve the image of the good 
leftist, preferring a protest to meeting with her boyfriend. Then she adds:  
There was no time for other things. We used to go to either a funeral or a 
demonstration every day. They were very hard times. I did not go to school for 
years. We hardly had time to breathe so we even could not realize the lack of 
boyfriends.             
Metin sees the pressure on romantic relationships as one of the obstacles in front 
of the movement’s development. He believes that oppression of the feelings led to lots 
of improper sexual explosions since it disregarded the natural flow of feelings through 
sexual abstinence. From that aspect, he is the first person who criticizes the movement 
for encouraging, even if it was unintentional or indirectly, open relationships: “It was 
excessive freedom, it was not clear who was with whom.” He classifies two edges in the 
movement as the ones that support sexual abstinence and the ones that support sexual 
freedom. The existence of these antipodal edges leads him to define the movement as 
“childish”. He alleges that there was not a grounded and an extensive knowledge in the 
base of the movement. However, he does not generalize this criticism since he thinks 
that he makes an unjust criticism. As a result of his hesitation, he adds that the general 
tendency was conservativeness and restricting the romantic relationships in the leftist 
movement.  
To some extent Đlyas supports Metin’s ideas and criticisms. Đlyas defines the 
general framework as being against opportunism in relationships. What opportunism 
refers to here is interesting. The use of this word shows that having a relationship was 
coded as “exploitation” or “taking advantage of women” that’s why; dating was viewed 
as an opportunistic behavior. He harshly criticizes the movements that support having 
sexual intercourse and indicates his discomfort stemming from the open declaration of 
these ideas in the left: “We always made fun of them. They were backslide 
revolutionaries, corrupted leftists. They were not the real revolutionaries.”  As we can 
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see, falling in love or making love is considered as the behavior of fake leftists. This is 
why, the implication here is that a real revolutionist does not flirt and love, s/he breathes 
only for the revolution. 
Đlyas defends the partial restrictions in the Dev-Sol faction, since he finds them 
relevant to his personal definition of “honor” [namus]. He says: “Life is not all beer and 
skittles. If you date one girl, you cannot date the second one in the following month. If 
you do this, the movement discharges you.” He points out the severity of punishment 
through an incident he witnessed. He tells that one of his high positioned revolutionist 
fellows cheats on his wife during a secret task given by the organization in which he has 
to pretend as if he is married to another woman. Then, this role playing comes true and 
they become real lovers. In the end, his wife informs the organization about the adultery 
and the organization committee finds him guilty due to his malpractice. The story ends 
with his dismissal from the movement. Here we see the influence of organizational ethic 
codes and unwritten rules on the members. The organization is treated as an authorized 
court that one can utter her/his complaints. Đlyas claims that even death penalty was 
practiced within the movement. However, then he indicates that he did not witness it but 
heard from his other fellows. Here the line between reality and fiction becomes blurry, 
since the story is based on deterrent urban legends. However, there is clear evidence 
that the movement was promoting monogamy and using psychological deterrent tools to 
keep militants away from love and romantic affair.  
Seyhan’s narrative also supports the negative attitude of the movement towards 
love. She defines her faction as the authorized institution, which holds the power of 
permitting or forbidding romantic relationships: “I heard stories about the rejection of 
relationships by the organization. That is why people were hiding their relationships. 
We were secretly in love.” Thus, she emphasizes the underground nature of 
relationships. Nevertheless, Seyhan does not find this situation bizarre. She states that 
the organizational structure that they were in was a paramilitary constitution. She 
believes that there has to be discipline in military units: “There cannot be normal or 
cozy relationships. In a sense we were soldiers.” She rationalizes the obedient soldier 
concept through referring to movement’s being her whole life. She tells the movement 
was both her family and shelter: “At home, in the dorm. We were always in this 
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structure. We had no place to go out of this structure.” Unconsciously, she gives up on 
her sexuality and downplays her female identity under the soldier image. She defines 
the social atmosphere in the movement as martial law. This is why; due to the extreme 
conditions of being in a war, feelings are suppressed. She also acknowledges that she 
and her friends never considered these things as oppression or problematic issues, since 
they devoted their energy to a very high ideal which was revolution. In comparison to 
the revolution ideal love emerges as a bourgeois practice in Seyhan’s narrative.   
At that point Seyhan’s husband Osman intervenes to our interview and starts 
talking about his ideas regarding woman-man relationships. After explaining his 
intervention as a clarification which was needed since his wife did not explain properly; 
he starts with the sanctioning power of the organization:  
If you do something improper, they dismiss you. Why do we obey these rules? 
We do not want to destitute of our organization. It is our belief. We live for our 
people. We are ready to do everything for them and these are the rules to be in 
the game. 
He defines the probability of dismissal as being excommunicated or an absolute 
loneliness. Osman’s claims in terms of love relationships in the movement are harsher 
than the other people. He explains the absolute isolation of the woman and man from 
each other in public as the following: “If you want to touch the woman you love, there 
is folk dance; you can touch her shoulder during the dance. You can dance. That’s all. 
There is nothing more.” 
Osman agrees with the criticisms regarding the feudal nature of the movement. 
He confesses that his rural background shaped his attitudes towards women and states 
that the movement’s approach was similar to his set of mind: “Where we came from, we 
were walking on separate sides of the street with our female friends.” Here he implies 
the match between the pre-existing prejudices, the system in their mind and the 
dominant ideology in the movement. However, he finds this match very problematic 
since it prevented them from identifying different needs and expectations: “We even 
could not understand each other, but we tried to change the society without 
understanding people.”  
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Mehmet has a classical story in terms of intimate relationships. He says that he 
never had a girlfriend in the movement: “All of the women were our sisters. It was not 
forbidden to have a relationship; but, they were our sisters and you cannot fall in love 
with your sister.” The sister discourse includes a strong deterrence that is indisputable 
due to its reference to incest and thus creates an auto-control in terms of oppressing 
feelings. Consequently, the relationships with women are mostly coded as sexless and 
emotionless struggle friendships.  
In these sexless and emotionless struggles, women are regarded as the sisters of 
the revolutionary males. Starting from this point, Nehir criticizes the sister discourse 
and discusses the movement’s restrictive mechanisms in terms of romantic 
relationships. She considers the pressure on these types of relationships as a reflection 
of putting private life on the back burner. All commitment was for the revolution and 
the revolution ideal was very demanding. While the people in the movement went after 
the ideal of revolution, their priorities shaped around the goal of changing the system. 
Then, they seemed to assimilate their identities, needs, and desires under this ideal, they 
rationalized and normalized the situation and they could not imagine an alternative way 
of life.   
Yağmur approaches the woman-man relationships in the movement from a 
different perspective. She tells that she left from Kurtuluş faction as a result of her 
discomfort that stemmed from over romance in the movement: “I found Kurtuluş 
movement as a marriage office. Everybody was in love with each other. I found them 
frivolous.” After her departure, she joins Halkın Kurtuluşu faction. This is why; with 
the thought of finding a person who had the chance to experience the two different 
factions closely, I ask her about the inter-organizational relationships. She says that 
there was a wrong belief which states that the relationships between different factions 
were forbidden. She shows herself as an example which validates this belief’s 
wrongness. As a woman who was married to a man from another faction she explains 
that there were not any punishments from the organization unless the person who 
wanted to leave was in a key position:  
If you know the secrets of the organization you cannot leave. If you are a simple 
militant like me, nothing happens. The organization wants you to submit your 
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self-criticism. You talk with them and leave. If one of the heads tries to leave, 
the situation will be different.  
Therefore according to Yağmur’s explanation, the people who are at the top of 
the movement cannot leave since they have the potential to put the movement in danger 
through the things that s/he knew. 
4.5.  Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have analyzed how leftist activists of the 1970s view the status 
of women and perception of women, feminism, and intimate relationships in the 
movement. Based on my interviews, I first noticed that despite the egalitarian and 
libertarian discourse of socialism, women in fact continued to be the carrier of “classical 
social roles” in the movement. As mothers [ana], for example, they were responsible for 
the upbringing and education of new socialist generations; if they were not mothers; 
meanwhile, they were to serve as an identical reflection of their partners’ ideology. 
Women could be seen as errand-runners, sexless comrades [yoldaş], and self-sacrificing 
sisters [bacı].  
Nevertheless, the identities held by women within the socialist movement were 
more complicated than they first appeared to me. On the one hand, women could be 
perceived as “stereotypically feminine”, fragile and in need of protection; therefore, for 
men to have a relationship with a woman was understood as exploiting her and as being 
opportunistic. On the other hand, women could be perceived as sly and dangerous 
enough to lead a male comrade astray. From this perspective, the role attributed to 
women in the leftist movement of the 1970s resembles the image of women in Islamic 
sources. The leftist version of this connotation, which was updated and adapted to the 
socialist ideology, also considered women to be an evil element with the capacity of 
disrupting the collaboration and solidarity in the movement (Berktay, 2010, p. 282).  
Moreover, when women complained about difficulties in the movement or in 
daily life, these problems were seen as simple and sassy sophistries that aimed to 
challenge the integrity of the movement. To be precise, the main issue of the leftist 
wave in Turkey was to materialize the revolution. As a result, a woman’s desires and 
demands regarding her female identity were recognized as a challenge to the grand 
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ideal, which was the revolution. Any demand to recognize “special” rights for women 
was considered dangerous, a threat to the inner cohesion of the movement and solidarity 
between the classes. Gender references -even uttering the word “woman”- was 
considered an attempt to replace more important class inequalities with secondary and 
divisive gender issues. In order to avert this division, women were forced to erase their 
identity as a woman and became sexless; femininity thus took a back seat to the 
discourse of avoiding bourgeois deviations from gender roles (Kadıoğlu, 1998, p. 97). 
Here the bourgeoisie was framed as a group that could easily influence women; 
in this worldview, the woman was susceptible and viewed with suspicion by her male 
comrades. This resulted in a process that my respondents also described: First she was 
to wait patiently in the movement in order to show that she was immune against the 
inborn risk of deviation. Thus, throughout this process of “purification from 
weaknesses” the woman in the movement remained a suspicious sister until she proved 
her sincerity to her male comrades. If she could pass every “test” in the monitoring 
phase, she could be promoted to “comrade” status. This was problematic in the sense 
that this monitoring dictated woman how to behave and what to do. However, the 
woman could not rebel against this treatment; because such behavioral control was both 
legitimate in the society and corresponded with social norms. This was also made easier 
because women did not have the required authority and power in the movement. 
Moreover, many women had already rationalized these restrictions as the necessities 
and a part of their revolutionary duties (Berktay, 2010, p. 281; p. 283).   
Pressure from society at large also had an impact on the way women were 
treated in the movement. The leftist movement sought to bring about a radical social 
transformation; doing this required at least some support from the wider public. In an 
environment where the biggest fear was isolation from the public, the focus for both 
men and women was on doing appropriate things that were in line with the social codes 
and norms with the aim of reaching the whole society. The public was seen by the 
movement as being tied to feudal ethic codes and a conservative discourse (Akal, 2011, 
p. 261). Therefore, it was understood that too much social deviance could distance 
outsiders from the movement. In Akal’s (2011) book, Dinçer describes this period as a 
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process in which the people in the movement embraced a puritanical revolutionism with 
conservative bonds (Akal, 2011, p. 262). 
Looking specifically at the discourse of my interviewees, we see that in a social 
environment where the factions were strongly devoted to the ideal of revolution, the 
secondary position of women emerged as an unquestioned issue. In any case, factions 
were dominated by men, and few women participated in their political structures, 
especially in higher ranks. Thus militants did not criticize women’s “invisibility” or 
their assignment to less important duties. 
Speaking decades later, however, most of my interviewees now found this 
approach towards women problematic. They said that since their analysis and 
perception of the world in the 1970s was defined more by their belief in a class struggle, 
they disregarded gender inequality within their factions. Even women interviewees 
described themselves as being unaware of this issue in the 1970s. For example, Zuhal 
explained her emerging awareness as follows:  
I am aware of the fact that I am not just somebody’s “sister” now. It was wrong 
to be someone’s sister. My comrades interfered in my clothes, hair, attitudes but 
I restricted this on my own, too. I was trying to fulfill the requirements of being 
truly revolutionary. This was very wrong. In some way, we adopted our 
secondary roles and took them for granted. 
Tayfun agreed with Zuhal’s criticism but found this situation normal given the 
conditions of the 1970s: 
We could not produce policies regarding women. As I said we were superficial 
on many issues. But we did everything we could. Expecting more was futile. It 
was not like today. Of course if there had been more women or if we had 
integrated more women into the movement with stronger ties, it could have been 
great. But we could not do it with the social capital we had.  
Today, after changes and developments in Turkey, my interviewees defend the 
free, equal, and independent participation of women in ideological platforms and in 
social life. In this sense, Seyhan explained this shift in her perspective, to one which 
rejected any past oppression, by explaining that she no longer had an “ideological 
identity”: 
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I do not define myself from an ideological perspective anymore. Today first of 
all I am a woman. Not a leftist, not a militant, not a revolutionary. My priority is 
myself. In the 1970s, the priority was on the revolution; so we did not question 
the restrictions that organizations imposed on us. As women maybe we were in 
secondary positions but nobody was aware of it. Of course I am for freedom of 
women today. I am an independent woman and inevitably I want total 
independence in life for all women.  
For Yağmur, similar to Seyhan, what made her question and see the secondary 
position of women was gaining more independence:  
We were not able to see what was happening in the past. We were young. Now I 
think that the voice of women should be louder everywhere. But we were used to 
caring a lot about what others thought for us at those times. So silence and 
obedience was normal. Now I earn my own money. I make my decisions on my 
own. I am a free individual. There is nobody that I refrain from. I became wiser 
enough not to let a man, an organization or a movement put me in secondary 
positions.     
Like Yağmur, Fatih also mentioned the secondary status of women in the 
movement and explained how he changed his mind as follows:  
I have a girlfriend who actively participates in one of the leftist factions. I 
definitely do not approach these issues as I approached them in the past. The 
world changed, Turkey changed, we changed. Women also changed. Today I say 
I wish there had been more women but we had other concerns like revolution at 
these times.  
On the other hand, my interviewees Đlyas and Mehmet argued that the women in 
their factions were not in secondary positions at all. They also stressed the necessity of 
involvement of women in social and ideological movements today: “There cannot be a 
movement or revolution without women. Women were in the movement in the 1970s. 
They have to be in any movements also today”, says Mehmet. For Đlyas women must 
participate in aspects of life:  
Half of this society is women. How one can expect not to see them in a social 
movement? Of course they have to participate. Even discussing this is nonsense. 
If women want to politicize they should be free. And I do not think that there are 
obstacles to their participation. Even in the past they were in the factions, so 
today it should be easier to be in a movement. 
While women’s auxiliary roles in the left prohibited the development of an 
independent and free women’s movement, the critical atmosphere in the left, at the 
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same time, helped to bring about an awakening among some women. By questioning 
their status and importance and also the hierarchical structure in the movement, women 
saw the meaning that was attached to their identity and presence in the left. 
Consequently, the general prejudice and gender-based discriminations of the movement 
eventually created a generation that cared about the problems of women, emerging as 
the feminist movement in the 1980s. Akal (2003) links the emergence of the feminist 
movement after the 1980s to the development of the required political and 
environmental factors in that period by referring to the political and ideological rivals 
silenced by the September 12 coup. In addition, she underlines the importance of 
women’s independence, expertise, and gender and sexuality awareness. According to 
that formulation, the base for the second wave feminism which would gain visibility 
after the 1980s was created by the emergence of these conditions (Akal, 2003, p. 197). 
Related with these arguments, Düzkan (2010) describes “facing some realities” 
in the post-1980s as another factor that contributed to the emergence of an independent 
women’s movement. According to her, after the coup, when women who had integrated 
into the socialist struggle returned from prison to their homes, what was waiting for 
them was routine domestic work. Women faced a reality at that point: They aimed to 
change the order and the system in Turkey, they could not change it, and when they 
turned back to their life out of politics, the expectation that was directed to them was 
telling them to wash the dishes and clean the house. Thus, with this realization they saw 
the missing part of the puzzle. The socialist revolution would not free women; there was 
the need for a separate women’s movement in order to ensure their complete 
emancipation. Thus, the necessity to create a separate women’s movement was 
understood in order not to repeat the mistakes in the leftist movement (Düzkan in 
Akman, 2010, pp. 254-255).  
However, since the women’s movement emerged as a movement which was 
critical of the leftist movement, it was disregarded and not respected in some leftist 
circles and blamed for replacing the more “mainstream” ideologies (Koçak, 2007). 
Moreover, as discussed before, since it emerged after the coup, feminism was accused 
of being aligned with the coup regime. As a reflection of this negative perception in the 
interviews I conducted, I received answers that pointed either anger and suspicion or 
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ambivalence towards the feminist movement. According to the new social order of 
leftist movement, the liberation of women would be attained through the revolution 
along with all liberations. In this struggle, the left was aiming to remove all types of 
slavery. However, in the eyes of the former organization members, feminism only 
focused on the slavery of the woman and rejected the rest. Therefore, my interviewees 
found feminism insincere and as a rival ideology that arose out of the heritage of the 
suppressed left. They displayed anger towards feminism; because, they considered 
feminism as an opportunist movement that came to surface with the imprisonment of 
the left. From this aspect, feminism was a divisive movement that had foreign origins 
and was produced in order to terminate their struggle. This is why most of my 
interviewees did not want to talk about feminism and openly said that they were never 
interested in or thought about feminism.  
When asked, only three of my interviewees shared their ideas regarding 
feminism in the 1980s and today. If we analyze their discourse, it can be claimed that 
there were not many changes in their approaches. In the 1980s, when the movement 
emerged, they said that they remained uninterested. Today only one of my interviewees, 
Metin, claimed that he supported feminism. While explaining his support as a 
consequence of his interactions with feminist women; he explained that his perspective 
regarding the feminist movement changed. However, despite his discourse which 
asserted a changed view, his approach towards feminism was narrower, only related 
with the sexuality of women. He positioned the movement as an enlightening one that 
would free the woman from the imprisonment that stemmed from her sexuality. 
My other interviewees, Yağmur and Zuhal, described feminism as a divisive 
movement or even an ideology that had a foreign origin and that emerged after the 
suppression of the left. While Yağmur labeled feminism as an elitist and exclusionary 
movement, Zuhal likened it to an accessory or ornament that tried to replace the leftist 
ideals. Therefore it can be claimed that their reactive approach towards feminism was 
still visible.  
In last section of this chapter, I analyzed the intimate relationships in the 
movement. Intimate relationships were one of the taboo concepts in the movement since 
romantic affairs were restricted by the organizational structures. Only two of my 
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interviewees rejected the sanctioning power of the organization towards the intimate 
relationships to some extent. Tayfun accepted the sanction power of the organization 
but did not define it as a deterrence that was imposed by the organization; rather, he 
described keeping away from romantic love as a voluntary renunciation. For Yağmur, 
there was freedom in terms of entering into romantic relationships if the person was not 
in a key position in the movement. She claimed that the restriction of the organization in 
terms of love issues was more binding for the high-level militants than for ordinary 
comrades. On the other hand, the other interviewees asserted that there was pressure 
from the organization that led to hidden and secret affairs. In these narrations, they 
portrayed love as an issue that should be postponed to a date that was after the 
revolution with the aim of blocking any deviations that could give harm to the ideal of 
revolution. Since love was considered as a risk element that could ruin the unity of the 
movement, the organizations kept militants under control with the threat of dismissal. 
This threat had an important sanction power because the organization was the home or 
the family in the eyes of the militants. Therefore with this strong sense of belongings 
and personal attachments, my interviewees uttered that they did not want to lose the 
bond between them and their factions. With this instinct, they asserted that they 
inevitably acted in accordance with the expected behavior patterns.          
When we look at the shift in their approaches towards intimate relationships, 
most of my interviewees found the control of the organizational bodies over their 
private lives problematic. However, they also claimed that it was a necessity under the 
conditions of the 1970s. For example, while confessing that he found romantic 
relationships as lümpen (although he said he had affairs), today Fatih supported freedom 
to have relationships and to choose a partner without the intervention of a superior. 
However, along with this idea he also introduced having similar political ideologies as 
an influential factor on the partner choice: 
Even if you do not have the same ideologies, you find the ones who have similar 
ideologies more attractive. I think a politicized person cannot be very happy with 
an apolitical person. But if s/he thinks that s/he is happy with this person, s/he 
should be the one who is making this decision. I mean the organization or any 
other structures should not intervene in their relationship.    
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Similar to what Fatih said, Mehmet also underlined the importance of similar 
political stands and explained it as follows. “I did not marry a person who was 
ideologically far removed from me. It was impossible for me to marry someone 
different from me.” In addition, Mehmet finds the binding influence of organizations on 
the relationships as normal by taking the environment of the 1970s into consideration: 
“While we were in the movement women were our sisters. They had to be our sisters. 
Otherwise how one would control the movement? We were trying to materialize a 
revolution. We were not trying to find girlfriends.” 
Today we see that the old, perceived tradeoff between organizational 
commitment and “primitive sexual desires” does not exist. Firstly, none of my 
interviewees were in an organizational structure. There was not a restrictive and binding 
entity in their lives which they were loyal to; therefore, they supported free and 
independent ideas related with intimate relationships. Secondly, the belief in revolution 
had disappeared for most of them, leaving them no reason to sacrifice personal 
emotions for a greater cause. For example Metin explains this situation as follows: 
“Love is good. I am against any kind of restriction. Therefore there should be freedom 
in everywhere, also in love.” On the other hand, Zuhal firstly criticizes the privilege of 
her organization in comparison to private lives then adds “I find it nonsense to let an 
authority control on your life. I am married. I love this man. I decided to love him. None 
of the organizations can tell me not to love someone today.” 
To put it differently, while in the 1970s, organizations represented an authority 
that can direct their lives legitimately, today this influential structure is not a unit that is 
sovereign to their personal decisions. This duality can clearly be seen in Seyhan’s 
discourse. As she talked about the past, on the one hand Seyhan rationalized the 
intervention of the organization in her life by considering concerns about secrecy and 
the importance of discipline in paramilitary structures. On the other hand, she openly 
explained that she did not support any intervention in her life today:  
Love was underground to a very large extent in the movement. Today I am 49 
years old and I do not want to hide my feelings. I am not a child anymore. An 
organization, a structure, a unit, whatever it is, cannot tell me how to live love 
and my life. But in the 1970s we were like soldiers. Under military discipline 
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there has to be restrictions. Everybody cannot live as the way s/he desired. So it 
was normal when we were in the movement. 
Similar to Seyhan, Đlyas also rejected the imposition of any authority on his life. 
After explaining that he had thought of intimate relationships as opportunistic behaviors 
that belonged to the fake revolutionaries in the 1970s; he underlined his changed ideas 
by referring to his marriage:  
I left my organization, fell in love and married. Maybe I would not have chance 
to do these things if I continued to be in my faction. I am supporting independent 
decision making processes now. When I looked back, yes, there was too much 
discipline and control but I do not know if there was any other way. We believed 
in the revolution and were persuaded by the necessity of our feelings’ 
suppression for a successful revolution. It was normal then.  
When she was analyzing the movement from today’s perspective, Nehir 
explained her discomfort regarding the restrictive role of the organizational structures. 
In her narration, this restrictive intervention of organizations was rationalized by the 
need to assimilate identities and desires. Today, she is of the opinion that there was no 
need for these limitations: 
Social movements are not platforms that are totally disconnected from life. They 
are a part of life. But we lived like it was not a part of life that at these times. We 
repressed our feelings. Today there is no need for such a pressure. Love is a part 
of life and it should be lived as the way it is. People should love each other 
without hiding.     
As it can be seen from these narrations, in terms of intimate relationships, many 
of my interviewees defended freedom and independence for the issues regarding their 
private lives. While doing this, on the one hand, they criticized the strict organizational 
structures in the 1970s; on the other hand, they defined rigid and disciplined 
organizations as a necessity of their time. Nevertheless, today as individuals who lost 
their connections with organizational units and who lost their belief in revolution 
understanding, they rejected the sanctioning power of any kind of structure in their 
lives.  
In this chapter I looked at the status of women, the perception of women and 
womanhood, the perception of feminism, and intimate relationships in the leftist 
movement by focusing on the transformations that my interviewees experienced along 
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these axes. In this context, approach to feminism appears to be the mere area where my 
interviewees underwent minimum transformation. Although the interviewees claimed to 
have changed their views on the status of woman, perception of womanhood, as well as 
intimate relationships and social manifestations, when it came to feminism, they do not 
perceive any change in their views or attitudes. In other words, they seem to retain their 
negative point of view of the 1970s against feminism, which positioned it as the 
collaborator of the coup regime. In the narratives of my interviewees, feminism 
continues to be an issue that is either avoided to talk about or is openly evaluated as a 
divisive and opportunistic movement. 
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis consisted of four chapters that tried to give a picture of the left during 
the 1970s and aimed to explain the ideological, socioeconomic, and gender-related 
“transformation” of the individuals who participated in various leftist factions by 
analyzing how they describe and legitimize the changes they underwent.  
In the introduction chapter, I first discussed the history of the leftist currents in 
Turkey throughout the 1970s to understand the background of my interviewees’ initial 
transformation, i.e., how they joined the leftist factions. Second, I briefly introduced the 
coup of September 12 as a rupture in the history of the Turkish left. In this context, the 
coup of 1980 can be considered important for two reasons: First, it represents the date 
when the physical dissolution of the left began; second, it represents the date when 
major transformations in the “social, political, and economic” make-up of Turkey had 
begun. I looked at the changes in Turkey in the post-coup period under these three 
categories in order to relate them with the personal transformations that my 
interviewees experienced.   
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In the second chapter, I specifically focused on my interviewees’ participation in 
their factions. Based on their stories, in which they explained this process as a major 
turning point in their lives, I showed that there were many similarities in the ways they 
joined the leftist movement. Regardless of their faction choice, what was common in all 
discourses was the effect of a person from their social network in adopting leftist 
ideologies. In this respect, we can claim that their decisions regarding their factions did 
not emerge as a consequence of a conscious process but coincidental. My interviewees 
said that they had tendency to act together with acquaintances, who acted as catalysts 
for their politicization. While the influence of these catalyst figures acted as a 
determining factor in their faction choice, each respondents’ factional ideology emerged 
later, since ideology was described as something that was examined only after 
participation had begun. 
In the third chapter I analyzed the economical and ideological changes that my 
interviewees experienced since 1980. Most of them rejected the idea that they 
underwent an essential “transformation”, preferring to define their current status as a 
change, in an attempt to prove that they did not betray their past. Therefore during our 
interviews they mostly took a defensive stance and gave the message that they may 
have experienced a change on the surface but continued to protect their leftist “soul” 
and values inside. 
Only economic transformations and the transformation in the faith of revolution 
were conceded without hesitation. Economic transformations were represented by the 
visible changes in respondents’ standards of living. Those who were financially 
successful did not try to hide or deny the increase in their social status. Meanwhile, 
those who could not create a drastic change in their quality of life linked their low status 
to their “incompatibility” with the capitalist system and the protection of their leftism 
and leftist values. In this context, economic transformations were regarded as a 
“capitulation” or as integration to the capitalist world. Therefore low income levels 
were the signs of disintegration and being disconnected from the system. In a society 
where the parameter of success was measured with earning money, this group who 
defined themselves as “outliers” displayed symptoms of resentment and a constant 
feeling of exclusion from the system due to their presumed “failure”.   
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Including this resentful group, all of my interviewees continued to present their 
relationship with money as a problematic one. In the narratives, there was a presumed 
correlation between preserved leftist values and the relationship with money. Bad 
relations with money (a discourse of “not liking” money) were the indicators of the 
rejection of the capitalist means. By underlying their negative feelings related with 
money, my interviewees wanted to prove that they did not lose their leftist essence 
which had been opposed to private property relations and financial speculation.    
If we look at the changes in the dream of revolution, analyzed as a part of their 
ideological transformations, we see that there were two main approaches. The first 
group defined revolution as a concept that was abandoned, as a dream of adventurous 
and excited youth. As individuals who were going through their maturity period now, 
they stated that they did not find the dream of revolution realistic. They were skeptical 
about “bright ideas” and questioned the purity of socialism ideal they had held in the 
1970s. What they found was the left’s also being a platform in which there were 
weaknesses and defects. Therefore by accepting the change in their ideas they stated 
that they expected to see societal evolution and development rather than a socialist 
revolution based on the capture of state power. Also, in these narratives, the 
revolutionary struggle was replaced with more conventional struggles like 
environmental sensitivities or legal protests and demonstrations. 
On the other hand the second group continued to say that one day the revolution 
would be materialized and socialism would win the war against capitalism. These 
people were the ones who considered themselves as individuals who could not be at 
peace with capitalism, as “economically backward” and “outliers”. They hoped that a 
revolution would put an end to the unfairness in the existing society that they were 
exposed to. In this narrative, the hope for revolution emerged as a cure to heal the 
wound of feeling disconnected and excluded.  
However, despite this group’s assertion of commitment to the ideals of the 1970s 
or protection of their belief in revolution by stressing their socialist essence, the 
revolution was now an ambiguous issue in all narratives. They could not answer the 
question of “who will materialize the revolution”. There was a reference to a mysterious 
group who would take the noble responsibility of the materialization of the revolution. 
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However, this group had no connections with my interviewees. As individuals who had 
no organizational ties with a leftist structure today they could not be a part of the 
struggle for the revolution but the new generation could do some sacrifices. Then, who 
were the ones that took place in this new generation? Their children? Apparently, the 
answer was no. This new generation was a community of the strangers. All of my 
interviewees openly stated that they did not want to see their children in an ideological 
struggle. If a revolution would come true, it should be materialized by the children of 
others and other people rather than my interviewees and those in their social 
environment. Therefore in contrast to their claim of continuation of the ideal of 
revolution, even this group’s belief in the revolution today was a more superficial and 
passive faith in comparison to the past. 
Apart from the changes in their faith in a socialist revolution, ideological 
transformations were generally the main resistance point in my interviews. Most 
interviewees did not want to accept the existence of any ideological transformations, 
since they associated them with their (undesired) integration to the capitalist system. 
Being an insider in a system that they tried to change 40 years ago irritated them. They 
demonstrated three kinds of responses to questions about ideological transformation: 
defense (a claim of being mentally disintegrated with the system), legitimization (a 
claim of being a part of the system without losing the awareness about the nature of it or 
having the same leftist “soul” or values) and rationalization (a claim of making the 
rational or pragmatic choice, given the conditions of the day, like jobs and families), 
while talking about the transformations they underwent. Consequently, what they 
defended was the existence of an economic transformation rather than an ideological 
one.  
Related to that argument, most interviewees still defined themselves as leftists. 
However they re-defined what it meant to be a leftist for them. The main values 
associated with the left, like social justice and freedom for all, were listed as values they 
retained. However, interviewees also asserted that they did not try to fit into the concept 
of a concrete and solid leftism that had one definition. What they claimed was having a 
unique and “personal” leftism that they formulated according to their own outlook on 
life. Moreover, they refrained from making concrete definitions of their new leftism 
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understanding, rather explained it as a flexible but also a blurry concept in which main 
values of the left were protected but the other ingredients of leftism, like organizational 
mobilization and leadership, were uncertain.      
In the last chapter, I looked at the image of women and the perception of 
feminism and intimate relationships in the movement. Based on my interviewees’ 
responses, I first saw that women were described as weak, dependent, and sexless 
comrades in the movement who had to adopt codes that assumed as masculine in order 
to gain acceptance or prove that they were not taking advantage of their sexuality or 
femininity. By being purified from any sexual reference, they were to be transformed 
into “sisters” or “mothers” in the movement. Like all mothers and sisters, they were 
supposed to be peaceful, tolerant, naïve, and reconciliatory. They were to act as a 
“buffer” capable of resolving possible conflicts. However, at the same time, women 
were still mostly invisible in the movement. Despite the exalted and holy meanings 
attributed to women, they were kept in the periphery and rarely rose in organizations’ 
hierarchical structures. This structure was also supported by a certain kind of 
conservative world view in which women were supposed to take supporting roles to 
some degree.  
This secondary and dependent position of the woman was described by almost 
all of my interviewees. My interviewees generally described women’s roles by referring 
to men. In their narratives, a woman in a sister or mother role was a dependent actor that 
could not exist independent of her male comrades. This view had many effects on 
women’s participation in the movement. Women and their problems were not perceived 
as an area of concern. Even if their problems were brought to the table, they were 
analyzed with the classical Marxist approach in which the stress was on class and 
women’s liberation was linked to the liberation of the working class. Second, when we 
look at the numerical distribution of women in the movement, we see that there were 
not many women in the organizational structures, especially in the upper ranks. In the 
specific context of my interviewees’ narrative, they asserted that women in the 
movement were sympathizers rather than active militants. Women were subjected to 
two contradictory pressures: While women were generally described as sensitive and 
fragile actors, “militarized” women were described as conflictual, radical, and harsh. At 
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the same time, adopting codes that perceived as masculine emerged as a virtue in 
comparison with femininity, which was perceived as a potentially dangerous influence 
on the men in the movement. As a reflection of this situation, even my women 
interviewees confessed that they never thought of themselves as women. Instead of 
being a woman they had become a militant, comrade, leftist and revolutionary. They 
mentioned only one identity construction, and it was ideological. However, also my 
interviewees stated that this was not a conscious renunciation, it was natural when they 
were in a strict organizational structure.   
Today, meanwhile, all of my interviewees criticized and problematized the 
secondary status of woman in their factions. While the invisibility of women in the 
leftist movement was portrayed as an inevitable situation given the social conditions of 
the 1970s and the general perception in their factions, my interviewees wished for a 
fairer society in which there was freedom, equality and independence for women. In this 
sense they defended the continuous [kesintisiz] participation of women in ideological 
platforms and social life.  
In the second section of this chapter I looked at the perception of feminism in the 
movement. My interviewees generally displayed a negative attitude towards feminism. 
In comparison to the ideal of revolution, feminism was degraded and labeled as a 
divisive ideology that aimed to split the power of the socialist movement. Moreover, my 
interviewees still expressed anger that while the left was suppressed and silenced, 
feminism found an opportunity to grow up without competing with strong ideologies. 
Feminism was also perceived as being in collaboration with the state, since there was an 
assumption  that feminism emerged with the state’s approval rather than confront it. 
Unlike interviewees’ changing attitudes towards women’s participation, in terms of 
approach towards feminism, it can be claimed that there was not a significant 
transformation since the 1980s. Whereas only three of my interviewees uttered their 
ideas regarding feminism, the rest openly indicated that they were never interested in 
feminism and rejected talking about it. If we look at these narratives, we see that the 
skeptical approach towards feminism which positioned it as a divisive, foreign, and 
opportunistic movement was still held by most of my interviewees. 
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In the last part of this chapter, I examined the perception of intimate 
relationships in the movement. Most of my interviewees stated that while considering 
relationships, they made decisions based on ideological and political criteria. 
Organizations emerged as influential actors that played a determinant role on the private 
lives of my interviewees. Firstly, organizations that had the sanction power stemming 
from extreme commitment to the movement and the ideal of revolution. Thus, romantic 
relationships in between factions and different organizational structures were not 
promoted, since there was the fear of splitting. Secondly, even relationships within the 
same organizational units were not welcomed since love had the power of confusing a 
comrade and distancing (him) from the struggle of revolution. Inevitably, in this high-
pressure environment, love largely remained invisible or secret. 
At the same time, some of my interviewees also said that pushing love to a 
secondary position was a voluntary decision rather than simple submission to 
organizational pressure. In this context, in order to be a devoted comrade it was 
necessary to put love into an auxiliary position. The focus was on revolution, so love 
could be postponed to a time after the revolution. Others argued that the organization’s 
sanctioning power on daily life was not equal for all activists. According to Yağmur, for 
instance, organizations were more eager to restrict relationships for people in positions 
that were key to materializing the revolution. However, for the ordinary comrades there 
were no restrictions on private life. Moreover, two of my interviewees (Metin and Đlyas) 
noted the existence of leftist factions where sexual freedom and open relationships did 
take place, though they nevertheless underlined that the common orientation in the left 
was to promote monogamy or celibacy. 
In terms of intimate relationships, we see a drastic transformation in the 
discourse of my interviewees. In contrast to the restrictive role of organizations on my 
interviewees’ private lives, today they rejected any kind of intervention regarding their 
“personal space”. They presented two reasons for this transformation: loss of 
organizational loyalty, and loss of the faith in the revolution. Today none of my 
interviewees had emotional and ideological bonds to any organizational unit. No 
authority held sanctioning power that could force them to make emotional sacrifices in 
their lives. Secondly, the perceived tradeoff between the materialization of revolution 
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and the satisfaction of sexual desires in the 1970s no longer existed. In this context, my 
interviewees defended “free” intimate relationships without sacrificing emotions in the 
name of ideals. 
Thus, they emphasized that they could only accept themselves as the absolute 
authority in their lives regarding their decisions. Changes in the private lives of my 
respondents, combined with transformations in Turkish society as a whole, made my 
respondents’ perceptions of the left more individualistic over time. Organizations were 
rejected, even if support for a vague and personally defined idea of the left still existed. 
Regardless of the specific ways in which their perceptions of the left changed or 
remained the same, interviewees’ responses were clearly related to changes in their own 
socioeconomic status and major events in their personal lives. 
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